I’ve been thinking more about closure, and what leads epistemologists to accept it in a theory of knowledge or justification. A standard way in which closure is defended is by appeal to something like intuitions. You consider all the examples … Continue reading
Among the things I know are things that I can’t remember where or how I learned them. If that description is correct, does it follow that I now know things for which I have no evidence? Well, if I pick … Continue reading
One of the virtues touted by contextualists for their view is its capacity to preserve closure. But suppose one begins from a relevant alternatives perspective, and gives up closure because of it. One can strain to regain closure, as Stine … Continue reading
One way of becoming interested in virtue epistemology is to be interested first in traditional epistemology, and hope that talk of the virtues can be useful for traditional topics such as knowledge and justification. There is another way, though, that … Continue reading
I’d like to see what you think about one (and a half) versions of the surprise examination paradox. I’m not actually sure this case is paradoxical; it’s a variant of one of the variants Williamson considers in Knowledge and Its … Continue reading
Here’s a question about norms of assertion. As I see it, it makes little sense to require that the norms be indefeasible, so I’ll assume here that they’re not. This assumption is useful for a variety of cases where we … Continue reading
After the wonderful REC conference, I’ve been thinking some about the relationship between philosophy of language and various accounts of our use of the term ‘knows’ and its cognates. What follows are some thoughts about the connections between semantical theory … Continue reading
OK, the semester is over, and I’m ready to vent. (Yes, I know I’ve already done it, but the urge to vent seems to recur more often in some of us…) This time it’s about gripes I have about student … Continue reading
Sosa raises the problem of the speckled hen for Fumerton’s account of justification, an account that depends on direct acquaintance with experiential states and the with the relationship of correspondence between these states and certain facts. The example involves the … Continue reading
There is a growing number of those who smell the scent of pragmatic factors in epistemic justification and knowledge. On the former, it might be interesting to see how defenders of the view want to avoid the following argument, an … Continue reading