This month at the Brains blog we are hosting an online conference in the philosophy of mind, and this week’s session on Belief and Reasoning is likely to be of interest to the audience at Certain Doubts. The papers are: … Continue reading
Many philosophers seem to think that – even if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are indeed normative notions, as is widely held to be the case – to say that a belief is “justified” is “rational” is to … Continue reading
Many philosophers endorse a truth-insensitivity hypothesis: certain core, philosophically important evaluative properties of a belief are insensitive to whether it is true. For example, if two possible agents believe the same proposition for the same reason, then either both are … Continue reading
Many epistemologists accept the mentalist version of internalism about rationality. In a slogan, this is the view that rationality supervenes on the mental states that the relevant thinker has at the relevant time. Coherentism, as I shall understand it here, … Continue reading
Here’s a view that I think some people are attracted to, a tripartite view of how positive epistemic standing is attained: Tripartite View: For a belief to constitute knowledge, three elements have to be in place: (a) There’s the belief … Continue reading
When I consider the NEDP for reliabilism, the intuitions involved seem to support the view that external properties (e.g. reliable belief production) are not directly relevant to justification. Furthermore, I take the motivating principle that is behind the intuition in … Continue reading
Suppose you engage in a long chain of reasoning: you believe that 1) p, 2) if p then q, 3) therefore q, 4) if q then r, 5) therefore, r, 6) if r, then s, etc. You justifiably believe each … Continue reading
I have argued that the NEDP is a problem for nearly all versions of internalism. Consider Augustine*, who in his seventy-six years of life, experiences all of Augustine’s conscious states but has no unconscious internal states. With respect to their … Continue reading
This is a follow up from the previous post. I’m considering not using ‘occurrent belief’ talk anymore since it either just stipulatively means conscious belief (in which case, we should just use ‘conscious belief’) or it’s just not clear what it … Continue reading
This is for an Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity, and is due to Daniel Star sometime in April, so I thought I’d link to the draft here, in case any want to help me by providing comments! You can … Continue reading