Epistemic contextualism is the view that the verb “know” is a context sensitive expression. As a first approximation, epistemic contextualism states that in order for us to truthfully say a person “knows” a proposition, that person must meet the standards … Continue reading
Professional philosophers often appeal to patterns in ordinary thought and talk — “commonsense” — in order to support theories or assumptions. In recent years, the emerging interdisciplinary field of experimental epistemology has revealed many instances where commonsense epistemology has been … Continue reading
Following up on some thoughtful suggestions in the comments to my previous post, I ran a couple follow-up studies with modified stimuli. … Continue reading
I conducted a simple study to determine whether knowledge, ordinarily understood, requires reliability.
Continue readingWithin the more metaphilosophically-oriented literature on experimental philosophy, there has been a great deal of discussion of the philosophical implications of cross-cultural differences in intuitions about Gettier cases. This work has been extremely impressive from a purely philosophical perspective, but … Continue reading
link pdf Does the contextualist seek to dissolve disputes over skepticism? And does she use a “perfectly general strategy” for doing so? Is she not interested in, or not addressing, the traditional topic of whether we really know things, instead … Continue reading
Here’s a view that I think some people are attracted to, a tripartite view of how positive epistemic standing is attained: Tripartite View: For a belief to constitute knowledge, three elements have to be in place: (a) There’s the belief … Continue reading
Consider this case: When Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he always parks in one of two spots: C8 or D8. Half the time he parks in C8, and half the time he parks in D8. Today Maxwell parked … Continue reading
What more is required of a belief, besides being justified and true (JTB), if the belief is to count as knowledge? In my view, at least two further conditions are required: the belief must meet the conditions of safety and … Continue reading
I heard through the grapevine that Jason Stanley is claiming on Facebook that there is an emerging consensus in the experimental literature. The consensus is that there is a robust stakes-effect on knowledge attributions, and the real debate is whether … Continue reading