Plato: Forms

This is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. The aim is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have corresponding Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have corresponding things. Both questions have come up before. But the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive (...) to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers but also with better insight into the questions. (shrink)

Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake (...) of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The purpose of this paper is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to the Form of the good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms, especially of his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution. It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that reconstruction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a “proposal” — his teaser to elicit (...) a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions. (shrink)

This is a proposal for rethinking the main lines of Plato’s philosophy, including some of the conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Drawing on a new interpretive paradigm for Plato’s overall vision, the central focus is on the so-called Forms. Regarding the guiding paradigm, we propose replacing the dualism of a world of Forms separated from a world of particulars, with the monistic model of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality. Regarding the tools of (...) the trade, we distinguish between three constructs that have come, one and all, and largely indiscriminately, to be regarded as Forms: Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. This recalibration of what we know of Plato’s outlook, tools, and methods, together with a realignment of these with his general aims, will also help restore the philosopher’s emphasis on that which is good, a perspective often blurred in the structure of two worlds. (shrink)

Did Plato abandon, or sharply modify, the Theory of Forms in later life? In the _Phaedo, Symposium, _and _Republic_ it is generally agreed that Plato held that universals exist. But in Parmenides, he subjected that theory to criticism. If the criticism were valid, and Plato knew so, then the _Parmenides_ marks a turning point in his thought. If, however, Plato became aware that there are radical differences in the logical behaviour of concepts, and the later dialogues are a record of (...) his attempt to analyse those differences, then Plato’s thought can be said to have moved in a new and vitally important direction after the _Parmenides_. _Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics_ brings together twenty essays by leading philosophers from the UK and the USA reflecting upon this important issue and upon the questions arising from it. (shrink)

Plato’s Euthyphro is important because it gives an excellent example of Socratic dialogue in operation and of the connection of that dialectic with Plato’s earlier theory of Forms. Professor Allen’s edition of the dialogue provides a translation with interspersed commentary, aimed both at helping the reader who does not have Greek and also elucidating the discussion of the earlier Theory of Forms which follows. The author argues that there is a theory of Forms in the Euthyphro and in other early (...) Platonic dialogues and that this theory is the foundation of Socratic dialogue. However, he maintains that the theory in the early dialogues is a realist theory of universals and this theory is not to be identified with the theory of Forms found in the Phaedo, Republic, and other middle dialogues, since it differs on the issues of ontological status. (shrink)

Plato’s Euthyphro is important because it gives an excellent example of Socratic dialogue in operation and of the connection of that dialectic with Plato’s earlier theory of Forms. Professor Allen’s edition of the dialogue provides a translation with interspersed commentary, aimed both at helping the reader who does not have Greek and also elucidating the discussion of the earlier Theory of Forms which follows. The author argues that there is a theory of Forms in the Euthyphro and in other early (...) Platonic dialogues and that this theory is the foundation of Socratic dialogue. However, he maintains that the theory in the early dialogues is a realist theory of universals and this theory is not to be identified with the theory of Forms found in the Phaedo, Republic, and other middle dialogues, since it differs on the issues of ontological status. (shrink)

Did Plato abandon, or sharply modify, the Theory of Forms in later life? In the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic it is generally agreed that Plato held that universals exist. But in Parmenides, he subjected that theory to criticism. If the criticism were valid, and Plato knew so, then the Parmenides marks a turning point in his thought. If, however, Plato became aware that there are radical differences in the logical behaviour of concepts, and the later dialogues are a record of (...) his attempt to analyse those differences, then Plato’s thought can be said to have moved in a new and vitally important direction after the Parmenides . Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics brings together twenty essays by leading philosophers from the UK and the USA reflecting upon this important issue and upon the questions arising from it. (shrink)

The Theaetetus is subtitled peri epistemes, on knowledge, and peirastikos, tentative. Theaetetus' three attempted definitions of knowledge, each ventured only to fail, are structured in a cascading reduction. This regress functions both negatively, as an indirect demonstration that knowledge is not definable in term of opinion or judgment, that is, knowledge is not "opinion plus," but also positively, as the ill-fated definitions build upon one another to delineate the elements necessary for a possible theory of judgment. The themes of knowledge (...) and judgment never resolve, yet, through the multiple peirastic beginnings that perish struggling to say something lasting about knowledge, this main theme ties together the dialogue's many subthemes-wisdom and character; sophistry and its relation to philosophy; Socrates' trial; intellectual midwifery, or Socratic dialectic; appearance and reality; Heracliteanism; Eleaticism; forms and participation; unity and plurality; particularity and universality; identity and difference; memory and time; relations; the relation of resemblance. One could go on. The guiding question, how to define knowledge, is a theoretical one, and the reasoning becomes progressively more abstract as the dialogue proceeds, while at the same time never straying far from practical implications: the theoretical conception of knowledge holds consequences made manifest in human action and deliberation. The dialogue about knowledge is also a dialogue about wisdom. (shrink)

It is argued that the analysis by which the gene are differentiated in the dialogue is an exercise in studied ambiguities informed by an Eleatic logic of strict dichotomy that was the underpinning of the Sophist's method of division. By this dialectical drill, Plato shows that the metaphysics underlying the Visitor's method fails to adequately distinguish what it means to have a character from what it means to be a character, and therefore remains inadequate to track down the sophist or (...) to distinguish him from the philosopher: Eleaticism, as critically examined by Plato, proves to be means to disguise, not to discover the sophist. (shrink)

The eponymous dialogue presents the sophist as a figure who defies definition, and those difficulties are attributed to the conception of the image. Ultimately, the sophist is defined as a species of image maker. The image, however, which is important throughout the Platonic corpus as a metaphor, an analogy, and a metaphysical concept as well, receives in the Sophist little clarification or definition apart from whatever may be inferred from the division of image making arts. In the Sophist, the sophist (...) escapes definition as in no other dialogue, rendering even the concluding division one that makes the distinction of the sophist from the philosopher problematic, if not impossible. The paper explores how the dialogue problematizes and rethinks the metaphysics of the image, as compared to its use in dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic, pointing to a refinement in understanding the relation of judgment to knowledge and appearance to reality. (shrink)

Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul DAVID APOLLONI VROM Phaedo 78b to 8od, Socrates attempts to answer Simmias' fear that, even if the soul has existed eternally before birth, it might be dispersed and this would be the end of its existence . His answer is an argument which attempts to show that the soul is incomposite because it is similar to the Forms and dissimilar to physical objects. To date, this argument -- the so-called Aftin- ity (...) Argument -- has not received much sympathy from Plato's commentators, who universally consider it the weakest of Plato's arguments for the immortal- ity of the soul? The lack of sympathy and enthusiasm for this argument is not difficult to understand. Just consider the following outline of the argument. The soul is invisible, therefore the soul is more similar to the Invisible, i.e., the Forms, which are always the same, than are bodies, which are visible and which are constantly changing, and which are more similar to the Visible than is the soul . Further, the soul is more like the Always the Same in that when it uses the body to see or hear or perceive, it is "dragged" by the body into the Never the Same, and the soul "wanders and is confused and whirls as if intoxicated" insofar as the soul has come in contact with such things . Whereas when the soul considers by itself, it goes to the realm of the Forms, and ceases its wandering. Therefore the soul is more like the Always.. (shrink)

Plato believes in the existence of Forms—eternal models or exemplars of which objects in our world in time and space are copies, and his Theory of Forms lies at the center of his philosophy. But according to the common wisdom, Plato raised the Third Man objection against his own Theory of Forms in the Parmenides. According to this objection, each Form is supposed to have the very characteristic it is supposed to be , and this leads to an infinite regress (...) of each Form . This book defends the view that a mysterious plural phrase at Phaedo 74 shows that the Self-Predication Assumption is both plausible and leads to no infinite regress of Forms. The Self-Predication Assumption in Plato is an essential resource for scholars, specialists, and students with an interest in ancient philosophy and classics. (shrink)

A prevalent view among scholars is that Plato believed the Self-Predication Assumption. I argue that Plato did not hold this assumption. First, I consider the evidence in Plato's text for the Self-Predication Assumption, and find it inconclusive. Second, I argue that at different times, Plato held two different theories of predication, each of which is inconsistent with the Self-Predication Assumption. Finally, I examine the first part of Plato's Parmenides and argue that there is no need to find the Self-Predication Assumption (...) there, not even in the Third Man Argument. (shrink)

Plato's theory in the Republic has been a model for realist metaphysics. His text, however, is not easy to understand because his language is often only suggestive or metaphorical with the result that many different interpretations have flourished, especially in this century, and many questions have not been resolved. ;My dissertation is a new and up-to-date defense of a traditional reading of Plato's metaphysics in the Republic, focusing on three central problem areas: the degrees of reality, Plato's arguments for Forms, (...) and mathematical intermediates. ;First, Plato distinguishes knowledge and opinion, and characterizes their objects as "what is" and "what is and is not," and some scholars have taken these to represent degrees of reality. This is a fundamental distinction for Plato; however, exactly what does he mean by "what is" and "what is and is not"? I shall argue that Plato primarily means "what exists" and "what exists and does not exist ", and that the distinction amounts to degrees of reality: being and becoming. ;Second, Plato uses two arguments for the existence of Forms: the Argument from Conflicting Appearances and the One-over-Many Argument . Exactly what are these arguments, and why does Plato use two, when one argument would seem to suffice? I shall argue that the two arguments can jointly generate Forms but taken separately each generates something short of Forms. They therefore function as one argument. ;Third, scholars have disagreed over whether Plato requires a separate metaphysical category for mathematical entities when he distinguishes two stages of knowledge in the Simile of the Line--noesis and dianoia. Granted that the objects of noesis are Forms, what are the objects of dianoia? I shall argue that they must be mathematical intermediates, while discussing related issues in the interpretation of this Simile. Without mathematical intermediates we could not understand the unique position of mathematics in Plato's educational program. ;The three problem areas are closed related, and my discussions will shed light to the basic tenets and logic of Plato's metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper is a brief discussion of the famous 'Third Man Argument' as it appears in Plato's dialogue Parmenides . I mention, criticise and refine the most influential analytic approach to the argument; show that the actual conclusion of the argument is different from the one attributed to it by the majority of scholars; and elaborate two responses to the argument, both of which shed interesting light on the Theory of Forms.

Commentators in antiquity took Plato to have a system of categories which they compared with Aristotle's. This work begins by exploring the genera of absolute and relative in Plato's dialogues. In addition, Aristotle alleged that Plato had a special argument for the existence of Forms corresponding to relative terms. Yet the argument which Alexander purports to reproduce from Aristotle's lost Peri Ideon does not obviously summarize any argument found in the Platonic dialogues. The last four chapters of the dissertation attempt (...) to isolate genuinely Platonic reasons for supposing that there are Forms for pros ti terms and to show that these reasons to do generalize to Forms for kath hauto terms. ;In order to resolve these questions I first turn to the very early dialogues. I offer a view about what sort of thing Socrates is looking for when he asks a question like, "What is piety?" and isolate some constraints on the adequacy of any answer. These constraints raise special problems for answers to "what is X?" questions when X is a relative term. These problems, together with certain other background assumptions, give Plato a reason to think that the sort of being which corresponds to the answer to a "What is X?" question is very unlike sensible things. Because 'beauty,' for instance, is a pros ti term, it will both hold and not hold for sensibles depending on how the predicate is completed. In the Phaedo he is led to the hypothesis that the accounts of relative terms are about separated Forms. Thus, Plato does have special reasons for thinking that there are Forms for relative terms--reasons that are not immediately applicable to kath hauta terms. (shrink)

Among Aristotle’s criticisms of the Form of the Good is his claim that the knowledge of such a Good could be of no practical relevance to everyday rational agency, e.g. on the part of craftspeople. This critique turns out to hinge ultimately on the deeply different assumptions made by Plato and Aristotle about the relation of ‘good’ and ‘good for’. Plato insists on the conceptual priority of the former; and Plato wins the argument.

In Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, René Girard interprets a phenomenon he dubs “metaphysical desire” in which “metaphysical” signifies objects of attraction that are not physical things but rather intangible bi-products of mimetic entanglement—such as prestige or fame or social status. These “metaphysical objects” fuel the sometimes frenzied rivalry between the actors in their grip. Desire in the mimetic theory is always subject to mediation, and Girard distinguishes two modes of mediation: external and internal. In external mediation, the model stands (...) outside the field of play of the imitator; in such cases there can be imitation but not the mutually amplified rivalry that leads to violence and scapegoating. In internal mediation, however, the model/imitators become antagonists. In Girard’s exposition, this difference between mediators provides a first litmus test of violent potential. But Girard’s dichotomy is limited to types of mediation, and another dichotomy is possible, one that distinguishes between types of metaphysical objects: those that are essentially sharable and those inherently not so. This extension of Girard’s mimetic theory can potentially cast great light on Plato’s dialogues. My essay will argue both that Plato understood the double-bind of mimetic entanglement and that his “forms” (at least in the ethical/political realm) can best be understood as metaphysical objects of the sharable kind. My points of reference will be primarily Plato’s Phaedrus and Book IX of the Republic (with pointers to Aristotle’s analysis of philia in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics). (shrink)

_Theaetetus_, the _Sophist_, and the _Statesman_ are a trilogy of Platonic dialogues that show Socrates formulating his conception of philosophy as he prepares the defense for his trial. Originally published together as _The Being of the Beautiful_, these translations can be read separately or as a trilogy. Each includes an introduction, extensive notes, and comprehensive commentary that examines the trilogy's motifs and relationships. "Seth Benardete is one of the very few contemporary classicists who combine the highest philological competence with a (...) subtlety and taste that approximate that of the ancients. At the same time, he as set himself the entirely modern hermeneutical task of uncovering what the ancients preferred to keep veiled, of making explicit what they indicated, and hence...of showing the naked ugliness of artificial beauty."—Stanley Rose, _Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal_ Seth Benardete was professor of classics at New York University. He was the author or translator of many books, most recently _The Argument of the Action, Plato's "Laws," and Plato's "Symposium,"_ all published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

This study consists of a series of essays on the metaphysics and epistemology of Plato's Philebus. My chief aim is to determine to what extent Plato maintains the theory of Forms in that dialogue. Because it is generally thought to be a late dialogue, the Philebus is a key to setting a long-standing debate about Plato's philosophical development. Scholars disagree on whether the theory of Forms is maintained in Plato's late dialogues. Most recent interpretations of the Philebus claim that it (...) is incompatible with the theory of Forms. My study shows, however, that the Philebus reaffirms the ontological and epistemological claims of that theory. To secure my thesis I make extensive comparisons with Plato's middle dialogues, particularly the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and Cratylus. This sort of comparison is crucial because Plato's actual descriptions of Forms differ in significant ways from standard accounts of his theory. I show that the distinctions between being and becoming and between knowledge and opinion, which were essential to the theory of Forms in the middle dialogues, are reaffirmed in the Philebus. As in the middle dialogues, Forms in the Philebus are the prime bearers of the attributes their names describe. Forms are logical causes of the attributes of sensibles, and each Form is a unit having many sensible participants. Plato's reaffirmation of the essential features of the theory of Forms in the Philebus shows that he did not substantially revise that theory in dialogues after the Parmenides. (shrink)

Plato's Forms: Varieties of Interpretation is an ambitious work that brings together, in a single volume, widely divergent approaches to the topic of the Forms in Plato's dialogues.

Plato’s demiurge makes a series of questionable decisions in creating the world. Most notoriously, he endeavors to replicate, to the extent possible, some of the features that his model possesses just insofar as it is a Form. This has provoked the colorful complaint that the demiurge is as raving mad as a general contractor who constructs a house of vellum to better realize the architect’s vellum plans (Keyt 1971). The present paper considers the sanity of the demiurge’s reasoning in light (...) of Timaeus 32c5-33b1, where he invokes considerations of wholeness, completeness, uniqueness, and eternality in deciding to build the body of the world from all of each of the simple bodies. Since the passage makes no appeal to the demiurge’s intelligible model, one can mine it for indications of the value that the demiurge takes those features to have independent of mimetic goals. I argue that, for Plato, those features are intrinsically good-making and, thus, that it is not only appropriate for them to characterize Forms qua Forms but also that it is appropriate for the demiurge to aim at replicating them, to the extent possible, in his creation. In particular, I argue that the demiurge’s success in instilling a circumscribed version of each feature in his creation helps to qualify it as a genuine being despite the fact that it comes to be. (shrink)