Gewirth answers the problem of the Cartesian Circle via the notion of psychological certainty. Cleaned up a bit, the best version of his view runs as follows. We first arrive at a clear and distinct perception that God exists and … Continue reading
Monthly Archives: January 2006
Are there counterexamples to the following? Where X makes Y reasonable, d is a defeater of this relation only if d’s being probable is also a defeater.
Here we are told that philosophers ought to look “pink-faced, white-bearded, rumpled, squinty.” I looked at our list of contributors, thought about what we all look like, and it doesn’t look good for us… … Continue reading
Can someone tell me why it is said that “other things being equal, the simplest theory is the best”? I have some thoughts about it, but I’d like to hear what other people think. Extra credit question: Is simplicity in … Continue reading
The department of Philosophy at CMU is organizing a summer school focusing on logic and formal epistemology. Information and instructions for application can be found at: http://www.phil.cmu.edu/summerschool/ The school intends to expose undergraduate students to topics in the aforementioned areas. … Continue reading
Here’s an amazing situation. I’m in a room right now with DeRose, Warfield, Fitelson, Senor, and McGrath! But it’s not an epistemology conference…
Prompted partly by Olsson’s recent Against Coherence (OUP 2005), I’ve been thinking about the truth-conduciveness of coherence. There’ve been two recent claims to prove that coherence cannot be truth conducive (in Olsson, and Bovens & Hartmann’s Bayesian Epistemology). I don’t … Continue reading
Branden Fitelson is coming to Missouri next week to talk about the paradox of confirmation. It’s next Thursday, January 26, at 3:00 p.m. If you’re close enough to drive over (or down or up), do it. There has been too … Continue reading
Consider two cases. In both cases, we have two hypotheses that explain data. For simplicity think of the data as data of sense. In one case, the hypotheses are a common sense one and a skeptical hypothesis. In the other, … Continue reading
CD-er Vincent Hendricks has posted his new piece on epistemic logic at SEP here. It’s amazing what a valuable resource SEP is, and this article is another nice example of why. UPDATE: I should have noted Vincent’s co-author on the … Continue reading