Sign on

SAO/NASA ADS arXiv e-prints Abstract Service

· Find Similar Abstracts (with default settings below)
· arXiv e-print (arXiv:1004.1461)
· Citations to the Article (1) (Citation History)
· Refereed Citations to the Article
· Also-Read Articles (Reads History)
·
· Translate This Page
Title:
Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage
Authors:
Manils, Pere; Abdelberri, Chaabane; Le Blond, Stevens; Kaafar, Mohamed Ali; Castelluccia, Claude; Legout, Arnaud; Dabbous, Walid
Publication:
eprint arXiv:1004.1461
Publication Date:
04/2010
Origin:
ARXIV
Keywords:
Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Bibliographic Code:
2010arXiv1004.1461M

Abstract

Privacy of users in P2P networks goes far beyond their current usage and is a fundamental requirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal usage. In a climate of cold war between these users and anti-piracy groups, more and more users are moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide their identity. However, when not designed to protect users information, a P2P protocol would leak information that may compromise the identity of its users. In this paper, we first present three attacks targeting BitTorrent users on top of Tor that reveal their real IP addresses. In a second step, we analyze the Tor usage by BitTorrent users and compare it to its usage outside of Tor. Finally, we depict the risks induced by this de-anonymization and show that users' privacy violation goes beyond BitTorrent traffic and contaminates other protocols such as HTTP.
Bibtex entry for this abstract   Preferred format for this abstract (see Preferences)
  New!

Find Similar Abstracts:

Use: Authors
Title
Keywords (in text query field)
Abstract Text
Return: Query Results Return    items starting with number
Query Form
Database: Astronomy
Physics
arXiv e-prints