Monthly Archives: July 2013

One can see the divide between Zizek and Chomsky as a battle over the “correct” or the most useful definition of ideology. Zizek has made it clear that on his definition Chomsky, contrary to what he himself may think, is … Continue reading →

I have been using the Chomsky/Zizek divide as a catalyst for a more general discussion. Chomsky and Zizek are involved in a battle over the criterion of truth (and thus over the criterion of ideology). Chomsky’s ideal is monist: differences … Continue reading →

Paul Feyerabend’s texts provide us with useful perspectives on the Zizek/Chomsky divide. For example, in CONSOLATIONS FOR THE SPECIALIST (available online here), he has this to say about the relative efficacy of argument and of immersion: “We certainly cannot assume … Continue reading →

We have seen that there is something very curious about Chomsky’s “Niño” argument. At the very moment he accuses Zizek of making non-empirically-testable assertions, Chomsky himself indulges in a rather puzzling thought-experiment. Try explaining Zizek’s ideas to a twelve year … Continue reading →

In a recent post I offered a reading of the first paragraph of Zizek’s LESS THAN NOTHING as proof that he is not writing incoherent rodomontades or empty platitudes. It is an example of how Zizek reasons reflexively, analogically, imagistically, … Continue reading →

Chomsky is an unreliabe narrator, an unreliable reader of an commentator on Continental Philosophy. Deleuze relegates such comments AND THEIR EXPECTED RESPONSES to the dogmatic image of thought. Chomsky constructs no problematic, he just presumes that he can rattle off … Continue reading →

Chomsky exemplifies a typical argument from authority. He claims to “see nothing” in the Continental texts he has read (I suppose we must believe him, but what texts has he read? and has he done the background reading? even Bertrand … Continue reading →