Historically, the shortcomings of conventional Israel education have resulted in an increasing reliance on informal “extra-curricular” programs, such as those offered by Jewish institutions like Hillel International and Chabad, as well as student-led activist groups. However, it has become evident that these programs and their personnel lack the necessary tools to provide education on Israel and Zionism that is comprehensive and intensive, especially given the current societal landscape. Recognizing this gap, the need for a transformative model is clear.

The primary objective of the proposed study is to meticulously map the existing Israeli studies programs on U.S. campuses, identifying the challenges they confront. Subsequently, the study will delve into exploring potential strategies for addressing these challenges and propose innovative ways to refigure both the programs themselves and the leadership steering them. Through this comprehensive analysis and strategic overhaul, the objective is to reinvigorate Israel education, fostering a more informed, resilient, and connected community of individuals who will shape the discourse around Zionist ideas and Jewish identity in the years to come.

Dr. Sara Hirschhorn is the project’s chief researcher.

The post Israel Studies at American Universities: Is There a Path Forward? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

President Donald Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip captivated attention this week as a seemingly outlandish proposal for Israelis desperate for a post-war vision.

After 16 months of intense fighting, the president presented an unexpected blueprint of what could follow the end of the war and, more importantly, how Israel’s security will be preserved in its aftermath.

On its face, the proposal raises numerous questions: Who will be tasked with evacuating Gaza? Where will its residents go? Who will rebuild the wreckage?

And perhaps most crucially, who will be permitted to return and live there in the future? These are questions that, at this stage, remain largely unanswered.

It is unclear whether the plan can truly be called a “plan” at all, as it appears Trump surprised not just his own staff but also Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Yet despite the glaring uncertainties surrounding the plan itself, the most vital aspect is the message it sends to the international community: The status quo in Gaza is no longer tenable.

The international community, along with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has long pursued the two-state solution as the only viable path toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This assumption has been a guiding principle for decades but has failed to lead to peace.

Consider the past. Israel withdrew from the West Bank in the mid-1990s only to face a wave of devastating suicide bombings that rocked the nation.

In 2005, Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip, only to watch Hamas seize control just two years later.

Since then, the cycle of violence has been almost on an annual basis with no end in sight.

Yet despite this history, the international community – and certain segments of the Israeli political establishment – has clung to the two-state solution as the ultimate objective.

This persistence, even in the face of failure, has been puzzling.

Take, for instance, the words of Antony Blinken, US secretary of state. Less than a month after the horrific October 7 massacre, Blinken reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the two-state solution.

“The United States continues to believe that the sole viable path is a two-state solution,” he declared, as if history had not already offered a clear verdict on its efficacy.

But Blinken’s unwavering stance was hardly unique. Even during the war, many Israeli policymakers continued to speak about the two-state solution as a goal, albeit one that may take longer to achieve.

THIS IS the context for Trump’s recent remarks, which suggest a starkly different approach: The two-state solution has failed, and it’s time to rethink the entire framework of the conflict.

At its core, the message from Trump’s proposal is unmistakable: Hamas cannot be allowed to maintain control of Gaza.

For the past two decades, Gaza has been a constant flashpoint of violence.

Yes, the IDF’s operations against Hamas and the destruction of much of its military infrastructure will delay for longer than before the next round of hostilities, but unless Hamas is eradicated entirely, the next war is simply a matter of time.

Trump’s idea, though, goes beyond merely advocating for the removal of Hamas.

It acknowledges that Gaza has been a disaster. The Egyptians didn’t want Gaza. Israel didn’t want it. The Palestinian Authority couldn’t control it.

Even today, Arab countries remain indifferent to the fate of Gaza’s population.

Despite sharing a direct border with Gaza, Egypt has shown no willingness to take in Palestinians from there. Likewise, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, geographically close, have also refrained from taking in people displaced from their homes.

This is the sad truth: The Arab world has no real interest in the people of Gaza.

This harsh reality cannot be ignored. And yet, while Trump’s idea is radical, it should not be simply dismissed as unrealistic.

The situation in Gaza requires a fundamental shift in strategy. As long as Hamas controls Gaza, as long as it remains mired in poverty and destruction, and as long as organizations like UNRWA continue to fund the perpetuation of conflict, the cycle of violence will persist.

To break this cycle, alternative solutions must be considered.

The conventional wisdom of the last 30 years has failed, and though Trump’s proposal may appear outlandish, sometimes drastic ideas are the only way to wake the world from its complacency.

That said, as this debate unfolds, there is one undeniable priority that must remain front and center for Israel: the safe return of the hostages.

Earlier this week, I bumped into the brother of a hostage not included in the first stage of the deal. The man was waiting in the lobby of an office building in the hopes of landing a chance meeting with a senior cabinet minister who he believed could help ensure his brother would be on the list.

It was an act of desperation, a reminder that, for many families, the war is far from over.

Another group of hostages are supposed to be released this weekend and that is what matters right now.

There are still dozens of Israelis languishing in Gaza. Trump’s idea and plan can wait. The hostages cannot.

Published by Jerusalem Post

The post Trump’s outlandish Gaza plan may spare Middle East from past mistakes first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

It’s not every day that a Yom Kippur sermon goes viral—but Rabbi Ammi Hirsch’s did. His powerful message struck a nerve across generations: Why are so many young Jews distancing themselves from Israel? Have we raised a generation so committed to Tikkun Olam—repairing the world—that they’ve forgotten Kol Yisrael Arevim Zeh lazeh—that all Jews are responsible for one another?

A must-listen episode for anyone who cares about the future of Jewish identity and Israel-Diaspora relations.

Apple:

Spotify:

The post Conversation with Rabbi Ammi Hirsch: Why Are Young Jews Turning Away from Israel? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

The post Newsletter 6.2.25 first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

Recently, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, has returned to public discussion. Former MK Tehila Friedman, in a featured Times of Israel blog post, invoked Rabbi Kook in her call for the emergence of an inclusive, moderate religious Zionism. She was promptly rebuked by Prof. Allan Nadler, who declared that such a call was totally misguided: Rabbi Kook, in his opinion, was a conservative Haredi nationalist rabbi – the father of the current Israeli religious hard right. Other writers joined the debate, correcting some of Nadler’s assertions.

This, of course, is not the first time that controversy has emerged regarding Rabbi Kook. It has been a staple of scholarly and public discourse, especially in religious Zionist circles, since his death 90 years ago. The incessant return of this controversy, in one form or another, suggests that the categories used to describe this figure – liberal, conservative, Haredi, etc. – are somehow inadequate, that Rav Kook eludes description in these familiar terms. To get a grip on alternative, perhaps more adequate categories, we ought to note another characteristic of this figure – the fascination he evokes among religious liberals and among the “Hardalim” (Israel’s national-ultra-Orthodox population) alike.

Ms. Friedman, chair of the liberal Neemanei Torah V’Avoda movement, is clearly taken with Rav Kook. Prof. Yehudah Mirsky, author of an outstanding 2014 biography of Kook, and a Modern Orthodox Upper West Side Jewish liberal, recounted in a newspaper interview, how, as a 19-year-old yeshiva student, “he fell in love” with this “vital and empowering” figure.

Thus, Kook’s religious Zionism is best conceived as a form of religious romantic nationalism with a capacity and tendency toward innovation – theological, institutional, and cultural (which may not be to everyone’s liking.) The basic idea of expressivism, as formulated by such thinkers as Herder and Hegel, is that an idea achieves full clarify and articulation when it is expressed in a material medium — paint, letters, sound. At the same time, the author of the idea only fully apprehends and actualizes what she thinks and feels through such material expression. In line with this philosophical approach, according to Rav Kook, the ultimate aim of the Torah and Judaism is to embody the divine ideals in the material and mundane spheres of the nation, the state, and the national territory – and ultimately the entire material cosmos. Such a union of opposites (Ichud Hahaphachim) constitutes the Redemption (Geulah) and actualizes God’s absolute perfection.

Zionism, the settlement of the Land of Israel and the establishment of the Jewish state are, according to this religious Zionist view, all way-stations of the redemptive embodiment of divine ideals in their dialectical opposite, the material mundane world.

The Jewish people, who participate in these processes and events clarifies its inner authentic will and intention to actualize the divine unity of the world and thus to return in some fashion to their ultimate source in God.

The potential for innovation and creativity is very great as spiritual ideals, such as divine justice and holiness, become expressed and embodied in material and mundane activity, and as groups and individuals recover their true inner will and thoughts. Indeed, religious Zionism has vastly expanded the definition of religious and sacred activity so as to include settlement, agriculture, economic production, and defense and security work, and even the revival of the Hebrew language and cultural production.

The seriousness with which religious Zionists take their religious duty to serve in the combat units of the IDF and contribute materially to Israel’s security can be gauged from the extraordinarily high casualty rate they have sustained in the current war, far beyond their share of the population. At the same time, in recent decades their spiritually based engagement with art and culture has produced significant poetry, music, literature and cinema.

What are the political implications of Rabbi Kook’s rarified theology? Is Rav Kook the ideological source of the militant hard right with its emphasis on Eretz Yisrael, and on settlements even in Gaza and South Lebanon? Of course. The holistic world view of romantic religious Zionism, within which body and soul, mind and spirit, are integrated, lends itself to a way of thinking that is organic and that regards Eretz Yisrael as one entity which cannot be divided or exchanged. Is this militant territorial nationalism the only outcome that can be derived from Rav Kook’s thought? Not at all. Some of Kook’s closest associates such as Rabbi Yeshaya Shapira and the influential journalist Yehoshua Radler (Rabbi Binyamin), were members of Brit Shalom, the organization that in the 1930s sought reconciliation with the Arabs of Mandatory Palestine and a bi-national state. Radler, especially using the same holistic thinking, developed the notion of “Pan-Semitism” which claimed that Jews and Arabs form one organic framework.

Decades later, an important Religious Zionist figure, Rabbi Yehudah Amital of Yeshivat Har Etzion, also adopted a flexible political stance, based upon his understanding of the primacy of ethics in Rav Kook’s thought. These ideas were revived in recent years by Rabbi Menachem Froman, who advocated reconciliation with the Palestinians on the basis of sharing the Land, not dividing it.

Is Bezalel Smotrich’s “Religious Zionist” party a true reflection of Rav Kook? Probably not. It lacks the openness, creativity and engagement with general Israeli society that characterized many of the first generation of Gush Emunim leadership, such as Hana Porat, Yisrael Harel, and Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun. It is that spirit together with the liberal religious Zionism of Tehila Friedman that is inclusive and constructive.

TOI

The post Who was Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook? first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

• A rise in the percentage of respondents who say they believe Israel lost the war.
• A third of the respondent panel believes that the new Trump administration deserves more credit for the deal than the Biden administration, and another third believes the opposite to be true.
• A significant drop in the percentage of politically conservative Jews who are confident that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding relations with Israel.
• Most survey respondents are not confident that Trump will do a good job in the spheres of democracy, the economy, immigration, foreign relations, and security/defense.
• A decline was detected in the sense of personal security among Jews of all religious streams due to the war in Israel.
• A majority of the respondent panel (54%) feels that the United States does not support Israel enough.
• A majority of the respondent panel agrees that “Israel is the safest place for Jews to live”; a smaller majority agrees with the assertion that “the US is the safest place for Jews to live” (based on two separate survey questions).
• Half of the respondent panel says it’s easier for them to forge friendships with Jews (than with non-Jews).

To download the PDF version, click here.

A general comment about the survey period: Data was collected between January 16 and 19, a few days prior to Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President of the United States, and after an agreement was signed for the release of 33 hostages and a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. The past month was marked by a joint offensive by the IDF, the US, and the UK against Yemen, the continuation of Houthi drone and missile fire on central Israel, and two terror attacks in Tel Aviv.

A general comment about the respondent panel: After a full year of activity and following a detailed analysis of the data on respondent panel participants – their demographic composition and views – we will begin, starting this month, to include aggregate figures that reflect the position of the panel as an entirety. This signals the maturation of the Voice of the Jewish People surveys and the stabilization of the respondent panel, in such a way that we can now represent them as a fixed group, where the trends observed among them have, in our view, a significance that reaches beyond their breakdown into sub-groups by religious stream (Reform, Conservative, ultra-Orthodox, etc.), or political orientation (liberal, conservative, centrist and the like).

The group of American Jews whose views are expressed in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People surveys consists predominantly of those with a relatively strong connection to Jewish identity, and/or Jewish institutions, and/or Israel. Our interest in this group is precisely due to that characterization. On average, this group is more active in the Jewish community, more connected to Jewish institutions of various kinds, contributes more to Jewish causes, identifies with Jewish struggles, and in many cases functions as the backbone of the larger American Jewish community – the largest outside of Israel. (JPPI tracks the views of Jewish Israelis via its monthly Israeli Society Index.) Therefore, there is a special significance to regularly and systematically monitoring the views, sentiments, and activities of this connected group, frequently and in an orderly way. This report includes a methodological appendix that details the composition of the Voice of the Jewish People panel, and the differences between JPPI’s survey and other surveys of American Jewry.

The Hostage Release Deal and the Ceasefire

As we began gathering data for this month’s survey, an agreement was reached on a hostage deal and a temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The deal was jointly brokered by the US, Qatar, and Egypt after long months of negotiation. Several of the questions posed this month examined respondent views regarding the agreement, which sparked controversy in Israel and around the world.

A third (33%) of respondents believe the agreement is a win for Hamas and a defeat for Israel, 31% maintain that it is a victory for both Israel and Hamas, 9% think it constitutes a defeat for both Israel and Hamas, and 7% think it is a win for Israel and a defeat for Hamas. Half of the liberal respondents believe the agreement is a victory for both Israel and Hamas, while most of their conservative counterparts regard it as a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel. Accordingly, in a breakdown by voting pattern, most Trump voters (61%) consider the agreement a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel, compared to 42% of Harris voters who believe it is a victory for both Israel and Hamas.

Many Israeli and American Jews credit the deal to the new president. A third of the American respondents feel that the nascent Trump administration deserves more credit for achieving the deal than the outgoing Biden administration, while a third give most of the credit to the Biden administration. A fifth (18%) of the respondent panel believes that neither the outgoing administration nor the incoming one deserves much credit for the deal, while an eighth (12%) gives equal credit to the two administrations. The majority of the “strong liberal” cohort (54%) thinks the Biden administration deserves more credit for the deal, while most in the “strong conservative” group (64%) believe that the Trump administration deserves more credit. Among those who self-identify as politically “centrist,” 39% believe that the incoming administration deserves more credit for the deal, compared to 18% who credit the outgoing administration.

Confidence in Trump

With Donald Trump’s inauguration approaching, we looked at the levels of confidence among American Jews in the incoming president across a variety of spheres. As expected, the level of confidence in Trump expressed by conservative Jews is significantly higher than among liberal Jews.

A similar trend is evident when the results are broken down by religiosity level – the further one moves along the religious spectrum from Reform to ultra-Orthodox, the higher the confidence in Trump’s future actions. Of the five areas on which we questioned respondents – democracy, the economy, immigration, foreign policy and security/defense – immigration and security garnered the highest levels of respondent confidence. The area that netted Trump the lowest level of confidence was his future handling of or, more precisely, his future impact on, democracy. Sixty-four percent of American respondents have no confidence in Trump in this sphere.

An overwhelming majority among the liberal cohorts (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) does not believe Trump will do a good job with respect to democracy. Some 60% of those belonging to the centrist group concur. By contrast, most of those in the “leaning conservative” (56%) and “strong conservative” (81%) groups have confidence in Trump in the democracy sphere.

Most of the conservative respondent cohort trusts Trump with regard to the economy, while most liberals do not have confidence in him in this area. Among the centrist cohort, 46% have no confidence in Trump in the economic sphere, while 35% do have confidence in him. In a breakdown by religiosity level, we see a similar distribution – most ultra-Orthodox (77%) and Orthodox Jews (58%) have confidence in Trump in the economic sphere, while most Conservative (59%) and Reform Jews (74%) do not have confidence in the incoming president with regard to the economy.

On immigration, too, the new president enjoys a high degree of confidence among politically conservative Jews – 97% of “strong conservatives” and 85% of the “leaning conservative” group say they trust Trump in this sphere. By contrast, the majority of those in the “strong liberal” (97%) and “leaning liberal” cohorts say that they do not have confidence that Trump will do a good job on immigration.

Compared to the immigration and the economic spheres, Trump elicits lower confidence in foreign relations among “strong conservatives.” As with the other spheres, most liberal respondents (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) attest to having no confidence in Trump when it comes to foreign relations. In the centrist cohort, the share of those who say they have no confidence in Trump with respect to foreign affairs (47%) is higher than the share who say they do (30%).

Half of the respondent panel (52%) does not trust Trump in the security and defense sphere. Most conservatives do trust him in this area, as do half of those in the centrist cohort (47%). Most liberal respondents also say they have no confidence that Trump will do a good job with respect to security and defense.

Further to last month’s Voice of the Jewish People survey, we looked again this month at how confident the respondent panel is that Trump will “do the right thing” in four areas – US-Israel relations, the fight against antisemitism, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Respondents expressed the highest degree of confidence in Trump around Iran. Trump’s future handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict elicited the least confidence.

A quarter (28%) of all respondents say they have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations, a quarter say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing in this sphere, and 37% say that they have a little confidence that he will do the right thing in maintaining the relationship between the two countries. Compared to last month, there was a significant decline of 20% in the share of the conservative cohorts (strong conservative + leaning conservative) who say they are confident that Trump will do the right thing with regard to US-Israel relations.

A quarter (26%) of the respondent panel has a lot of confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding the fight against antisemitism, a quarter (27%) say they have little confidence in Trump on this matter, and 40% say they have no confidence at all that he will do the right thing in fighting antisemitism. Most conservative respondents (“strong conservative” + “leaning conservative” ) have a lot of confidence in Trump in this regard, while most liberal respondents (“strong liberal” + “leaning liberal”) say they have no confidence at all. Compared with last month, there was a decline in the confidence level of those in the “leaning conservative” group on this issue – last month 69% of them said that they had a lot of confidence that Trump will act appropriately in this sphere; this month the corresponding figure was 52%.

A third of respondents (30%) have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran, a third (29%) have little confidence, and a third (31%) have no confidence at all in him on the Iran issue. Most politically conservative respondents and a third of self-identifying centrists (34%) have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding Iran. By contrast, most “strong liberals” (66%) and 40% of those “leaning liberal” report having no confidence in Trump where Iran is concerned. On this issue as well, a decline was found this month in the level of confidence placed in Trump among the “leaning conservative” cohort – last month, 69% said they had a lot of confidence in Trump vis-à-vis Iran, while this month 56% responded this way.

Forty-five percent of the respondent panel has no confidence that the new president will do the right thing regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, a quarter (27%) say they have little confidence, and only 16% say they have a lot of confidence in Trump in this regard. A large majority of “strong liberals” (81%), half of those in the “leaning liberal” cohort, and a fifth of those self-identifying as centrist (22%) say they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By contrast, most “strong conservatives” (56%), a quarter of those in the “leaning conservative” cohort (23%), and a fifth of self-identifying centrists (18%) report having a lot of confidence that Trump will act appropriately on this issue. In a breakdown by religiosity level – 45% of ultra-Orthodox respondents and a fifth of the Orthodox cohort say they have a lot of confidence that Trump will do the right thing in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Support for Israel

A majority of the respondent panel (54%) believes that the United States does not support Israel enough, 30% believe the US supports Israel enough, while 11% think the US supports Israel too much. This finding shows no change compared to previous months. The disparity consistently found on this question between the strong liberal cohort and the other groups remains unchanged this month as well: among conservatives and centrists, the dominant response is that the US does not support Israel enough. By contrast, in the “strong liberal” group, 33% feel that the US supports Israel too much.

In a breakdown by denominational affiliation, most Conservative, Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox respondents say the US does not support Israel enough. Thirty-nine percent of Reform, 30% of Conservative, and 23% of Orthodox respondents believe that the US supports Israel enough.

The vast majority of Trump voters (90%) and a third of Harris voters (32%) think the US does not support Israel enough. Forty-four percent of Harris voters feel that the US supports Israel enough, while 17% of them believe that the US supports Israel too much.

Israel at War

This month we again examined how American Jews view the question of Israeli victory. Like last month, there is no consensus among respondents on this issue. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who believe that Israel won the war. Most conservatives, 21% of centrists, 14% of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and 13% of the “strong liberal” cohort feel this way. A significant number of respondents feel that Israel has neither won nor lost the war. A low percentage across cohorts think Israel has lost the war, while an eighth to a quarter across all groups believe it is too early to say who won.

This month, there was a significant drop in the percentage of respondents who believe that Israel has won the war. Last month, 37% said they thought Israel was victorious, while only 19% thought so this month. At the same time, there has been a rise in the share of panel participants who think that Israel has lost the war. Last month only 5% felt this way, while 14% gave that response this month.

This month saw another drop in the percentage of “leaning liberal” respondents who think Israel’s actions in Gaza are “too aggressive.” Beyond that, no significant changes were found compared to earlier months on the question of Israeli aggressiveness. The share of conservatives who feel that Israel is overly aggressive has remained very low since early 2024, while the percentage of liberals and self-identifying centrists who feel this way has been on the rise almost every month – until the past few months, when the intensity of the fighting eased.

As of January, 39% of survey panel respondents feel that Israel’s actions in response to the October 7 onslaught are “not aggressive enough,” a fifth (22%) believe that Israel’s actions are at the right level, 15% think that they are a little too aggressive, and a fifth (18%) feel that they are much too aggressive. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of those who think that Israel’s response to Hamas is not aggressive enough.

Sense of Security

Most panel participants continue to report that the war in Israel compromises their sense of security to some degree. Forty percent say they feel less secure due to the war, and another 36% say that they are more worried about their personal security as Jews as a result of the war. A fifth report that Israel’s war does not affect their sense of personal security. The data indicates that the personal security level of those in the liberal cohorts is slightly lower than for respondents in the conservative groups. All groups show the persistence of a similar share, amounting to a fifth of their members, who say the war does not affect their sense of security.

There was a rise this month in the share of connected American Jews, from all religious streams, who say they feel less secure because of the war in Israel. Ultra-Orthodox respondents showed the most significant increase; last month, the share of this cohort who felt this way was 28%, while this month it was 41%. However, this finding should be treated with caution, as the percentage of ultra-Orthodox survey participants is not large. Compared to the same point in time last year, the sense of security among Reform and ultra-Orthodox respondents has weakened, while the sense of security among Conservative and Orthodox respondents has improved slightly.

This month, we also queried respondents about their views regarding Israel and the US as a “safe place for Jews to live.” Most respondents (63%) feel that Israel is “the safest place for Jews to live” (totally agree + somewhat agree with the statement). It is interesting to compare this finding with those of an identical question posed to Israeli Jews last month (in an Israel Democracy Institute survey). According to those findings, 73% of Israeli Jews think that Israel is the place where Jews can most safely live.

Among American Jews who answered this question, the percentage of respondents who think Israel is the safest place for Jews to live rises the further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative. While most “strong liberals” (51%) do not agree with the statement “Israel is the safest place for Jews to live,” most “strong conservatives” (77%) believe that the statement is correct. A breakdown by voting pattern shows that most Trump voters (77%) and most Harris voters (52%) agree that Israel is the safest place for Jews.

A similar question presented respondents with the statement: “The US is the safest place for Jews to live.” Nearly half the respondents (46%) somewhat agree with this statement. A third (31%) somewhat disagree with the statement, while less than 10% totally agree or disagree with it. Compared with the previous question, we can see that a higher percentage of survey panel respondents feel that Israel (63%) is safer for Jews than the US (54%). It should be noted that the questions were posed separately, and both could be responded to with affirmative agreement or disagreement to varying degrees. A fifth of respondents, in fact, said that both Israel and the US are the safest places for Jews to live.

Closeness to Israel and to Judaism

We have assessed the connection of US Jews to Israel several times since the October 7 attacks. Over the past year, there has been a consistent respondent majority who assert that the events of the past year have caused them to feel closer to Israel. At the same time, there has also been a consistent percentage (10-16%) who say that these events make them feel more distant from Israel and a similarly consistent share of a quarter who report no difference in their feelings one way or the other.

This month there was a slight drop in the percentage of respondents across all ideological cohorts who say that events in Israel make them feel closer to Israel. This month recorded the lowest percentage of “strong liberal,” “centrist,” and “strong conservative” respondents who reported that what is happening in Israel makes them feel closer to Israel. As of this moment, a quarter (28%) of “strong liberals,” half of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and most conservatives and centrists say that what is currently going on in Israel makes them feel closer to the country.

Friend Groups

We included a question this month about respondents’ social lives. Half (52%) reported that it’s easier for them to forge friendships with Jews, while another 46% said that whether someone is Jewish or not has no bearing on their ability to build a friendship with them. The further one moves along the religious spectrum from Reform to ultra-Orthodox, the higher the share responding that it’s easier to forge friendships with Jews than with non-Jews. It is also worth noting the correlation between the rise in respondent share more comfortable making friends with Jews, and the number of Israel visits. While a third (31%) of respondents who have never visited Israel say that it’s easier for them to build relationships with Jews, two-thirds (64%) of those who have lived in Israel for a period of time say this.

In a question about friendship with Israelis, most respondent panel participants (66%) report that whether someone is Israeli or not has no effect on their ability to forge a friendship with them. A fifth (22%) say that it’s easier for them to build friendships with Israelis. A quarter of all respondents say that it’s easier for them to forge friendships with both Jews and Israelis.

Survey Data and Its Implications

This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 734 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The report includes an appendix describing panel member characteristics, and differences between it and American-Jewish groups surveyed by other organizations.

In general, it can be said that JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People surveys tend to reflect the views of “connected” American Jews, that is, Jews with a relatively strong attachment to the Jewish community and/or Israel, and/or to Jewish identity.

Appendix: Methodology

After a year of continuous activity and following a detailed analysis of the data on JPPI’s respondent panel, its composition and views, we will now, starting this month, publish a general statistic that reflects the position of what we will be referring to here as “connected American Jews.” This reflects a maturation of the Voice of the Jewish People panel and the stabilization of the survey respondent sample in a way that allows us to now represent it as a coherent group. The trends observed among this group, in our view, have a significance that reaches beyond breakdowns into sub-groups based on religious stream (Reform, Conservative, ultra-Orthodox, etc.), or political orientation (liberal, conservative, centrist).

The group of connected Jews we are tracking is – as the designation suggests – a group whose degree of connection to the Jewish people, the Jewish community, Jewish institutions, Jewish identity, and/or Israel is strong – certainly compared to American Jewry writ large. To illustrate the group’s characteristics, we present here a few comparisons between connected Jews and US Jewry more broadly. Our underlying assumption is that there is value and interest in its frequent and continuous monitoring, along with less-frequent tracking of American Jewry in general, given that a certain dominance can be ascribed to it in setting the American Jewish community’s “agenda,” to the extent that the community has an identifiable and distinct voice.

The “connected” group is not, of course, identical in composition to the American Jewish community as a whole, and its views are not representative of all US Jews. On certain issues, the differences between our respondent panel and the wider US Jewish community are substantial and significant. On many other subjects, the gaps are negligible. Either way, regular tracking of the connected Jewish community certainly doesn’t obviate the need for periodic consideration and assessment of the views of American Jewry as a whole, as conducted by a variety of organizations.

What does this mean in practical terms? It means that starting this month, a single weighted response will be presented for every question in the Voice of the Jewish People surveys – a response that expresses the aggregate view of our respondent panel. These general-result statistics will be presented after weighting by religious stream and political orientation, in order to maintain consistency from survey to survey. Alongside these statistics, we will also, as usual, present sub-breakdowns by religious stream, ideological camp, and other characteristics as needed (age, connection to Jewish institutions, voting patterns, Israel visits, and the like). Month-to-month trend shifts will also continue to be monitored. As part of the analysis, we will, of course note the specific origins of the shifts, if any (for example: strong liberal Jews changed their view, causing the total to change, while in other cases strong-conservative Jews changed their view, causing the total to change).

The framework of the connected community, as presented in the Voice of the Jewish People surveys this year, was established after an in-depth assessment of data from JPPI surveys and other surveys of American Jewry – the Pew Research Center’s comprehensive survey from the start of the decade figuring chiefly among them. The Voice of the Jewish People scientific adviser, Professor David Steinberg of Tel Aviv University, examined JPPI’s respondent panel, the major characteristics of panel participants over the course of a year’s activity, against the characteristics of respondents to other surveys of American Jews. This assessment enables us to set a framing standard that will be maintained via the sampling and weighting of data, such that the significance of responses given from month to month will remain the same – because the group surveyed will remain the same. In other words, the connected American Jews of January and the connected American Jews of December will have similar characteristics, making it possible to reach meaningful and insightful conclusions from changes and trends we will detect moving forward.

A central characteristic of JPPI’s respondent panel, which can be compared with the general American Jewish population, concerns the degree of representation of “religious streams.” In general, our panel of connected Jews has a higher representation of Jews affiliated with religious streams and a higher incidence of religious activity. The Panel’s share of Orthodox Jews is three times higher than in the general Jewish population, while the percentage of Conservatives is nearly double. The percentage reporting affiliation with “other” streams is much larger – nearly one out of every six respondents versus 1 out of every 25 in the general American Jewish population. A group that is significantly underrepresented vis-à-vis American Jewry as a whole comprises Jews who are unaffiliated with any recognized stream of Judaism. The table below shows the representation of religious groups on the JPPI’s panel in comparison with Pew data.

As part of our data analysis on the entire respondent panel, and on the 2024 survey participants, we looked at many variables such as religious-stream affiliation (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox, other), political orientation, levels of Jewish identity and parental identity, visits to Israel, connection to Israel, and traditional practices. In some cases, the possible responses to questions are worded differently in different surveys, which may explain incongruities in the findings. Even so, there are major points that are easy to identify. Nearly all of JPPI’s panel participants are Jews “by religion” (96% versus 73% of the American Jewish community as a whole, per Pew data). A large majority of JPPI’s panel participants report that both of their parents are Jews (84% versus 69% per Pew data on all US Jews).

Assessment of panel data on religious practices also enables us to make certain comparisons with other surveys that examine American Jewry as a whole. For example, 83% of JPPI respondents reported having attended a Passover seder, compared to 62% in a Pew survey of American Jews (albeit from a different year). On Yom Kippur, 47% of JPPI’s respondent panel reported having fully fasted, and another 27% had engaged in a partial fast – for a total of 74%. In the Pew survey (2020), 46% reported having engaged in a partial or complete fast. Although these differences do not refer to the same year, there is clearly a disparity between surveys that does not reflect a sudden leap in the percentage of those observing the traditional Yom Kippur fast, but is rather a reflection of the fact that our panel comprises “connected” Jews whose level of traditional observance is higher. Similarly, with the approach of Hanukkah and Christmas, most Voice of the Jewish People survey respondents reported that they were planning to light Hanukkah candles on each of the holiday’s eight nights. The candle-lighting rate in JPPI’s survey is also higher than in other surveys of American Jewry as a whole, 90% of the JPPI respondent panel reported lighting candles every night (or most nights). A large majority of our respondent panel participants (90%) said that there would be no Christmas trees in their homes. This is a higher percentage than that obtained by the Pew Research Center in 2013, when 32% of US Jews said that they would have Christmas trees in their homes during that survey year’s holiday period (27% of Jews by religion).

The most striking component of how JPPI’s respondent panel reflects the identity of “connected” Jews has to do with connection to Israel. Over six out of every ten panel participants have visited Israel more than once; only one in five of them have never visited Israel. This is a markedly different finding than that obtained for the American Jewish community as a whole.

Similarly, and perhaps most strikingly, a higher percentage of JPPI panel participants report a stronger connection to Israel than do American Jews in general. In this case, the wording of the question is not identical to the Pew survey, but a reasonable comparison of categories points to the difference. Comparison to other surveys reveals similar findings. For example, a 2021 AJC survey included a question about the importance of connection to Israel for Jewish identity (“How important, if at all, is being connected with Israel to your Jewish identity?”). In the survey’s findings, which represent American Jewry in its entirety (though with some differences from the Pew survey), 29% said that connection with Israel was “very important,” and 31% said it was “somewhat important.” The JPPI panel reflects, in general, the views of Jews whose attachment to Israel is clearly stronger than the broader American Jewish population.

Regarding political orientation, the JPPI panel has a slightly, though not significantly, more conservative bent than American Jewry as a whole. The following table provides a comparison with the Pew survey used in all of the comparisons, but juxtapositions with other surveys have been made as well. For example, the 2014 AJC survey, which regularly skews more conservative, categorized American Jews as follows: 29% liberal, 19% leaning liberal, 32% “moderate” (as opposed to the JPPI designation “centrist”), 9% leaning conservative, and 11% conservative (1% did not respond). Overall, the AJC survey found 47% of US Jews to be liberal (a finding in line with JPPI surveys), 32% “moderate” (lower than in JPPI surveys), and 20% conservative, versus 28% for the JPPI panel.

In JPPI’s ongoing research, our goal is to continue monitoring respondent panel characteristics and, when needed, to update the group framework and, accordingly, the way trends we track are presented. Because the panel is still in an early stage of development, such assessments will be made every six months. The framework evaluations will also be carried out during periods of dramatic increase in the number of panel participants (after a participant-recruitment campaign).

The post Voice of the Jewish People – US Jews on Confidence in Trump, the Hostage Deal, and the War in Israel first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

About one-fifth of the general public—and about a quarter of Jewish respondents—prefer to halt the hostage deal after the first phase and resume fighting in Gaza to topple Hamas.

Among Arab respondents, three out of four support completing the deal, while only a small minority favors a return to fighting.

The survey was conducted late last week and early this week, with findings released ahead of the meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington DC, where the continuation of negotiations for the release of the hostages will also be discussed.

A similar JPPI survey in January found that 55% of the public supported the statement: “We can agree to Hamas’ demands and bring back the hostages, as there will always be a way to resume fighting later.”

Analyzing responses by ideological affiliation, outside of respondents who identify as right wing, there is a majority in favor of “completing the hostage deal in full and deciding later on Hamas rule in Gaza”— while among those on right, nearly half (48%) support returning to war after the first phase of the deal, compared to about a third (32%) who support continuing with the deal.

Looking at party affiliation, supporters of two parties—Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit—stand out in their preference for resuming the war after the first phase. Seventy percent of Religious Zionism supporters and 60% of Otzma Yehudit supporters (those who say they would vote for these parties today) favor returning to war.

However, when analyzed by religiosity level, a majority of religious respondents (who do not all vote for these parties) prefer completing the deal (45% vs. 38% who prefer stopping the deal after the first phase).

Among current Likud supporters, there is a slight majority in favor of continuing the deal (43% vs. 40%). Opposition party supporters overwhelmingly prefer continuing the deal—89% of National Unity supporters, 98% of Yesh Atid supporters, 79% of Yisrael Beytenu supporters, and 99% of Democratic Party supporters.

The post A Large Majority Supports Completing the Hostage Deal; Only 20% Prefer to Halt Progress and Resume the War first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

Respondents were asked about their stance regarding President Trump’s proposal to relocate Gaza’s Arab population to another country.

– 43% of all Israelis believe Trump’s plan is “practical” and should be pursued.

– Among Jewish Israelis, a narrow majority of 52% holds this view.

– An additional 30% of Israeli Jews responded that the plan is “not practical, but desirable,” meaning they support it but do not see it as realistically feasible. Altogether, more than eight out of ten Jewish Israelis support the plan.

Approximately 14% of all Israelis (13% of Jews) consider the plan a “distraction,” which does not indicate outright opposition but does reflect skepticism about engaging with it. 13% of Israelis believe Trump’s proposal is “immoral”. This group is overwhelmingly Arab (54% of Arab respondents hold this view). Among Jews, only 3% consider the plan “immoral.”

Support by Ideological Affiliation:

– Among right-wing and right-center groups, there is a clear majority who believe the plan is both desirable and practical (81% on the right, 57% on the right-center).

– On the center and center-left, there is a majority in favor of the plan, but fewer believe it is practical (31% in the center).

– Only among the left, a relatively small group (about 7% of all Jews), is there a majority expressing reservations about the plan’s feasibility or morality. Even in this group, moral opposition is not dominant (about 27% of left-wing Jews, roughly 3% of all Jewish Israelis).

Support by Party Affiliation:

– 71% of Likud voters believe the plan is both desirable and practical.

– 51% of National Unity (HaMahane HaMamlachti) voters believe it is desirable but not practical.

– 62% of Labor (Avoda) voters consider the plan either a “distraction” or “immoral.”

Shifting Views on Population Transfer Overall, the idea of significantly relocating Gaza’s Palestinian population—once considered illegitimate by many Israelis—now enjoys broad support among Jewish Israelis. When there is opposition, it is typically based on practicality (“a distraction”) rather than principle.

Surveys conducted in the 1990s and mid-2000s on the transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank generally found support levels of 40–50% among Jewish Israelis.

The post Majority of Israelis Support Trump’s Proposal to Relocate Gaza’s Population to Other Countries first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.

“I CAN’T BREATHE – LET ME BREATHE!” –

Shouted 80-year-old Israeli hostage Gadi Moses into the crushing crowd of HAMAS terrorists and civilian gawkers on Thursday in Khan Yunis, on his 482nd day of captivity since October 7th, as he was frog-marched to the Red Cross van to his freedom.

This cry immediately brought back the terrible refrain of George Floyd as a Minneapolis police officer leaned on his neck for 8 interminable minutes on 25 May 2020, that set off nation-wide riots and reflection in the wake of murder. [It wasn’t the first time this stifled scream had reverberated either – it was also the final words of the Eric Gardner as he was suffocated in a choke-hold by the NYPD in July 2014.] In the violence of Floyd’s death, he gave us a new vocabulary to fight injustice everywhere.

“I Can’t Breathe” soon became the slogan of activism, of resistance, and of speaking truth in the face of power — so much so it was printed on T-shirts, painted on street murals, and became a hashtag on social media.

Ultimately, it became an international cri de coeur heard around the world — including adopted by the Palestinians as part of their call for liberation.

But how could the struggle from Minneapolis to Palestine lead to this?

The images from the hostage release should shock the conscience of everyone who resists oppression, inequality, and racism around the world. This is not the arc of the moral universe bending toward justice, this is the arc of the universe bending toward shame and savagery.

I wonder if the world watching television or millennial progressives scrolling on social media look at these images of terrified young women and a determined elderly man paraded through lynch mob of masked men and jeering and leering civilians (including women and children filming on their phones) and think to themselves: have we been supporting the wrong side?

Does it cross their minds that their occupations of the quad, street protests, and media campaigns led to this moment?

That all the “good humanitarians” — the International Red Cross, the United Nations, and the NGOs — have conspired in this brutality beamed around the world on state-sponsored terrorist TV of Al-Jazeera?

That their accusations of starvation, dehumanization, and even attempted genocide truthfully apply to the frail and flummoxed hostages experiencing one last act of total violation and humiliation on their way home?

[Do they stop to think that Shiri Bibas and her two children Kfir (2) and Ariel (5) are still there? And more elderly men, fathers, sons, brothers, partners, and friends, including US citizens, who may only come home in a coffin?]

I can’t breathe watching these images because my faith in the fundamental righteousness of Palestinian statehood has been shaken by their monstrousness and villainy. Humans that take 80-year-old men, young women, (and babies) hostage are people who simply do not understand the meaning of justice or freedom. They are thugs who abuse theories of rights, citizenship, and equality. HAMAS and its supporters (including civilians who joined this cruelty today and for the past 482 days as accomplices in the hostage-taking, torture, and murder of over 1200 civilians) are not members of a brotherhood of men — they are members of death cult.

Gadi Moses, hope against hope, returned to his family today on his own two feet — pushed through the crowd with the dignity of his white-haired head held high. Arbel Yehud, manhandled by the same men who may have mistreated her in unimaginable ways for the past 14 months, made her way toward freedom. Agam Berger, alone on a stage, stared down swarms of men who didn’t have the courage to reveal their own faces, with superhuman strength to survive.

But if this is what from Minneapolis to Palestine is to mean — so many deaths have been in vain. This is perversion of justice that so many struggles for freedom — from American civil rights to South African apartheid — have embodied.

There have been many jugs of ink spilled on the end of allyship after October 7th and how former companions in just causes — from racial equality, to feminism, to climate change — turned their backs on the Jewish community. That a history dating back to 1967 has now culminated in a definitive parting of ways of Zionism and the Left and the complete subordination of identity politics toward Palestinian liberation. But today need not be the end of history –

I hope that the scenes of incontrovertible inhumanity are a watershed moment about the future of “From the River to the Sea” — that some people doom-scrolling and channel-surfing may finally admit to themselves that this has taken their own breath away and they are now gasping for air as much as grasping at straws about what solidarity can mean in the face of such sadism.

Martin Luther King Jr. preached that the arc of the moral universe is long but bends toward justice — may today be that moment of inflection that will bring us closer to our ideals as civilized people.

TOI

The post ‘I Can’t Breathe!’ From George Floyd to Gadi Moses first appeared on The Jewish People Policy Institue.