The Archdiocese of Detroit’s plan to bring the civil status of parishes and their properties into line with Catholic canon law (and for that matter, with sound ecclesiology) is unusual only in that too few arch/bishops have undertaken to do likewise in their respective churches. Let’s recall the example of one bishop who did.
Back in 2003, Bp. Robert Vasa, then of the Diocese of Baker OR, undertook a tedious task.
Knowing canon law (which regarded parish property as belonging to parishes, not to dioceses, and certainly not to bishops, per Canons 515 § 3 and 1256), aware of Roman directives dating back a century (see Canon Law Digest II: 444-445) to avoid confusion in this regard, and alert to the post-conciliar ecclesiology of the parish community (Lumen gentium 26, Christus Dominus 30, and Canon 515 § 1) which respected parishes as legitimate churches, Vasa carefully set about distinguishing parishes and their assets from the diocese and its bishop (which Oregon’s old ‘corporation sole’ model for handling parishes and dioceses struggled to do), by separately incorporating all of the parishes of the Baker diocese and re-registering the properties already canonically assigned to parishes as properties civilly belonging to each parish.
Because, however, the Baker diocese also faced, about that time, more in clergy sexual abuse claims than the diocese was financially worth, Vasa’s project, which gave the appearance of reducing the number and worth of Church assets that till then had been perceived (understandably, but wrongly) as being diocesan property, was lambasted by plaintiff’s attorneys who suspected Vasa’s move was some kind of ‘asset hiding’ or a ploy to dodge payments to abuse victims. It was, of course, no such thing, and in one of my earliest blogs (here, scroll to February 5), I said so.
Anyway, plaintiff’s lawyers obtained (to no one’s great surprise) a temporary restraining order against Vasa’s incorporation and property registration plans but, upon demonstration that his project was supported by factors having nothing to do with avoiding responsibility to abuse victims, that TRO was soon lifted and the reorganization was completed.
Fast forward to 2018, wherein Abp. Allen Vigneron is undertaking a similarly tedious task, i.e., separately incorporating AOD parishes and civilly re-registering, as parochial, properties that canonically belong to those parishes. Predictably, his move is being blasted in various outlets as ‘asset hiding’, including by quoting some plaintiffs’ lawyers who dismiss this sound application of canon law as mere “club rules”. Such contempt from American attorneys for the canon laws by which the Catholic Church carries on her mission is nothing new, of course. Canon lawyers have seen such disparagement of Church law for, oh, about a thousand years before there even was this thing called American law. It will doubtless be repeated by others equally ill-informed.
Meanwhile, ironically, it is Vigneron who, like Vasa before him, respecting Church law and heeding the ecclesiology of parish and diocese, is being criticized for acting after his predecessors had done little or nothing to address this serious disconnect between the canon and civil laws regarding the basic structure of parishes and the registration of their property.
If the text recently sent to me really was the homily that Fr. Don LaCuesta preached at the funeral Mass of a young man who suddenly killed himself a few days ago, for which homily LaCuesta has been savaged in the print and electronic media and even (temporarily, I assume, while the facts are sorted) deprived of faculties for preaching, all I can say is, God bless Fr. LaCuesta.
Note, first, how short this homily is. Perfectly in line with canonical and liturgical norms for such cases.
More importantly, and flatly contrary to how LaCuesta’s homily has been portrayed in the media, I don’t see Hell mentioned anywhere, anywhere, nor any language that relegates this poor young man thereto, and instead I see clarion reminders of the mercy of Christ recited at least half-a-dozen times. I see, too, the moral gravity of suicide—itself approaching epidemic proportions among Americans today—directly acknowledged and fears about its eternal consequences candidly admitted, but I also see consoling references to how much more God knows about one’s life than do those even closest to him and how much that deeper, likely mitigating, divine knowledge leaves the rest of us mortals, grieving a suicide, room for real hope. And I see sincere sympathy for the powerless, abject suffering visited on those left behind by a suicide, on people who would have moved heaven and earth to help a child seriously considering self-destruction, but who are now forever bereft of that chance (save for their prayers for the departed, of course).
And yet these few, balanced, honest, words were twice interrupted by family members for their failure ‘to celebrate the life of the deceased’, and the secular media, always ready to encourage a ‘Let’s you and him fight’ scenario when it comes to Catholics and the Church, fomented a picture of this priest as a heartless thug without citing so much as a single independently-reported word of his homily? Crimeny.
So here’s my suggestion: when the perfect homily for funeral Masses of those who kill themselves is composed we’ll send it right off to all priests ever called upon to deliver one. Till then, parish priests might want to look at Fr. LaCuesta’s homily for some good thoughts and ideas.
I do not know Fr. Don LaCuesta or the Hullibarger family nor do I know what LaCuesta said in his homily at last week’s funeral for 18-year-old Maison Hullibarger (who had killed himself some days before) or how LaCuesta said what he said (reports here and here). Such caveats, however, in light of my treatments of other issues related to the canon law on Church funerals, might qualify me to make some objective comments on the controversy erupting in the wake of LaCuesta’s funeral homily wherein, it seems, Maison’s ‘life was not celebrated’ and doubts about his entry into heaven were expressed. Three points need to inform discussion of this controversy.
First, until just a generation ago and for many centuries before, controversy over homilies delivered at the Catholic funerals of suicides was unheard of for the simple reason that Church law forbade all funerals for suicides, so, no funeral homilies on suicide could have been preached. See 1917 CIC 1240 § 1, n. 3. With the appearance of the Johanno-Pauline Code, however, the prohibition of funerals for suicides was dropped (see 1983 CIC 1184). True, a qualified restriction on funerals for those who die in “manifest sin” remains (and suicide is unquestionably a grievous sin, see CCC 2280-2281), but the nearly-universal pastoral practice is to accord funerals to suicides in light of legitimate questions about, among other things, the likely-diminished psychological freedom enjoyed by someone who suddenly kills himself (CCC 2282) and in deference to the doctrinally-sound hope that, in ways unknown to us, God may save such persons (CCC 2283).
Second, nothing in liturgical or canon law suggests that Catholic funerals are intended to serve as ‘celebrations of one’s life.’ Instead the primary focus of funeral rites is on “the paschal mystery of Christ”. Rite of Funerals, Intro., n. 1. Per the USCCB, “At the funeral liturgy, the Church gathers with the family and friends of the deceased to give praise and thanks to God for Christ’s victory over sin and death, to commend the deceased to God’s tender mercy and compassion, and to seek strength in the proclamation of the Paschal Mystery. The funeral liturgy, therefore, is an act of worship, and not merely an expression of grief.” Some brief “words of remembrance” of the deceased are permitted (usually just before the end of the funeral Mass) but these are to be brief and nothing like a eulogy or ‘celebration of a life’ now sadly gone.
Third, while every Catholic should die in hope of salvation, none (absent private revelation) dies with the certainty of salvation, a fact that, in turn, obliges the family, friends, and the wider Christian community of the deceased to pray for the departed—no matter how they died—and to avoid attitudes that discourage prayers for the dead such as happens with the modern mindset that, basically, everybody’s good and we all go to heaven. This sort of thinking, a species of presumption (CCC 2092), has become common among clergy and laity and has impacted attitudes toward death, judgment, and the meaning of funerals. For example, a cleric of the Archdiocese of Chicago holds that “For a priest to even hint that the person [who kills himself] might not be in heaven is grossly wrong.” This priest’s claim, of course, is precisely what is “grossly wrong”, but it is consistent with his condemnation of others “who view suicide as a mortal sin,” supposedly because “That [assessment] has been categorically denied by church leadership.” Again, this cleric’s claim is rubbish but years of such sloppy talk has seduced many into a superficially comfortable, but doctrinally indefensible and pastorally dangerous, way of thinking about death—whether by suicide or otherwise.
At this point, though, without specific knowledge of what LaCuesta actually said, my citing to canons on homilies in general (including those norms that call for the doctrine of the Church to be preached therein, such as Canons 769-769) and to rubrics that call for funeral homilies to be brief and phrased so as to avoid “offending those who mourn”, per the Rite), would be of little avail. The Archdiocese of Detroit has restricted LaCuesta’s faculties for preaching at funerals (I imagine, per Canon 764) and one trusts that, in taking such action against LaCuesta, they had access to more specific information about his homily than was available in main stream media reports. If LaCuesta said the right thing the right way, he should be defended; if he said the right thing the wrong way, he should be corrected; if he said the wrong thing the wrong way, he should be chastised.
Meanwhile, those seizing upon this young man’s devastating choice, his family’s unimaginable grief, and the as-yet uncertain remarks of a homilist, to misrepresent Christian teaching against self-murder, to presume the salvation of anyone, and to minimize the need to assist the dead with our prayers, should cease their harmful talk.
Update: 17 Dec 2018.
An essay published some five years ago purporting “to clear up confusion about excommunication” recently popped up again and sowed anew confusion on several aspects of excommunication. I don’t recall responding to the original publication but I will briefly respond now.
Preliminarily, there are, of course, several good points made in the essay, such as noting that excommunication is rarely imposed these days and that the sanction is primarily aimed at the reform of the offender. But at least two hot-button issues related to excommunication were wrongly presented in the essay and warrant correction.
The first is the mistaken idea that, upon excommunication, a “person is no longer a member of the Catholic Church.” Actually an excommunicated Catholic is still a Catholic in rather the same way that a convicted felon is still a citizen. An excommunicated Catholic is simply (sadly, but simply) a Catholic who is excommunicated.
Canon 205 recognizes as Catholic any baptized person who is joined with the Church “in its visible structure by the bonds of profession of faith, of the sacraments, and of ecclesiastical governance.” Now a priest who, say, violates the seal of confession (an excommunicable offense under 1983 CIC 1388) might well believe everything Catholics believe, share in the seven sacraments to the extent allowed by canon law (and, mind, all Catholics are restricted from certain sacraments under certain conditions), and acknowledge the governance of the Church in the very act of accepting the excommunication and in working diligently to have it lifted—as happens from time to time. Such a priest, regretting his act and distressed by his excommunication, does not need to make a ‘profession of faith’ (as if he were coming into full communion from some other religious body) but rather admits his specific fault and seeks the lifting of the Church sanction.
If the foregoing does not suffice to show that excommunicated Catholics are still Catholics (albeit excommunicated ones), consider: excommunicated Catholics are still bound to attend Mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation (1983 CIC 1247), something non-Catholics are not required to do; excommunicated Catholics are still bound to observe the Church’s laws on marriage (1983 CIC 1059) something non-Catholics are not required to do; and excommunicated Catholics are still bound to contribute to the material needs of the Church (1983 CIC 222, 1262), something non-Catholics are not required to do. I could list another score of canons that excommunicated Catholics are bound to observe in ways that non-Catholics are not so bound, again, in rather the same way that felons are still bound by the laws of the state while in prison (e.g., prisoners are still subject to income taxes and might have to file tax returns from behind bars). All of these serve to demonstrate that excommunicated Catholics are still Catholic.
In short, while there are some ways for a Catholic to cease juridically being a Catholic (e.g., “defection” from the Church, a topic too far afield from ours), excommunication is not such a way. Excommunicated Catholics are still Catholic. Bad Catholics, sure; but Catholics.
Second is the mistaken idea that “legislators who promote abortion and make it possible … surely must incur the penalty” of excommunication. No, they don’t, but I have made this point in so many venues that I see little use in making it again. Those interested in seeing why those reprehensible Catholics who vote to legalize abortion are, for all that, not excommunicated for abortion, or for anything else, (as if, you know, merely dodging excommunication for one’s evil deeds suffices to show the goodness of such deeds) can look here or more generally here for more information.
There are still other problems in the recirculated essay—such as its uncritical reference to the lifting of Lefebvrite excommunications and to the subsequently regretted lifting of Williamson’s sanction, both matters I consider to have been canonically botched, as discussed here: Edward Peters, “Benedict XVI’s remission of the Lefebvrite excommunications: an analysis and alternative explanation”, Studia Canonica 45 (2011) 165-189; reprinted in Canon Law Society of Great Britain & Ireland Newsletter 172 (Dec 2012) 1, 8-29—but let the above two examples suffice to show that, in dealing with matters of canon law, especially penal canon law, and most especially with matters of excommunication, readers should beware.
Ceterum, poenae latae sententiae delendae sunt.
If Pope Francis wants to change the canon law forbidding ecclesiastical funeral rites for “manifest sinners who cannot be granted ecclesiastical funerals without scandal” (1983 CIC 1184 § 1 n. 1) he can do so. Till then Church law forbidding such funerals, a law that dates back many centuries, remains in effect, and its apparent gross violation last week by clergy of the Archdiocese of Boston, who (seemingly with approval from the chancery), granted notorious mob murderer James “Whitey” Bulger a Catholic funeral Mass, hardly justifies granting Church funerals to other “manifest sinners” who do not give “some signs of repentance before death”—which no one claims Bulger gave—not that that fact gave James Martin, sj, any pause before tweeting Bulger’s funeral as preemptive justification for Church funerals for “LGBT person[s even though] they are married”.
To be sure, few priests and prelates seem willing to observe even the softened canon law restricting ecclesiastical funerals that has been in effect since 1983. One bishop who did observe it was Brooklyn Bp. Thomas Daily who denied ecclesiastical funeral rites to John “the Dapper Don” Gotti, an American Mafia chieftain who died in prison in 2001. I defended Daily’s refusal here: Edward Peters, “Lest amateurs argue canon law: a reply to Patrick Gordon’s brief against Bp. Thomas Daily”, Angelicum 83 (2006) 121-142, on-line here. In accord with canon law (e.g., 1983 CIC 901), I would note, a later memorial Mass was permitted for Gotti (just as one would be permitted for Bulger and Martin’s ‘same-sex spouses’). But other bishops who think that canon law means what canon law says, besides Madison WI Bp. Morlino and Springfield IL Bp. Paprocki, seem few.
Now, to be clear (in case some folks think law means always having to say No) following the canon law on funerals does not always mean refusing such rites in controversial cases. For example, in 2009 the Archdiocese of Boston accorded the notoriously pro-abortion, etc., Sen. Edward Kennedy a Church funeral, a decision I defended as being within the law given public evidence that Kennedy had met the admittedly very low canonical standards for giving “signs of repentance” prior to his death. See Edward Peters, “Still trying to get the Kennedy funeral lessons right”, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly 34/1 (Spring 2011) 57-59. As I said, though, no such claims were offered re Bulger.
So if all of this boils down to, the canon law on funerals is not well understood for clergy or laity, and it might be pastorally more trouble than it’s worth, I say, okay, then explain and enforce the law as is, or modify, re-explain, and enforce a reformed law. But don’t leave the law in place, yet disregarded. There are good reasons for and against the law as written—pace, I would say, murder-suicides, and especially family annihilators like Steven Suepple, cases for which no justification, I think, can be found—but for the rest I am willing to hear arguments for and against. So are many thoughtful others.
Till then, however, “manifest sinners” such as Whitey Bulger should not be accorded Church funeral rites and media priests such as Martin should not parlay violations of canon law into a reason to violate it again. That spreads disrespect for law and for the values it seeks to uphold; it implies that breaking the law itself justifies breaking it again. Of that mentality we need no more.
And may James Bulger, and his dozen-plus victims, rest in peace.
Most Catholics correctly, but incompletely, understand schism as “the refusal of submission to the Supreme Pontiff” (1983 CIC 751). Overlooked here—perhaps because it is much rarer than is typical ‘anti-papal schism’ and is harder to spot when it does occur—is the second kind of schism, namely, “the refusal … of communion with the members of the Church subject to him” (1983 CIC 751). In other words schism comes in two varieties, ‘vertical schism’ whereby one refuses submission to the Roman Pontiff and ‘horizontal schism’ whereby one refuses to extend that Christian unity owed to others who are, in fact, in union with the pope. If the poster boy for vertical schism was, say, Martin Luther, the horizontal schismatic is, I suggest, one whose devotion to the pope is so extreme that he regards as disloyal those who don’t share his opinions on all things papal and, for that reason, shuns them.
Of course Catholics’ opinions on popes and prelates may vary widely, and, to be sure, the canonical requirements for proving schism, vertical or horizontal, in actual cases are high. But Catholics critical of Pope Francis and/or his governance of the Church—Catholics, mind, in full communion with the Church per Canon 205—notwithstanding their demonstrable communion with the pope, are frequently disparaged these days, sometimes by ranking bishops, as being adversaries, accusers, and gossip-mongers. To some extent, of course, such verbal insults should be written off as Life in This Valley of Tears and those subjected to them simply reminded that others have endured far harsher treatment for the Faith. But lately I wonder whether this demonizing of papal critics risks taking a canonical turn.
Long-time Vaticanista Marco Tosatti recently claimed (Eng. trans. here) that word has been passed down by papal representatives to bishops not to invite Raymond Cdl. Burke to their dioceses and that, should Burke appear at an event in their churches, they should not even appear with him. If this report is true, then understand: bishops working in close collaboration with the pope are instructing other bishops to avoid and, if necessary, to refuse manifestations of Christian unity due to a bishop who is, beyond any question, in full communion with him and them. That report, if true, would suggest something well beyond mere verbal disparagement of a fellow bishop.
Again, journalist claims of such counter-catholic (in the sense of ‘unity’ and ‘oneness’) directives are a long way from constituting proof of horizontal schism in their authors, but that such measures could even be plausibly alleged is a sign of the times and deeply troubling. Like Catholics admonished to avoid sin and even near occasions of sin so prelates should avoid schism and even actions suggestive of schismatic attitudes. If such disgraceful directives were quietly issued may they be quietly and quickly withdrawn; if they were even contemplated may be they be rejected lest they open the door to even deeper divisions than we already suffer.
It needs no long blog post from a canon lawyer to explain how wrong would be a failure by a bishop to protect his faithful against scandal (CCC 2284, 2287) and/or to defend the Eucharist against potential sacrilege (CCC 2120) but, make no mistake, in reiterating that “it is not [his] policy” to withhold holy Communion from persons in ‘same-sex marriages’, that is what Cdl. Cupich’s refusal to act as ‘the guardian of the entire liturgical life in the church entrusted to him’ (c. 835 § 1) and “to exercise vigilance so that abuses do not creep into ecclesiastical discipline, especially regarding … the celebration of the sacraments and sacramentals, [and] the worship of God” (c. 392 § 2) in this matter, does.
Cupich’s failure ‘to bishop’ in this regard, of course, effectively abandons his pastors and other ministers of holy Communion to face alone the anger of some Catholics in ‘same-sex marriages’ who (like persons in merely civil marriages following divorce) must nevertheless be refused holy Communion by pastors correctly recognizing that, no matter what their archbishop doesn’t say, they are still required by canon law not to admit to holy Communion those who ‘obstinately persevere in manifest grave sin’ (c. 915).
Canon 915, as has been explained many, many times, rests on ancient, indeed Biblical, foundations, nothing in modern canon law or recent magisterial literature annuls it, and it unquestionably applies in regard to Catholics who have attempted a ‘same-sex marriage’. But it might still be useful to explicitate briefly the application of Canon 915 in some same-sex pastoral situations.
1. A homosexual inclination or orientation does not, in anyone’s opinion, disqualify a person from being admitted to holy Communion.
2. Cohabitation by homosexuals does not, in my opinion, disqualify them from being admitted to holy Communion because one does not assume that persons of the same sex are engaged in sexual activity (and in this respect, yes, homosexual cohabitation differs from heterosexual, or has differed, according to about 5,000 years of recorded human behavior).
3. Attempted civil marriage between persons of the same sex (just like those following divorce between heterosexuals) disqualifies, in the common and constant opinion of learned persons (which I share), such Catholics from being admitted to holy Communion because the sign-values that marriage (c. 1055) enjoys in the Church and civil society—itself a public sign proclaimed, by the way, irrespective of whatever private sexual activity might or might not be occurring between the persons involved—are contradicted by persons purporting to be in a ‘marriage’ that cannot be a marriage.
The above analysis applies, I suggest, even if it is not promoted by local Church authorities.
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PS: Speaking of Chicago, has an announcement been made yet that the two Chicago-based priests recently arrested for XXXing each other in a car parked a short distance from a playground in Miami will be prosecuted canonically toward their dismissal from the clerical state? If not, might one ask what the delay is?
