Tim Williamson holds that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and though I think this is wrong, let’s assume it for present purposes. My interest is not so much in what the norm(s) of assertion are, but rather whether they … Continue reading
As noted earlier, I’ve put a new item on the sidebar. It links to works in progress where contributors can have a link put to drafts on which comments would be welcome (and, I assume, proper blog etiquette requires explicit … Continue reading
Multi-Premise Closure (MPC) can seem a less secure principle than is Single-Premise Closure (SPC), because MPC is subject to what I’ve for a long time called the problem of the “accumulation of doubt,” which is, or is at least very … Continue reading
We all know that justified true belief can fail to be knowledge when funny stuff happens (or at least most of us think this). What I want to ask is whether a JTB can fail to be knowledge for a … Continue reading
Assume that sensory experience has no propositional or semantic content. Further assume that Hume has developed two reliable dispositions. He has learned to discriminate colors from each other, and he has also formed the reliable disposition to believe in any … Continue reading
I’ve spent a lot of energy dealing with this skeptical argument, that I’ve called “The Argument from Ignorance” (AI): 1. I don’t know that I’m not a BIV 2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I … Continue reading
My recent experience with refereeing for journals has had an inordinate commonality. I’m seeing a greater percentage of counterfactual analyses playing a role in papers than I can ever recall. I wouldn’t be surprised if my experience is idiosyncratic, and … Continue reading
As noted in my previous post on Sellars’ problem, one option is to jettison the presupposition in my characterization of Sellars’ problem that the notion of justification (or whatever notion is thought to close the gap between true belief and … Continue reading
Here’s a followup issue regarding Keith’s post that could be lost in the comments and is significant enough that it shouldn’t be. It’s from Matt McGrath, and so I’m lifting it to a main entry to promote further discussion of … Continue reading
I’ve been following the fascinating thread on pragmatic encroachment, and it led me to wonder about a situation William James poses in The Will to Believe. He takes our situation with regard to belief in God to be one in … Continue reading