David Lewis thought the following is true: The Principal Principle (PP): Ps(A|Po(A)=x)=x (where Ps is a rational subjective probability, and Po is some objective probability). Here’s a gloss of this claim, more or less accurate: if you know that the … Continue reading
One of the joys after the semester is getting to read. So, since Brian recommended “CIA Leaks”, I got to read the paper this morning. It’s full of neat examples and powerful arguments, but there is one argument that I … Continue reading
I’ve posted a long paper, “The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Attributions.” It argues for a fourth alternative to contextualism, invariantism, and relativism: that knowledge-talk is governed by inconsistent inference-principles, but that these principles rarely lead us into contradiction. In … Continue reading
I have a draft of a paper on gradable adjectives — currently entitled “Gradable Adjectives: A Defense of Pluralism” — on line here (pdf). It’s largely an attack on what I call the “‘for an F’ myth” (or “Implicit Reference … Continue reading
In my replies from the Pacific meeting session on my book, I pursued an analogy between the value of truth and the disvalue of pain. Robert Johnson emailed me with some interesting thoughts about an alternative view of pain. The … Continue reading
I’ve finally finished writing up my responses to critics from the Pacific Division session on my book. They are here. As always, comments welcome. … Continue reading
The Rutgers Epistemology Conference announces the fifth bi-annual prize for the best essay submitted to the Conference by a person with a Ph.D. obtained by the time of submission but not earlier than ten (10) years prior to the date … Continue reading
THE 2007 RUTGERS EPISTEMOLOGY CONFERENCE Plans for the REC07 are taking shape. The conference will be on Friday, May 4-5 (Friday and Saturday), 2007, at the Hyatt in New Brunswick. (Where it has been for the last 4 years.) It … Continue reading
The webpage for the conference we’re hosting at the University of Stirling on Epistemic Value this August has been updated, and now includes a provisional programme, along with titles and abstracts for most of the papers. Here’s the link. … Continue reading
The following combination of views seems a natural one to me, but (in my admittedly limited excursions into the field) I have not yet seen it defended: 1. True epistemically normative statements are made true by objective facts. 2. These … Continue reading