An announcement and explanation. First the announcement: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, which I’ll be editing, has now been approved for publication annually. Second, the explanation: part of the goal of the series is to publish the work of … Continue reading
Monthly Archives: June 2007
The new issue of The Reasoner is up. Features: Jesse Steinberg, “Pierre may be ignorant, but he’s not irrational”. Gerald K. Harrison, “Free Will and Lucky Decisions”. Amit Pundik, “United States v. Shonubi: Statistical evidence and ‘The Same Course of … Continue reading
From Harvey Siegel at Miami, I received the following information about this essay contest, which has a submission deadline of October 15, 2007: The Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking invites applications for its fourth annual AILACT Essay Prize. … Continue reading
June 9 was our third birthday, but I’ve been traveling and failed to mention it that day. Thanks to all who’ve made the time so rewarding! In the three years, we’ve had 628 total posts and 4700 comments. In the … Continue reading
This is just a reminder that the deadline for registration for the Social Epistemology conference at Stirling later in the year is *July 1st*, so if you want to come and you haven’t already registered then you’ll need to get … Continue reading
In a very interesting recent note in Analysis, “Ramsey + Moore = God,” David Chalmers and Alan Hájek have argued that the Ramsey test for conditionals, together with the rational requirement to avoid Moore-paradoxical beliefs, entail that all conditionals of … Continue reading
Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., William Harper and Gregory Wheeler (eds.) (King’s College Publications, London, 2007) is now available at Amazon in the US and UK. New essays by Gert de Cooman and Enrique … Continue reading
A fairly standard approach to the preface paradox is basically Lockean. On the Lockean story, belief is degree of belief past a certain threshold. We then explain away the inconsistency involved in the paradox by an underlying probabilistic coherence. The … Continue reading