There is a huge amount of futures work undertaken by the military. Unhappily, it's either done by officers on a two year secondment to "planning" or by the sort of people who heap up bullet points, newspaper clippings and /r/Fut memes and call it "futures". You can see this most poignantly from within the energy industry,m which has half a century of serious planing at its back, and the trivia that appears in the popular media; and here.

Military futures are primarily about three things: power projection, conflict avoidance and conflict resolution. Power projection is by no means led by military might. The key is knowing what you want, and from whom, and managing an enormous range of tangible and intangible levers to get towards it. You want stable Atlanticism? Dedicate fifty years to building it up. You want a quiet maturation of Chinese power? Spend thirty years in mutual discussion to ensure it. The reason that we give so much attention to "terror" - despite its almost vanishingly small practical impact - is that it is a tool that it is hard to manage remotely, not least as its users either follow values on which they will not compromise or which predicate unacceptable outcomes, such as the eradication of secular society.

Conflict avoidance and resolution come down to deterrence, winning when that fails and arriving at war aims that lead to a stable outcome. (And not to a frozen conflict that will break out again in a generation.) As major symmetrical conflict cannot and will not lead to any sort of acceptable outcome - save the stability of a cemetery - we have tended to avoid this for seventy years. Which is a triumph of planning, rationality and user education: politicians need to be aware what military power can do, and cannot do.