Monthly Archives: September 2015

Reading PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY, Feyerabend’s Philosophical Papers volume 4. After a short introduction by Stefano Gattei and Joseph Agassi giving valuable historical context, the book begins with Feyerabend’s first known paper, “The Concept of Intelligibility in Modern Physics”, which was … Continue reading →

In considering the relation between Feyerabend and Popper in the 50s, an illmuminating comparison can be made with the relation between Nietzsche and Wagner. In both cases a younger thinker is transformed by his encounter with an older more successful, … Continue reading →

Here is an inspiring and valuable survey of John David Ebert’s intellectual path from myth studies (Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell) to pluralist philosophy (Sloterdijk and Deleuze and Guattari), as seen through a series of his book reviews spanning 15 … Continue reading →

My review of Graham Harman’s book THE THIRD TABLE has now attained 2,000 views on academia.edu. I have also opened a discussion session, and the paper has received 662 views. Even allowing for some overlap, this amounts to 2,500 views. … Continue reading →

Many people cling to at least some of the programmatic formulations of OOO mainly for emotional reasons, whether the theses are coherently expressed or the arguments are logically compelling or not. In the general climate of confusion and doubt, Harman’s … Continue reading →

Originally posted on synthetic zero:
http://www.latimes.com/includes/projects/before-after/japan-tsunami/japan_tsunami.07.before.jpg “Now that the SR/OOO wave has crested, crashed, and receded, we can start to evaluate it with the advantage of perspective. I won’t attempt to offer an autopsy here, but I do want to…

Harman criticises the reductionism that he finds underlying Eddington’s account of the “two tables” paradox see my review here). However, Eddington’s own position already contains a far more effective critique of reductionism as based on false mental pictures inferred illegitimately … Continue reading →