Jeff McJunkin

@jeffmcjunkin

The NetWars guy! Counter Hack employee and Certified SANS instructor living in Oregon. Varied background in sysadmin, web and net pen test, forensics. GSE #128.

Southern Oregon
ಏಪ್ರಿಲ್ 2008 ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಸೇರಿದ್ದಾರೆ

ಟ್ವೀಟ್‌ಗಳು

ನೀವು @jeffmcjunkin ಅವರನ್ನು ತಡೆಹಿಡಿದಿರುವಿರಿ

ಈ ಟ್ವೀಟ್‌ಗಳನ್ನು ವೀಕ್ಷಿಸಲು ನೀವು ಖಚಿತವಾಗಿ ಬಯಸುವಿರಾ? ಟ್ವೀಟ್ ವೀಕ್ಷಣೆಯು @jeffmcjunkin ಅವರ ತಡೆತೆರವುಗೊಳಿಸುವುದಿಲ್ಲ

  1. ಪಿನ್ ಮಾಡಿದ ಟ್ವೀಟ್
    ಆಗ 29,2017

    Woohoo! The recorded version of my webcast is online now! Slides and video linked below:

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  2. 11 ಗಂಟೆಗಳ ಹಿಂದೆ

    This thread is worth the time. Merry Christmas to all, and to all: fight the good fight!

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  3. ಡಿಸೆಂ 20

    Microsoft doesn't release unscheduled patches without reason. You *need* an emergency change control process in place to deploy this starting in <24 hours.

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  4. ಅವರು ಮರುಟ್ವೀಟಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ
    ಡಿಸೆಂ 19

    Hey folks, To help people get easier access to the challenges, we’re releasing them on a single web page. Check here for details: And for all the great new Holiday Hack music, get the free album: Have fun! :D

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  5. ಅವರು ಮರುಟ್ವೀಟಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ
    ಡಿಸೆಂ 18

    Hey folks, The KringleCon LineCon is going off line for a bit. Santa’s elves are working on something WONDERFUL! Stay tuned….

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  6. ಅವರು ಮರುಟ್ವೀಟಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ
    ಡಿಸೆಂ 18

    Wow! , . , : Just wanted to say thank you! NetWars Tournament of Champions was awesome. Being in the room with all of the champs and all of you was amazing! So much knowledge and good vibes! Kudos!

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  7. ಅವರು ಮರುಟ್ವೀಟಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ
    ಡಿಸೆಂ 14
    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  8. ಅವರು ಮರುಟ್ವೀಟಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ
    ಡಿಸೆಂ 12

    Patch your Domain Controllers running DNS (typical config, so most orgs) ASAP. DNS remote code execution vulnerability which runs as LocalSystem on Windows DNS server (usually a DC).

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  9. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Anybody who works in defense, or offense, in organizations with Active Directory (read: pretty much everybody in infosec) should give this a watch. Great work, and !

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  10. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11
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  11. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    And that's a wrap! Webcast complete, lots of great questions. One more shout-out for the BloodHound Slack, lots of great discussions happening every day: . Thanks for following this tweet-storm! [30/30]

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  12. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: Where'd that "% of users with paths to DA" number come from? A: The PowerBI workbook, and a standalone script. Or manual neo4j cypher query. Last Q: What makes a high-value target? A: High-value targets can all reach DA. [29/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  13. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: What about accounts marked as sensitive and not available for delegation? A: Manual analysis, currently. Q: Will the PowerBI workbook be made available? A: Yes, free and open source, just gotta make it usable. Q: Can we undo removing edges? A: No, just re-import. [28/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  14. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: How'd you add the local privesc path from RDP? A: We didn't, we found the privesc through manual analysis. If no privesc, remove the CanRDP path. If privesc, mark the computer as "Owned". Q: How do you show BloodHound data? A: Literally screenshots of the BH UI. [27/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  15. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: Constrained/unconstrained delegation? A: Yes, latest BloodHound has edges for it. Q: What gets logged? A: SharpHound doesn't try to be stealthy, execution is logged, LDAP traffic is mostly normal. Q: Has anyone done real-time session enum? A: No, but that'd be cool. [26/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  16. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: What about sparsest cuts ()? A: That's, uh, hard, and difficult to scale to huge graphs like BloodHound. could do 100 nodes, but not 1k+. Instead, focus on left and right sides of attack paths, and AD knowledge. [25/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  17. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Q: Obfuscating SharpHound? A: Recompile/obfuscate yourself, or use the .ps1 version. Q: What if you're worried about stealth? A: SharpHound -Stealth and optionally -ExcludeDC to avoid MS ATA. Q: Performance issues? A: Not really, DC's are meant to LDAP all day long. [24/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  18. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Time for questions! Shout-out to BloodHound Slack (which I frequent): 1st question is answered by on huge networks, over ~100k+ principals means you may have to tailor queries carefully. 2nd Q: Re-importing data is fine, REST API is dead [23/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  19. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    One reminder: DA is not the attacker's goal. Your data (usually) is. Find paths to specific servers, Azure sync accounts, privescs (Tier 1 -> Tier 0), contamination between dev and prod as well. That said, DA helps attackers a lot. Go forth and reduce your paths! [22/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  20. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    About a week and half into the 2 week engagement, recommended removing those four specific users' rights to edit those groups (break the left side of the chain from 20/n). Now less than 1% of users can reach DA [21/n]

    ಈ ಥ್ರೆಡ್ ತೋರಿಸಿ
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  21. ಡಿಸೆಂ 11

    Now that we know which GPO's affect DA's, we'll look at the non-DA users and groups that can control them. 15% of the domain can gain access to the four users on the left side of the screenshot. Side note, GPO's affecting DC's are also of course a route to AD takeover. [20/n]

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