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Title:
The Evolution of Cooperation
Authors:
Axelrod, Robert; Hamilton, William D.
Publication:
Science, Volume 211, Issue 4489, pp. 1390-1396 (Sci Homepage)
Publication Date:
03/1981
Origin:
JSTOR
DOI:
10.1126/science.7466396
Bibliographic Code:
1981Sci...211.1390A

Abstract

Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficuilty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
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