Tweets

	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	1 Std.
	Antwort an @JeremyJWaldron It would've been fine if you would have, to be honest.
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	2 Std.
	Antwort an @Jbloeffler I don't think so. The same rules on the use of force would presumably apply regardless of whether and in what way Gaza is occupied.
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	4 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl (this is a sophisticated way to bind states, that disagree that IHRL applies in armed conflict, to IHRL standards)
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	4 Std.
	Antwort an @acandidworld The Commission's reply would probably be "find non-lethal means". My reply would be that Israel's Gaza policy is so bad that it leaves it no clearly lawful ways to protect its legitimate interests. In such situations the policy should change.
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	5 Std.
	Antwort an @acandidworld I think they looked at these activities through the prism of law enforcement, so Protocol III was less relevant
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	5 Std.
	Antwort an @acandidworld unless in specific cases
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	5 Std.
	Antwort an @acandidworld They were understood as causing certain harm to property (burning fields), but not imminent or certain harm to persons
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	5 Std.
	Antwort an @AdHaque110 @HelenFrowe 13. If this is true (and I set this aside), it is interesting that in ethical terms, the commission seems to adopt a threshold view that even massive harm to property (eg burning of fields) cannot justify potentially lethal force. @AdHaque110 @HelenFrowe
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	5 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl point 6 would probably prove contentious
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 12. One more thing - a likely point of contention is the Report's assertion that launching incendiary balloons is not per se an imminent threat to life (paras 355-359)
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 6. The commission holds that under IHL, targeting members of armed groups present in an otherwise civilian demonstration would "almost always be unlawful" mainly because the potential harm to civilians
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @Marianhouk of course!
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 11. There's a lot more in the Report that will interest international lawyers in terms of the interaction between law enforcement/hostilities, but maybe later :)
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 10. but rejects that this can justify potentially lethal force in circumstances in which it found that no imminent threat existed, which it held was the case in the absolute majority of the situations it looked at
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 9. It accepts that "defending the separation fence from damage, prohibiting acts of vandalism within Israel and against its land, equipment and infrastructure is a legitimate [law enforcement] objective."...
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 8. but quickly holds that this was not the case in the Gaza events
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 7. The commission "acknowledges" that when there is a "ferocious degree of violence" emanating from a group it is sometimes impossible to identify specific individuals that pose imminent threats, and this might result in liability to potentially lethal force....
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 5. The commission essentially gives a list of situations in demonstrations in which a threat could be considered "imminent" (pp. 89-100)
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @AeyalGross 4. The commission adopts the "functional approach" to occupation: Israel remains an occupying power with obligations towards Gaza that are “commensurate with the degree to which it exercises control.” @AeyalGross
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	Eliav Lieblich @eliavl	6 Std.
	Antwort an @eliavl 3. Regarding extraterritorial application of IHRL, the commission implies that even if we would reject such application, since Israeli soldiers are positioned on Israeli soil, their actions are subject to territorial application, although the effects are in Gaza
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