Najib’s Vocal Defense of the Rohingya Backfire lacks credibility


December 6, 2016

Najib’s Vocal Defense of the Rohingya Backfire lacks credibility, given his domestic human rights record

http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/will-najibs-vocal-defense-of-the-rohingya-backfire/

Image result for Najib and The Rohingnya Protest

While Najib’s remarks at the Stadium Titiwangsa in Kuala Lumpur drew strong support from the Rohingya community in Malaysia, and marked the first time a Southeast Asian leader has condemned the Myanmar state’s actions in such strong terms, they should be treated with some caution.

A cynical reading of Najib’s address would see him reaching for the moral high ground at a time of immense domestic pressure. These, after all, have not been quiet months for Najib, who has battled corruption allegations over the 1MDB scandal since early 2015 – and has just emerged from a series of tense and highly visible protests led by BERSIH, a wide-reaching campaign for clean government. Despite winning a state election in Sarawak earlier this year, Najib’s ruling National Front has struggled to regain its former popularity, and was recently faced with allegations of human rights violations (from Laurent Meillan, acting representative of the UN Human Rights Office for Southeast Asia, no less) over the arrests of several activists at the Bersih rallies.

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In this light, there is little doubt that Najib’s statements are at least partly designed to shore up his human rights record and regain much-needed political capital. State violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar has taken place since at least 2012, and it’s hard to overlook the particular timing of Najib’s unprecedented response. In a pointed statement ahead of the rally, the President’s Office in Myanmar called it a “calculated political decision to win the support of the Malaysian public.’”

But this was not simply the case of the wrong person saying the right thing at the wrong time. Najib’s statements reflect several political dilemmas that lie at the heart of the refugee question in Southeast Asia, and three elements of his speech deserve closer examination. First, it is worth noting that he chose to frame the issue with a moral vocabulary that other Southeast Asian leaders have, thus far, kept at arm’s length. He emphatically referred to the abuses as “genocide,” and called them, “by definition, ethnic cleansing.” With a characteristic rhetorical flourish, he asked the crowd: “Do they want me to close my eyes? Want me to be mute? […] What’s the point of a Nobel Peace Prize?”

Such statements, which not only imply that he is acting on a universal duty of response – and holding Suu Kyi to the global ideals that are seen to underwrite her Nobel Prize – are a deliberate departure from the position, long held among Southeast Asian policymakers, that regional and local values hold sway in Southeast Asian contexts. Building on the “Asian Values” discourse, Southeast Asian leaders  and diplomats have previously stressed the region’s “incommensurable differences from the West” as reasons to question the universality of human rights. Najib’s statements suggest a clear pivot away from the default Southeast Asian position, and besides voicing indirect criticism at his own region’s lackluster human rights record, they may also imply that the global community (and the support it can offer) seems somewhat closer to Najib at this point than his immediate neighbors.

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The Rohingya Issue is an ASEAN and International Challenge

Second, Najib’s comments on the ASEAN Charter raise difficult questions about regional cooperation in a time of fraught relations. In response to the Myanmar government’s statement – which framed the planned protests as an external intervention in its internal affairs, and reminded Malaysia to adhere to ASEAN principles of noninterference –Najib said: “There is an article in the ASEAN charter that says ASEAN must uphold human rights. Are they blind? Don’t just interpret things as you choose.” In any case, he added, “this is not intervention. This is universal human values.”

These remarks come in the wake of palpable friction among ASEAN members over conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea, and both the United States’ and China’s increasing involvement in the region. Noninterference by regional and global powers alike has been a core tenet of ASEAN’s institutional stability since its inception, and has been credited for promoting peaceful relations in Southeast Asia especially since the end of the Cold War. However, Najib’s comments have flagged up the uncomfortable truth that this insistence on traditional state sovereignty may be less and less tenable in the present global context, and especially with regards to transnational migration. From Malaysia’s perspective, with more than 56,000 Rohingya refugees already registered by the UN refugee agency within its borders, the question of what constitutes “external interference” seems especially urgent. Najib may have a point: that ASEAN’s ability to effectively tackle regional issues is not necessarily helped by its members’ sensitivities to others’ incursions on their turf.

Finally, Najib’s focus on the “root cause” of refugee flight – Myanmar’s internal abuses against the Rohingya – successfully presents the crisis as a national issue, and sidesteps the glaring evidence that countless refugees are trafficked across the region in horrific conditions, and fall victim to the combined effects of patchy law enforcement, organized crime, and Southeast Asia’s insatiable appetite for cheap labor. Many end up in Malaysia and Thailand, or in refugee camps in Indonesia; because none of these countries are signatory to the Refugee Convention, few enjoy the legal right to work or corresponding protections against abusive employers. In late 2015, the discovery of the mass graves of human trafficking victims in Malaysia brought the regional scale of the issue to global attention.

Najib’s call for Myanmar to cease crackdowns against the Rohingya, while valuable in itself, swept this wider incrimination of Southeast Asian governments, including his own, under the carpet. More than a choice of political convenience, it was perhaps a deliberate decision to downplay transnational aspects of the refugee question, and – by drawing on regional and global perceptions of Myanmar as a pariah state in transition – place the responsibility for regional crisis within the already-tied hands of an unstable administration. While raising his human rights credentials vis-à-vis his neighbors, thus, Najib simultaneously exempted them from adopting a concerted response.

For those concerned – as we should all be – about the increasingly dire situation facing the Rohingya in Southeast Asia, Najib’s decision to take the stage with firm words against the events in Myanmar offer limited consolation. Beyond achieving domestic political motives, his remarks have sharpened the existing tensions between global and local values, ideas of regional integration and national sovereignty, and questions of transnational and national responsibility. At best, we can hope that Najib continues to place valuable political capital behind his rhetoric. At worst, the ideals he has promoted may well be eroded by a failure to follow up with policy. It would not be the first time.

Theophilus Kwek is currently reading for a MSc in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies at Oxford University. He has served as co-editor of the Journal of Politics and Constitutional Studies, publications director of OxPolicy, and vice president of the Oxford Students’ Oxfam Group.

APEC beyond economic cooperation


November 17, 2016

APEC beyond economic cooperation

by Ippei Yamazawa, Hitotsubashi University and Toshiya Takahashi, Shoin University

Brexit and refugee problems in the European Union have caused uncertainty for economic integration, but APEC’s renewed commitment to it will provide some impetus to the global economy. While APEC is regarded primarily as a diplomatic opportunity for regional leaders, APEC’s achievements, based on wide-ranging government–business collaboration, provide it with the possibility to expand its role and help nurture regional stability.

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APEC began in 1989 as a series of meetings among foreign and economic ministers in Asia and the Pacific. Invigorated by the European Single Market in 1992 and the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay round of negotiations in 1993, the United States, as APEC’s chair in 1993, created the leaders’ meeting to discuss the creation of a free trade area across Asia and the Pacific. The Bogor Declaration in 1994 set out a roadmap for trade liberalisation by 2020.

APEC’s economic integration has not made linear progress despite early high expectations. The 1995 Osaka Action Agenda, which combined voluntary trade liberalisation with facilitation and technical cooperation, provided concrete measures for achieving the Bogor Goals, but the Manila Action Plan a year later resulted in only small-scale trade liberalisation. Attempts at early voluntary sector liberalisation also failed in 1998.

In the face of the Asian financial crisis, expectations of APEC’s economic integration decreased substantially. By the 2000s the WTO’s Doha Round negotiation began, while free trade agreements proliferated across Asia.

Since then APEC has adopted a modest strategy centred on trade facilitation and technical cooperation, and economists and the media have lost their interest in its message of economic integration. Some of the member economies that were unsatisfied with voluntary liberalisation formed the P4 group, which later expanded to become the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

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But legally binding trade liberalisation did not make much progress in the 2000s. The Doha Round negotiation remains deadlocked even after its 15-year effort. The TPP was finally concluded in 2015 but its ratification has been delayed and is now in question. In the European Union, economic integration is highly developed, but opposition to its centralised decision-making and flows of labour from later-developed member countries shadow its future.

In contrast, APEC’s pragmatic and flexible approach to trade liberalisation has succeeded in areas like customs procedures, business mobility, and standards and conformance. The 2001 Shanghai APEC summit declared an intention to reduce trade transaction costs by 5 per cent in five years. This was achieved through various task forces composed of governmental officials and the business sector. The Busan APEC summit in 2005 announced another 5 per cent reduction that also succeeded.

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They fought over Trade

APEC has provided a program for economic and technical cooperation over small and medium industry development, structural adjustment and food safety that has not been achieved through other economic institutions. And it has contributed to Asia’s globalisation, starting in the 1980s and becoming the East Asian economic miracle by the 1990s. The rapid economic rise of countries like China and Vietnam can also be attributed in part to their involvement in APEC.

But APEC’s role in sustaining regional stability should be re-evaluated. Prosperity is a condition for peace. So is an increase in economic transactions. APEC has served regional peace and stability through prosperity and economic connectedness, though it does not deal with security issues directly.

APEC’s open membership worked for mitigating ideological and political dividing lines in the Asia Pacific after the end of the Cold War. Its early acceptance of ex-communist countries such as China in 1990 and Russia and Vietnam in 1998 promoted the liberalisation of their markets and opened the door to their acceptance in the WTO. Both China and Taiwan’s participation showed that APEC’s identity was beyond political confrontation.

APEC’s wide-ranging framework for talks and its flexibility in liberalising markets helps create political background for further regional cooperation. Voluntary liberalisation allows members to compromise with domestic opposition. The APEC experience shows that different positions on economic issues can be mitigated through continuing talks rather than renouncing them, and this learning can be applied to non-economic issues.

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The South China Sea

Asia and the Pacific today face military build-up and unresolved conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The APEC approach to reconciling differences provides the basis for resolving security and political confrontations in the region. While it is an economic institution, these political functions — which are the product of its twenty-eight-year history — should be remembered and reinvigorated with the aim of developing a regional consensus for ‘peace by talks’.

Ippei Yamazawa is Emeritus Professor of International Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Japan.

Toshiya Takahashi is Associate Professor at Shoin University.

APEC beyond economic cooperation

Australia’s China choice is not between security and prosperity


November 15, 2016

Australia’s China choice is not between security and prosperity–Why not both?

by Paul Hubbard, Australian National University @Canberra

http://www.eastasiaforum.org
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If strategic rivalry between China and the United States escalates, Australia will face uncomfortable choices that could leave one or both partners unsatisfied. But it is wrong to frame this as a trade-off between national security and economic prosperity, as if strategic strength were born from economic pain. National security and economic prosperity are both vital national interests and deeply symbiotic. A stable international order underwrites economic prosperity; international economic engagement supports a stable order.

Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop in her office at Parliament House.

Australia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop in her office at Parliament House. Photo: Alex Ellinghausen

Unfortunately, economists and strategists have trouble talking on the same terms. The starting point for economists is usually an abstract model that assumes the security infrastructure and norms needed for markets to thrive. If economists think about armed conflict it is usually as a ‘tail risk’ — potentially catastrophic, but highly unlikely. But take away a stable national, regional or global order and the business and commerce that generate material prosperity will evaporate.

Security thinkers don’t sit around and assume thriving societies. Instead they are paid to detect threats and contemplate worst-case scenarios. Mitigating these requires clear thinking, well-resourced diplomacy and defence capability. This, in turn, depends on a prosperous economy.

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Chairman Mao Zedong meeting with the Hon. Gough Whitlam QC, Prime Minister of Australia during the historic Prime Ministerial visit to the People’s Republic of China, 31 October – 4 November 1973. Photo courtesy the Hon Tom Burns AO, Chair of the Queensland China Council, personal collection.

Australia can afford multi-billion dollar submarines and joint strike fighters because it has a US$1.2 trillion economy. The Defence White Paper’s US$32 billion funding target for 2020–2021 assumes that the Australian economy will continue growing faster than the United States, the Euro Area or Japan. Achieving this requires deeper economic engagement with a fast growing Asia.

The complementarity of security and prosperity is not a new discovery. Former US president Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 Peace Without Conquest speech recognised that popular support for communism in Southeast Asia came not from the peasant’s fascination with Marxism, but rather from a desire for basic life necessities and an ‘end to material misery’. He proposed the creation of the Asian Development Bank to show that these needs could be met through markets and capitalism, without resorting to radical communism and violent conquest.

While the United States lost the battle against communism in Vietnam, it won the war for open markets and prosperity in Asia. The examples of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore convinced China’s leaders in 1978 to put aside the horrors of Maoism and adopt not just ‘reform’ but crucially, ‘opening up’.

Unbridled ideology was exchanged for market pragmatism. The result was the largest and most rapid movement of humanity from poverty in history. China stopped exporting international revolution and instead now exports 18 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods, in accordance with the rules-based order of the World Trade Organization. Foreign investment in and out of China puts assets at risk on both sides, giving owners a strong material interest in preserving peace.

Of course national interests go beyond the economy. Providing for the material welfare of citizens is only one of the legs of political legitimacy. States sometimes adopt goals that cut across the material welfare of their citizens. The first era of globalisation did not stop the imperial follies of the First World War. The following wave of fascism and totalitarianism subordinated individual welfare to the strategic interests of the state.

China’s policies after 1978 were calibrated to reassure the international community that its re-emergence would not follow this menacing route. Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra was to hide China’s strength and bide its time. Hu Jintao promoted China’s ‘peaceful rise’. Which is why strategists have reacted with alarm to a more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping.

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What should economists make of this? Is China’s increasing assertiveness ‘a reality that seems to have bypassed many of Australia’s economic commentators’ as one strategic commentator suggests?

The new direction is worrying. Perhaps the risk of conflict is slightly less remote. But there’s not enough to overthrow the central scenario under which China continues to prioritise domestic and international stability. Just as regional stability serve Australian prosperity, so too does it serve China’s own vital economic interests.

The economist would also distinguish threats to international stability from more common but less catastrophic risks that hide among the cross-border movements of people, goods and capital. As Deng Xiaoping famously observed, opening the window invariably involves letting in a few flies.

The best line of defence against economic harm is competition in a well-regulated domestic market. Unlike Mao’s China, which hoped that correct behaviour would flow from correct ideology, the market system does not depend on the goodwill or benevolence of market participants. Where threats appear to specific security interests, the solution is not to shut the window on prosperity, but rather to use some of the proceeds to buy more and better fly-swats.

This approach allows Australia to choose both security and prosperity, putting the country in a more comfortable position to deal with both the United States and China.

Paul Hubbard is a doctoral candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. He is currently on leave from the Australian Treasury as a Sir Roland Wilson Scholar, and is a former Fulbright Scholar in international relations. The views in this paper do not reflect those of the Australian Treasury.

The economics of Australia’s security in Asia

Message to Donald Trump from Mexico’s Ambassador to Malaysia


October 1, 2016

Message to Donald Trump from Mexico’s Ambassador to Malaysia

READ Bunn Nagara’s article here:

http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/behind-the-headlines/2016/09/25/realities-behind-the-wall-the-fuss-over-measures-to-prevent-illegal-migration-seems-as-out-of-touch/

Mexico is convinced that the phenomenon of migration and refugees demands an integral approach with a shared responsibility of all the governments involved, with an inclusive and solidarity vision and full respect of human rights. Walls cannot solve the complexity of this global reality.–Carlos Félix, Ambassador of Mexico to Malaysia

 

http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/letters/2016/10/01/mexico-is-against-putting-up-walls/

Image result for Carlos Felix, Mexico's Ambassador to Malaysia

REFERRING to the article “Realities behind the wall” by Bunn Nagara, (Sunday Star, September 25), I wish to make important clarifications about the view of Mexico on the polemic issue of building walls to deal with migration flows and the best way to treat migrants.

1. Migration is a complex social and economic phenomenon in almost all the regions of the world. In the case of Mexico, Central America and the United States, this issue has related mainly to complementary labour markets and family ties which have prevailed for many years without an integral solution.

2. Mexico recognises the important contributions of migrants. We are a country of origin, transit, destination and return of migrants. Mexico always has promoted the respect of human rights of all migrants with a dignified treatment as human beings looking for better opportunities.

3. In the discussion of the issue of undocumented migrants – no human being can be illegal – Mexico has proposed an integral approach with a shared responsibility of the governments involved to look for an orderly, safe and regular migration with full respect of human rights.

 4. Mexico recognises the sovereign right of all countries to build whichever structures inside their own territory. Nonetheless, history shows that there are no physical or natural barriers that can stop the flow of people, fusion of cultures, cycles of demand and supply of labour markets or reunification of families.

5. For all these reasons, Mexico does not favour walls in any place as part of the solution to this complex reality, as was cited in the article by Bunn Nagara.

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Nieto (Mexico), Trudeau (Canada) and Obama (United States)

6. During the 71st Session of the UN Assembly, President Enrique Peña Nieto (pic) reaffirmed this position. He reiterated that the migrants and their rights, dignity and well-being should be the central element in the global dialogue to find solutions that require international cooperation to strengthen the capabilities of nations to address an integral attention of the migration phenomenon.

7. With this vision, Mexico has proposed to be the host for the preparatory conference for the adoption of the Global Pact for the Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration of 2018.

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8. Mexico is convinced that the phenomenon of migration and refugees demands an integral approach with a shared responsibility of all the governments involved, with an inclusive and solidarity vision and full respect of human rights.

9. Walls cannot solve the complexity of this global reality.

Carlos Félix, Ambassador of Mexico to Malaysia

Indonesian Islam: Neither White Knight nor Damsel in Distress


September 22, 2016

Asia Pacific Bulletin

Number 354 | September 22, 2016

ANALYSIS

Indonesian Islam: Neither White Knight nor Damsel in Distress

by Benjamin Nathan

In the fifteen years since 9/11, the attitude of the American media and foreign policy community towards Indonesian Islam has followed two parallel paths. The first is that Muslims in Indonesia have the potential to influence the thoughts and actions of Islamic extremists in the Middle East. The reasoning behind this viewpoint is easy to see: Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population, an overwhelming majorityof whom reject acts of religious violence. American policymakers from both parties naturally see this state of affairs as a useful diplomatic tool for combating extremism in the Middle East.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz echoed this theme in 2009, writing in a Wall Street Journal op-ed entitled “Indonesia Is a Model Muslim Democracy” that “if [Indonesia] continues to make progress on religious tolerance, it can point the way for other majority Muslim countries.” In November 2015, The New York Times described a recent anti-ISIS media campaign led by the Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as a “welcome antidote to jihadism” and as a solution to the problem that “Western leaders often lack credibility with those most susceptible to jihad’s allure.”

The second path of American thinking about Indonesian Islam is that Islamic extremists in the Middle East have the potential to influence the thoughts and actions of Muslims in Indonesia. This is an idea of Indonesia as a teetering domino, a fortress of religious moderation under internal siege from a worldwide pox of Islamic fundamentalism. In this view, the fact that 90% of Indonesians are Muslims makes the country vulnerable to radicalization, moderate as Indonesia’s mainstream form of Islam may be. In its 2016 budget, the State Department listed Indonesia as a “focus country” for its Antiterrorism Assistance and Countering Violent Extremism programs. The United States provides financial and technical support for Detachment 88, Indonesia’s most prominent antiterror group, and also funds organizations deemed capable of “grass-roots counter-messaging” against extremism.

These twin perspectives assume the potential for widespread, persuasive communication between Indonesian Muslims and their coreligionists around the world. This assumption is largely off base. Chief among its flaws is that cultural and religious disparities between Indonesia and the Middle East, while impossible to measure precisely, are stark.Indonesians speak not Arabic but Malay, an Austronesian language whose resemblance to Arabic consists only of a scattershot of shared vocabulary. Indonesian Muslims generally make a point of distinguishing themselves from inhabitants of the Arab world. The Indonesian term kearab-araban, roughly equivalent to “over-Arabness,” is not a term of respect.

Even if they could easily communicate with other Muslims around the world, Indonesians would have few opportunities to do so. Indonesians are simply not well-placed around the globe to influence the ideological tide of worldwide Islam. Indonesia’s diaspora, aside from those who live in neighboring Malaysia, is small relative to population size. Of the Indonesians who travel to the Middle East, most are female domestic workers. The Saudi government caps the number of Indonesians allowed to attend the annual Hajj pilgrimage at 168,800 per year –– just .08% of the country’s Muslim population.

And even if it were conceivable that Indonesian anti-extremist rhetoric could dissuade Muslims around the world from joining groups like ISIS and Boko Haram, it would still be misleading to claim that organized Islam in Indonesia is an outstanding example of peace and tolerance that transcends historically-bound political conditions. The New York Timesarticle that called attention to Nahdlatul Ulama’s anti-ISIS efforts made no mention of the fact that the group played a central role in the murder of hundreds of thousands of suspected communists from 1965 to 1966. Its popular reputation as a moderate organization that “stresses nonviolence, inclusiveness and acceptance of other religions” is the result of an astonishingly narrow focus on the present day.

The reason why Nahdlatul Ulama and similar organizations no longer coordinate mass violence is that their institutional legitimacy is now secure-they face no challenge to their influence that compares to the threat they once faced from organized communism. Their professed tolerance is a result of political stability, not a cause. The historical record on this point is clear: when immersed in the power struggle of the 1960s, NU proved just as susceptible to the temptations of political violence as the extremist groups its leaders denounce today. It is therefore hard to imagine how Indonesia’s present-day brand of tolerance could take hold in such politically unstable regions as Syria and Nigeria.

The same factors that limit the usefulness of Indonesian Islam as a counterweight to extremist groups in the Middle East apply with equal strength to attempts by extremist groups in the Middle East to make inroads in Indonesia. The wide political and cultural reach of groups like NU and Muhammadiyah have provided resistance against the ideological incursions of Salafi proselytizers and the recruitment efforts of the Islamic State. Even as mainstream Indonesian Islam grows more conservative in areas like LGBT rights and inter-religious tolerance, its institutions constrain foreign radicalization.

ISIS, for its part, seems both unable and unwilling to carry out major terrorist attacks in Indonesia. In a January 2016 report for USAID, political scientist Greg Fealy estimated that only 250 to 300 Indonesian citizens-roughly one for every million-have traveled to join ISIS. Neighboring Australia’s per capita rate is five times as high. While the attacks that killed four people in Jakarta on January 14 were widely interpreted as a sign that ISIS had expanded its focus to Indonesia, evidence suggests that central ISIS leadership in Iraq and Syria did not have a planning role. The attack was an amateurish and homegrown operation with no proven connection to ISIS beyond hazy funding links and an impossible-to-disprove link of ‘inspiration.”

Indonesia today faces issues that dwarf the threat of terrorism in their scope and significance, such as the economy and institutional political weaknesses. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Indonesia would not match Nigeria’s 2014 casualty count from terrorism if an equivalent to January’s Jakarta attack occurred five times a day for an entire year. The US foreign policy community should not let the strategic priority of preventing the spread of terrorism distort their view of Indonesia’s own pressing needs. A strong Indonesia, after all, fits well within the policy interests of the United States. The world’s fourth-most populous country is an important economic and strategic partner, not least because of China’s increasing ambitions to establish its influence in Southeast Asia.

There is a risk, moreover, that funding local counter-terrorism efforts will incur more than just an opportunity cost. The Indonesian military, sidelined since Suharto’s downfall in 1998, views access to counter-terrorism funding as a potential wedge for reestablishing its influence in national politics. A remilitarization of Indonesian society would surely damage the country’s young democratic institutions. It could also thwart key American policy goals like the protection of religious freedom and human rights. The military has recently been involved in programs like bela negara (“defend the nation”), a training program for lay citizens that aims to target such social ills as latent communism and homosexuality. If American policymakers insist on enlisting Indonesia in the fight against terrorism, they must take care to avoid treatments that cause more harm than the targeted disease.

About the Author

Benjamin Nathan is a former researcher at the East-West Center in Washington. He graduated from Williams College in 2015 and is an alumnus of the Critical Language Scholarship program in Malang, Indonesia. He can be contacted at [email protected].
 
The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue.

 

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The Asia Pacific Bulletin (APB) series is produced by the East-West Center in Washington.

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MCA, UMNO lapdog, flexes its muscles to no avail


September 17, 2016

Cowardice rightly understood begins with selfishness and ends with shame.”- José Rizal, ‘Noli Me Tángere’

The spat between the MCA’s Ti Lian Ker and UMNO’s Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz is not about the disparity of power between the component parties of BN but rather the continuing existential crisis of the MCA that it has been unable to overcome since losing the support of the Chinese community.

MCA, UMNO  lapdog, flexes its muscles to no avail

by Cmdr S, Thayaparan

Whereas the MIC has accepted its role as the water boy to UMNO, MCA desperately attempts relevance in a turbulent time of ‘Melayu’ political upheaval.

There has always been a disparity of power within Barisan Nasional (BN). However, parity of power was never the currency between the MCA plutocrats and UMNO potentates who shaped the national agenda and serviced the gravy train that enabled this country to remain in relative functionality for decades.

These schemers were aided by a polity willing to subscribe to the so-called social contract, as long as the people could pursue their economic agendas and live in relative harmony.

Ti’s contention that BN playing the ‘jaguh kampung’ (village champion) was causing BN to lose cosmopolitan votes is the kind of pussy-footing that that seems to be the only stratagems that the MCA these days is capable of coming up with.

I hope Pakatan supporters are not naïve enough to think that there is no nexus of connections between MCA plutocrats and DAP operatives working together for mutual benefit, which goes far beyond political profit. The same applies to UMNO and its so-called political enemies.

First off, BN is not playing the ‘jaguh kampung’, UMNO is in a ‘fight to the death’ struggle with Najib refuseniks and is attempting to keep their rural voting bases safe from the clutches of a newly revitalised Malay power group. The reality is that the rural demographic in the Peninsula and UMNO’s vote banks in Sabah and Sarawak are holding BN together, and this is because of UMNO and not because of BN.

The reality is that, unofficially, UMNO has given up on urban voters and it is the responsibility of MCA to shore up support and make the case for UMNO and not BN. I am sure the  outspoken MCA operative is aware that there are many UMNO-elected officials who do not support Najib but are only interested in their political survival that translates to UMNO’s survival.

After getting a spanking from Nazri, like a chastised child the MCA central committee member claims, “Now that the ultra-Malays who destroyed Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Alliance are out of BN and in Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), BN leadership must seize this opportunity to navigate BN to its rightful 1Malaysia course or the spirit of the Alliance’s founding years of Tunku Abdul Rahman,” which is again horse manure disguised as a mea culpa.

The thing that’s destroying MCA

The contradiction is obvious. First, Ti claims that UMNO’s continued use of Malay nationalism for the support of rural voters is destroying BN’s chances in the urban areas, and then he paradoxically claims that with the ejection of so-called “ultra-Malays” from the parties – the very ones who reject the Najib regime – things could get back to normal.

Image result for UMNO is controlled by Malay Ultras

The problem is that the so-called ultra-Malays are the ones in charge of UMNO now. Moreover, I do not mean people like Nazri (photo above ) who has had run-ins with the ultra-Malay component of UMNO, but would rather be attacking the Najib refuseniks than trading shots with a so-called “partner”.

This is the problem with throwing in with UMNO, the very basis of power-sharing is based on communal preoccupations that either conflict with each other or are manipulated to appeal to the lowest common denominator.

If you want to survive in the game, then you have to spin the racists’ rhetorics for your partners but most importantly, have the support of the community you claim to represent. This is why Nazri has it both ways. This is why he gets to play the realpolitik card against the MCA operative, alluding to the former’s desire for political rejuvenation and the slim chance of it because of the lack of his community’s support and at the same time, slay UMNO-Melayu sacred cows.

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And therein lies the problem. How does a race-based party operate when it has lost the majoritarian support of the community it claims to represent? How does a race-based party offer dissent or advice when it has to rely on the generosity of UMNO to remain politically relevant? How does a race-based party counter the supposedly race-blind propaganda of the opposition when it does not have the support it needs to offer a counter-narrative because the Chinese community it supposedly represents has abandoned it?

As I wrote in ‘MCA’s long day’s journey into night’, “What is really destroying the MCA is not the propaganda of the DAP but the acceptance by a large voting demographic of the Chinese community that no representation in the government is better than MCA representation.”

In addition, this is not the first time Ti has stirred the pot. Some time back, Ti made the claim that the Federal Constitution was not inherently racist but those with racist intent manipulated its provisions.

I actually thought that MCA was on to something and singled out Ti, writing, “However, the MCA political operative did show some cojones when he said ‘we can consider amending or ratifying our constitution to free ourselves of racism’ but of course, he qualified this with the most overused, disingenuous, servile and obnoxious Malaysian excuse of ‘come a day when we are there – a matured and democratic nation’.”

However, Ti made the same nostalgic claim when he talked about bridge building and ‘Alliance’ cooperation when he correctly pointed out that the constitution needed to be amended, in his own waffling way. He makes the same claim in this mea culpa, alluding to the halcyon days of Alliance politics.

But as I quoted from Mavis Puthucheary’s article, ‘Malaysia’s Social Contract – Exposing the Myth Behind the Slogan’: “In the first 10 years after Independence, the balance of power between the two main parties, UMNO and the MCA, was more or less even. After 1969, however, the balance of power within the ruling coalition shifted significantly in favour of UMNO and the political system itself became less democratic.

“Although both parties fared badly in the 1969 elections, UMNO leaders who had secured control of the government concentrated their efforts on regaining Malay support while still maintaining the power-sharing structure.”

In other words, for BN there is no going back. Unfortunately for MCA, this new alliance spearheaded by the powerbrokers in Pakatan Harapan and the Najib refuseniks is the closest things we will get to the flawed Alliance strategy of yore.

The MCA’s sin is that it does not have the courage either to support its partner, UMNO or leave BN.

http://www.malaysiakini.com –OPINION