I just learned that Jason’s new book Knowledge and Interests will be out late summer or early fall with Oxford. Here’s the central claim of the book: There are cases in which two people are similarly situated, but one has … Continue reading
Philosophical blogdom is in a bit of a tizzy over Posner’s remarks as guest blogger on Brian Leiter’s site. Posner insists that the reasons we give for moral positions we hold can only be rationalizations, maintaining that the real reason … Continue reading
Philosophers can be, at times, inordinately dense. I’m in that state now, I fear. It’s engendered by considering the interesting email exchange copied to me by Jonathan Schaffer and David Sosa. The discussion is a follow-up to a previous post … Continue reading
Plantinga once told me that the proper response to Lehrer’s gypsy lawyer case is this: “The lawyer doesn’t know, but he is in a position to know.” Here the idea is that the lawyer already has all the evidence needed, … Continue reading
As a followup to the earlier post on the idea that being in a position to know other truths explains how knowledge is more valuable than true belief, suppose the set of claims that you are in a position to … Continue reading
I’ll be gone for the next week, and won’t be able to do much with the blog because of it. I’ll try to check email when I can. My spam-preventing techniques often force comments to be approved by me before … Continue reading
Here’s some thoughts on an idea about the value of knowledge. The idea comes from John Turri, who posted the idea here over at Fake Barn Country. It’s a really interesting idea, one I hadn’t thought of, but well worth … Continue reading
If you have seen the syllabus for the Fodor and Peacocke course on Representations taught last spring at NYU, here’s the link. There are quite interesting papers linked from this page by Fodor and Brandom and others on perception and … Continue reading
Keith’s response to Ernie’s complaint that contextualism is not a theory of knowledge is to grant that it isn’t, but maintain that it is important to epistemology nonetheless. Keith says, “To the extent that contextualism/invariantism is an issue in the … Continue reading
Keith’s explanation of contextualism as a semantic theory relevant to offering a theory of knowledge, but not offering one itself, led me to think a bit more about two quite different approaches to the theory of knowledge, so I’m going … Continue reading