Socrates

These new translations of the Defence of Socrates, the Euthyphro, and the Crito present Plato's remarkable dramatizations of the momentous events surrounding the trial of Socrates in 399 BC, on charges of irreligion and corrupting the young. They form a dramatic and thematic sequence, raising fundamental questions about the basis of moral, religious, legal, and political obligation. The introduction provides a stimulating philosophical and historical analysis of these texts, complemented by useful explanatory notes and an index of names.

The Times Literary Supplement of November 8, 1917, contained, under the title of Socrates recognitns, a review of Plato's Biography of Socrates, a lecture delivered by Professor A. E. Taylor to the British Academy in the early part of last year. The opening sentence of the review is as follows: ‘Next to the problem of the Gospels ranks that of the Platonic dialogues amongst those most vital to the history of the human spirit.’ A little further down the reviewer says: (...) ‘It is much to the credit of British scholarship—and especially to that of the University of St. Andrews—that it should have attacked these problems with untiring energy, and propounded solutions which, although they run counter to most of the traditional tendencies of historical and philosophical criticism, have not only challenged attention, but are carrying conviction even to unlikely quarters.’ And again, at the end of the article, we read this passage: ‘It is scarcely to be thought that the ground won by the scholars of St. Andrews will be held without counter-attack; but this is slow to mature, and in the meanwhile such essays as the subject of this notice, with which we may couple the paper recently read to the British Academy by Professor Burnet on the Socratic doctrine of the soul, serve to buttress and consolidate the position.’. (shrink)

One of the more attractive features of Greek moral philosophy and its medieval dependents is that it provides an obvious motivation for being moral: rational self-interest. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas are all rational egoists, and each argues that acting only for the sake of one's own happiness is compatible with treating other people morally. Each bridges the gap between egoism and altruism by arguing that a rational person has sufficient reason to care about other people. This raises two main (...) problems: can egoistic or "selfish love" count as genuine love, and even if it can, can "selfish love" insure that an egoist will have the proper moral respect for all who are worthy of moral respect? ;Socrates believes that nothing can be loved or desired both as an end and as a means, and so he cannot justify any but an exploitative love which cares for the other not for the other's own sake, but only for the instrumental benefits he, she or it provides the lover. ;Plato succeeds in justifying love for another for the other's own sake by arguing that one's beloved is a constituent of and not just an instrumental means to one's own happiness. Nevertheless, Plato does not justify respect for the other as an independent end-chooser, and this prevents him from justifying moral respect for the autonomy of the other. ;Aristotle makes up for this deficiency of Plato's by founding the best sort of love on the mutual respect required by co-operation in deliberation, decision and action in mutually valued projects. This solution, however, prevents Aristotle from justifying moral respect for anyone who is not sufficiently virtuous, and this threatens to limit severely the number of people for whom Aristotle can justify proper moral respect. Aristotle can disarm this threat, even in the form in which it is posed by Christian charity. ;Aquinas argues that Aristotelian love is insufficient for justifying Christian charity. The difference between them, however, does not concern the theory of what love consists in, but in how to apply the theory of love. (shrink)

Shows that the dialogue in Plato's Phaedo is primarily devoted to presenting Socrates' final defense of the philosophical life against the theoretical and political challenge of religion.

The Socratic method is considered obsolete and unhelpful by many legal educators. Catalyzed by the latest report of the Carnegie Foundation on legal education, educational reformers are pushing for the reduction or elimination of its use. This paper presents a historical perspective on the importance of the Socratic method to the development of law and to its continuity across time. It highlights the importance of the method in imparting Aristotelian epistemology and scholastic modes of reasoning that are increasingly rare in (...) society at large, but which are critical to the structure and spirit of the law. Accordingly, it is argued that it is impossible to predict with confidence that the demise of the Socratic method would not destroy our hermeneutic bridge to the era in which foundational concepts of law were elaborated, or even destroy our ability to understand them. This perspective should give us pause when we consider making changes to a tradition with a value that we do not always appreciate. (shrink)

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

What Zubiri defines as Socratic wisdom seems to coincide with the matter suggested by philosophy itself, in its relation with the way of living. A new sort of wisdom comes up with Socrates, not only for the approach to those topics seeming too human, but also for the assumption of philosophy as a way of life. From those premises, Zubiri concludes something raising controversy: What is proper in wisdom is the abandon of public life, the look for intimacy of self (...) and thinking in the private life. The main objective of this article is elucidating the notion of Socratic wisdom proposed by Zubiri. The method consists of the analysis of the arguments presented by Zubiri in order to confront his thesis with the findings in some of the Dialogues of Youth or Socratic Dialogues of Plato. (shrink)

In this book, William H. F. Altman argues that it is not order of composition but reading order that makes Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, and Phaedo “late dialogues,” and shows why Plato’s decision to interpolate the notoriously “late” Sophist and Statesman between Euthyphro and Apology deserves more respect from interpreters.

Socrates (469—399 B.C.E.) Socrates is one of the few individuals whom one could say has so-shaped the cultural and intellectual development of the world that, without him, history would be profoundly different. He is best known for his association with the Socratic method of question and answer, his claim that he was ignorant (or aware of […].