I’m reviewing this book for Notre Dame Philosophical Review, so I will use this forum to raise some issues that occur in the discussion that I won’t bring up in a relatively short review. Here’s one such issue, one between … Continue reading
I’ve got a friend who is an associate dean here, an anthropologist, who encouraged his kids to take as much logic and epistemology in college as they could get. In talking with him, I think he views epistemology as a … Continue reading
In case you haven’t heard, Richard Heck has started a new searchable database of online papers in philosophy at PhOnline. If you have online papers in epistemology, I urge you to use this site. You will need to register as … Continue reading
There’s a new draft of John’s paper “Holding Defeat to the Fire” linked to in the sidebar. Check it out!
Sosa’s latest account of safety is: S’s belief that p is safe iff S holds it on a basis that this belief would not have without being true. He offers this new account to avoid the Kripke red-fake/green-barn counterexample. Here’s … Continue reading
Hawthorne and others take knowledge to be central to practical reasoning, in the sense that if one employs premises that one does not know to be true, one has done something wrong. I wonder the extent to which this claim … Continue reading
Brian Weatherson has a new argument on his blog for why gettier cases are cases of knowledge. His first argument was something like this: an analysis of knowledge ought to be relatively simple, and gettier cases, if they are not … Continue reading
I’m curious about what your intuitions are in this variation of the painted mule case. Apologies if it’s already been gone over in the literature or elsewhere. As usual, I’ll stipulate that a painted mule really would look like a … Continue reading
A primary motivation for finding a place for useful falsehoods resides in wanting to explain how one can use a false theory to acquire knowledge. Ptolemaic astronomers knew where the planets would be at fixed points in the future, and … Continue reading
Here’s a further issue for Klein’s account of useful falsehoods. For reference, here’s the full account again: The belief that uf is a useful falsehood to S (for acquiring knowledge) by producing a doxastically justified belief that h iff: 1. … Continue reading