The majority of PSCRP materials in the final month of 2024 concentrated on the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
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Thursday 16.1.2025, 6:00 pm โ 7:30 pm - Israel Standard Time
- Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham
- Paper No. 2323
The collapse of the Assad regime has returned the issue of Syrian chemical weapons to the fore. The international community now sees a favorable opportunity to root them out, provided that effective cooperation with the new Syrian regime is established.
In the complex and often unpredictable realm of global politics, few political developments carry as much potential for transformative impact as the prospect of a second Trump presidency. This collection of expert analyses delves into the multifaceted implications of such a scenario, offering a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of how a Trump return to the White House could reshape global strategic landscapes. With a special focus on the Middle East and Israel, the publication provides an in-depth examination of how potential shifts in US foreign policy could reconfigure regional dynamics and strategic relationships.
The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic โbetโ. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.
- Dr. Eado Hecht
- Paper No. 2215
Lebanon:
At 0400 AM, 27th November, a ceasefire commenced on the Lebanese front of the war. However, fighting continues, albeit at a much-reduced level.
Israel's minimum demands for the ceasefire were:
โข Hezbollah troops and equipment will be withdrawn north of the Litani River. Also, because the river's distance from the border varies from 3.5 kilometers to 15, Israel demanded a further withdrawal in some areas.
โข The cleared area will be held by the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon), who will ensure that Hezbollah complies with this demand both now and in the future.
โข Hezbollah is to be disarmed, and at the very least, Iranian arms supplies will be blocked from entering Lebanon to rearm the group.
โข If the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL fail to fulfil their mission, Israel retains the right to freely conduct military operations to enforce the agreement.
In November 2024, the PSCRP program at the BESA Center published analytical materials covering three subregions of the post-Soviet area, namely, Central Asia, โthe Westโ (focusing this time on Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia), and the South Caucasus.
- Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal
- Paper No. 2320
In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.
- Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal
- Paper No. 2311
Israelโs move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror โ however successful they may be โ are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israelโs approach to defeating Hezbollah.
- Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Bartal
- Paper No. 2317
Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwarโs elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the groupโs rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwarโs lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?