This guide is written at a time of a prolonged war in Israel. This war broke out after a year of struggles over the essence of Israeli democracy, and following the COVID-19 pandemic. The implications of these three crises on the role of women in Israeli society and the economy are gradually becoming clear, and with them, the threat to women’s rights. Alongside these implications, we can also identify opportunities for the construction of a democratic and just society, in which gender equality serves as a cornerstone.

Using test cases from Israel and worldwide, we illustrate how gender lens philanthropy can lead to significant and sustainable change. These cases highlight the huge potential of this approach – from realizing values of equality and justice to creating a broad socioeconomic impact and maximizing the effectiveness of grants.

Based among other things on research undertaken to identify challenges and opportunities for the adoption of a gendered perspective in philanthropy, the guide provides knowledge on gender gaps in a variety of social fields in Israel: health, employment, welfare, education, personal safety, civil and family status, the environment, sports, and culture. For each field, we present major challenges as well as action items for philanthropy that can reduce gaps and promote equality.

The guide offers a wide variety of directions for action, from support for dedicated programs for women to incorporating gendered thinking in existing philanthropic work. Quantitative and qualitative data, combined with the analysis of inspiring cases, offers a solid basis for immediate action leading to significant change. This guide also includes practical tools that will help you start or deepen your gender-oriented activism. We believe that gender lens philanthropy is not only the right way, but also the smart way of attaining sustainable influence.

JFN is here to guide funders and foundations in applying the principles of this guide, to facilitate connections with funders and foundations already active in the field, and to provide personalized guidance to deepen your knowledge and implement gender strategies in your philanthropic work.

We invite you to join us on a journey for social change where every action can lead to transformation.

הפוסט Gender Lens Philanthropy: The Complete Guide to Promote Gender Equity through Strategic Philanthropy הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The Defense Budget and the Socio-Economic Budget

Some three decades ago, in October 1995, the Adva Center began publishing independent annual budget analyses of the proposed national budget. In most of the years since that time, the Adva document focused on the socio-economic budget. The reasons for that focus were twofold: one, the fact that Israel’s defense budget was never revealed in full; and two, Adva’s socio-economic analysis became in high demand for dozens of socially oriented organizations that were founded in subsequent years. It will be recalled that a decade before, in 1985, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan was initiated, whose main thrust was privatization of the social services. Since then, most of the social welfare services were handed over to external contractors, as were informal and enrichment educational services. At the same time, efforts were made to weaken labor unions, first and foremost the Histadrut – the national federation of labor.

Not long afterwards, in 2001, Israel found itself in a double bind:  it experienced both the second intifada and the global hi-tech crisis. In response, the government adopted drastic economic measures, the main one being cutbacks in the budgets of Israel’s social services. While those unkind cuts had an adverse effect on the majority of Israelis, the individuals most affected were those with middle and low incomes.

That being the case, we at the Adva Center entitled our annual budget analysis Dark Year. When the national budget of the following year held no respite, we named the next analysis Dark Years. (Published in Hebrew)

A generation has passed since those dark years, and here we are, once again faced with two crises at one and the same time: a war and a severe economic setback. It is no secret that the defense budget and the social affairs budgets are interdependent.

The human suffering caused by the present war is unprecedented in Israel’s war history. Tens of thousands of families are now bereft of loved ones, of their sources of livelihood and of the roof over their heads. On the defense front, the IDF mobilized tens of thousands of reserves for more than a year and utilized a huge quantity of equipment and ammunition. The mobilization of so many reserve soldiers, in turn, had a deleterious effect on many parts of the economy.

What is needed, therefore, is a socio-economic budget that will put the economy back on its feet.  However, this time the budget debate goes beyond the “usual” division between the defense and the social budgets, for the “Iron Swords” war, which began as a “regular” conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, expanded into a far broader confrontation:  a power conflict between the United States and its allies, on the one side, and China, Russia and Iran on the other, over control over the entire Middle East.

As one of the US partners in this battle, Israel found itself fighting in seven different arenas.

Since the beginning of the war in October 2023, the US has provided military aid in the amount of NIS 22 billion.[1]

This amount is often presented as a “gift”; however, it is a self-gift, as most of it is utilized for the purchase of equipment and armaments from US firms, thus strengthening the US defense industry. [2]

Not only that: the equipment thus purchased requires active utilization and regular maintenance by Israeli military personnel. In other words, what we have is an arrangement that obligates Israel to maintain a large defense budget for years to come. Stated differently, that arrangement stands in the way of Israel’s continued development of a proper social budget.

That is exactly the way the present extreme right-wing Minister of Finance, Betzalel Smotrich, views the situation, but from the opposite point of view. In a press conference held on September 3, 2024, Smotrich described the burden of defense as one that is to continue for a long time to come. He stressed that Israel will have to continue to fight on all the fronts of the present war – the South, the North, the West Bank and also more distant locations, as it has no choice.

Against this background, the 2025 budget proposal promises Israelis numerous “dark years” — years without a social agenda.

הפוסט Dark Years for Israel: Comments on the Proposed National Budget for 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A different approach is exemplified in an essay entitled “The Cost of Living in Israel: Low Salaries or High Prices?” written at the research institute of the Histadrut (federation of labor unions) – Forum Arlozoroff.[3]

Firstly, in contrast with the “optimistic” approach, this essay finds that the cost of living in Israel is indeed high; moreover, the phenomenon is attributed to low salaries rather than high prices. It should be noted that the indicator of pay utilized is the average hourly wage rather than the average (monthly) one. The reasoning behind this choice is that “the hourly wage provides a measurement of how many hours a person needs to work in order to purchase a certain amount of consumer goods.”[4] We add that a significant proportion of employed persons do not have full-time jobs (Some 25% in Israel according to a manpower survey for the month of October 2023).[5] The main contention of this article is that despite Israel’s “impressive” economic growth over the past two decades, the purchasing power of salaries has eroded in international comparison; not only that: the purchasing power in Israel at present is lower than it was at the turn of the century. Regarding household expenditures, two categories  — housing, electricity and water; and food and beverages — have become much more expensive in Israel, compared with the OECD average. In contrast to the previous approach, this one does not view food and housing expenses as exceptional and certainly not as peripheral, but rather as the main expenses of Israeli households, as together they constitute more than 50% of the difference between what we Israelis spend and what households in the developed nations of the OECD spend. I venture to add that most Israelis would agree that these expenditures are far from marginal.

Yet another approach is that familiar to readers of The Marker, the financial and business magazine of the newspaper Haaretz,  whose focus is on prices and not on income – specifically, the prices of food and beverages. This approach coincides with the perceptions of numerous Israelis, who see with their own eyes how food purchases become more expensive from month to month — and even week to week. The contention of The Marker is that what we see is an increase in the cost of living, and it stems mainly from SIMPLE GREED on the part of the supermarket chains  (more than others) and the companies that produce foods and beverages. These parts of the food chain have been raising their prices above and beyond increases in raw materials and the costs of production. Furthermore, the present government has done nothing whatsoever to prevent wildcat increases in the costs of essential items.

The three different approaches to the cost of living in Israel point to a number of directions to be taken. The “optimistic” approach seeks the solution in reducing concentration (of supermarkets, for example) and in increasing competition;  the low income approach seeks the panacea in increasing the educational level of Israelis and their productivity and, of course, in raising salary levels; the high food prices approach looks to competition, competition and yet more competition (in food production, food marketing and food importation). That said, there is no sign of any governmental body taking any action that might contribute to one or more of the solutions proposed. In the absence of significant government intervention or serious opposition of the Histadrut and/or consumer organizations aimed at placing the welfare of the population front and center,  numerous families will continue to cope with the high cost of living and low salaries that severely limit their options.

הפוסט Everybody is Talking About the Cost of Living in Israel but Nobody is Doing Anything About It הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A whole day was devoted to discussions on social housing, in which the Adva Center played a central role as a leading research and advocacy institute that is deeply involved in housing policy, including social housing in Israel. The thrust of Adva’s remarks was a call to significantly increase the stock of social as well as affordable housing.  It should be noted that Adva has for many years and continues to advocate for the right of all individuals living in Israel to have a safe and stable roof over their heads.

Some ten different parliamentary committees held meetings centered on the issue of social housing. At the main event, led by MKs Lazimi and Biton, the emphasis was on the demand for immediate improvement in social housing policy, including changes in eligibility rules and an increase in the number of apartments available. During the same day, two exhibitions were on display at the Knesset, one entitled “It Could be Better,” in which photographs showed the contrast between Israel’s social housing, obviously suffering from neglect, and well-kept social housing in Austria and Scandinavian countries. Another exhibition, entitled “Lionesses,” featured photos and stories of women living in social housing who are untiringly fighting for their rights.

Adva researcher Yaron Hoffmann-Dishon took part in three different discussions, including the main event, where he presented findings from studies of the budgeting trends of housing in Israel in recent decades. The figures testify to the fact that while state income from real estate taxes and land sales reached new heights in recent years, state investment in housing underwent erosion. Hoffmann-Dishon’s comments in committee discussions revealed that while the real estate market has become an important source of national income, the national investment in the various types of housing assistance has been on the decline, at the same time that the social housing stock, which suffers from neglect, continues to decrease.

Adva researcher and policy advocate Tehila Sharabi, who took part in the discussion organized by the Knesset Committee for Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women, presented the implications of housing policy for gender inequality, emphasizing its effects on women from disadvantaged social groups and women suffering from family violence; for the latter, the lack of accessible, suitable and safe housing forces them to choose between the devil of remaining in violent situations or the deep blue sea of becoming homeless. Sharabi emphasized the need to develop programs that would offer long-term housing solutions for abused women.

הפוסט Adva Center Promoting Social Housing: ‘Public Housing Day’ in the Knesset – 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Dr. Shani Bar-On and Ms. Tehila Sharabi of the Adva Center presented concrete recommendations for policies that would have the best chance of leading to full recovery in the areas affected by the war.

The conference aimed to promote policies based on the experience, the knowledge and the involvement of the displaced individuals themselves. The recommendations presented were based on research conducted by the Adva Center among individuals displaced since October 7, 2023, at state initiative, for an extended period of time: The Trials and Tribulations of Israelis Who Became Refugees in Their Own Land.

הפוסט Knesset Conference: “It Won’t Work without Us” הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A recent Adva Center study revealed that close to a third (28.5%) of employed persons in the northern and southern districts earn low salaries, compared with less than a fifth (17.5%) of employed persons in the central area of the country.

Below are some of the budget cuts planned for 2025, all of which are expected to have a negative effect onlow wage workers:

1. Placing a freeze on negative income until 2027. (Retracted) 
2. Placing a freeze on child allowances until the end of 2025. These allowances, paid to mothers, reflect at least a minimal recognition of the cost of raising children. They constitute a significant source of income for households in the lower income deciles, and the failure to link them to rises in the cost of living will widen inequality.
3. Increasing the lower level of the national insurance (social security) tax . This tax hike will lower take-home pay, and will, of course, affect low-income workers more than others. Women constitute 65% of low earners and will thus bear the brunt of the tax hike.
4. Initiating across-the-board budget cuts in the public services – to the tune of some 6.5 billion shekels. These cuts will affect, among others, Israel’s education, healthcare and social welfare systems; they will be sorely felt not only by women living in poverty, who are almost entirely dependent on public services, but also on lower middle class households.

Dislocated Persons from the South and the North of Israel Will be Especially Affected by the Absence of Relevant Policy

A study recently published by the Adva Center showed that the continued dislocation of Israelis from their homes resulted in the desolation of communities; it also forced numerous households to move from place to place and resulted in employment as well as personal crises.

The extended residence of displaced individuals and families in hotels also extracted a heavy price. Parents reported a loss of authority, among others due to the lack of stable educational frameworks; adults and senior citizens coped with forced inactivity and in some cases isolation from their families. The longer the hotel stay, the more invidious its effects. When the time comes for displaced households to return to their homes, the experience of dislocation is liable to affect the capability of internal refugees to forgo dependence and return to normal life.   It should be noted that a possible result of a too-early cessation of financial assistance for housing, unemployment, and businesses for those adversely affected by displacement, may very well have implications for the economic resilience of households and whole communities and result in increased poverty in the North and South of Israel.

Poverty and Debt in Arab Society in Israel

Most Arabs in Israel live in separate rather than mixed Jewish-Arab localities, and many Arab localities are to be found in the North and South of Israel.

In recent years, against the background of the high cost of living and increased interest rates,  a debt crisis has developed among Arab households. These households are more likely than Jewish households to experience economic distress (In 2022, 39% of Arab families lived in poverty, compared with 16% of Jewish families). This situation has led to a type of double jeopardy:  as institutional credit is not readily accessible to Arab citizens, they are dependent on the gray market, which does offer loans, but at high interest rates and danger to life and livelihood if the loans are not repaid in time. This situation not only creates and exacerbates the debt crisis, but also buttresses organized crime, which takes full advantage of the economic distress in Arab society for its own gain.

A study conducted by the Adva Center found that in 2021, 7.9% of Jewish households were in debt, compared with 19.4% of Arab households. Despite this situation, Arabs were under-represented in insolvency rehabilitation programs, and the average time it took to return a loan for Arabs was fully 18 times longer than for Jews, despite the fact that Arabs’ loans were smaller.

Protecting the Poor in the Periphery: Policy Recommendations

Adva Center recommends initiation of a broad-based policy of economic rehabilitation and debt servicing assistance. In addition, we recommend the initiation of a multi-year strategy whose goal is to rehabilitate those who were uprooted from their homes in the North and South of Israel. In the short-run, we call on the government to adopt the following recommendations:

1. To cancel the proposed budget cuts proposed by the Ministry of Finance, as they will have harmful effects on low-income workers, and to consider in their stead raising tax rates for high earners and on profits on capital investments. In the middle and long run, the negative income tax for parents should be significantly increased.
2. To design non-profit programs to provide credit accessibility for low-income persons, on better terms than those currently available. This can be effected by utilizing the Postal Bank or by creating a fund on the basis of monies obtained following criminal proceedings against those who break the law mandating fair credit terms.
3. To continue to support individuals and families displaced by the October 2023 war, with existing or new allowances. This can be done, for example, by utilizing the mechanism of the Victims of Hostile Actions Law of 1970, via a temporary order.

הפוסט In the Absence of a Broad-based Economic Rehabilitation Policy, Poverty in Israel is Expected to Grow הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

For women who experience domestic violence, the absence of accessible, suitable alternative housing leaves them with only two choices:  to remain at home, where they continue to suffer from violence or to become homeless. In other words, for many, escaping violence means the loss of housing.

In April 2024, the Adva Center, together with the Forum for Public Housing and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, presented a position paper to the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of Women entitled, “Expanding Housing Assistance Mechanisms for Women Survivor of Violence and their Children”. The paper demonstrated how the absence of alternative housing gave abused women and their children no choice but to remain in dangerous home environments.

The fact that in Israel, domestic violence does not constitute a criterion for eligibility for social housing means that the only option for abused women is to receive housing assistance for rent from the Ministry of Construction and Housing. This assistance is predicated on having spent time in a shelter for women survivors of domestic violence, which means that women who could not find a place in a shelter or whose husbands received a court order to stay away from the family home but did not honor it were not eligible. In addition, financial assistance from the Ministry is available for no more than three years. The first year of assistance is awarded without many strings attached, but subsequent years involve presenting proof that the potential recipient is devoid of housing options. According to information supplied to the Knesset Center for Information and Research by the Ministry, if the woman and her husband are joint owners of an apartment in which the husband resides, whose value has yet to be divided between the spouses, the woman’s eligibility for housing assistance will be renewed.

According to a report published by the OECD in 2023, most countries provide survivors of violence with emergency shelter for a short period; however, in most countries, the demand is greater than the supply. The same report indicates that some states provide transitional housing for longer periods than in Israel. For example, in Hungary, there are transitional apartments located close to centers for the treatment of domestic violence that offer housing for up to five years. Figures published in 2019 indicate that the average stay in those apartments is two years, after which the women rent on the private market or receive social housing.

Some OECD member states, among them Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Japan and Australia, give precedence to survivors of domestic violence when it comes to eligibility for social housing. This policy could be adopted by Israel as well.

הפוסט Housing Opportunities for Women Survivors of Domestic Violence in Israel and in OECD Member States הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

After the coronavirus pandemic, food security in unrecognized villages worsened. Societal infrastructures had to reassess their capacity under large-scale emergency stress. In the unrecognized villages of the Negev, exploratory research conducted in the first year and published in September 2023 highlighted how the lack of infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, directly affects residents’ food security (in Hebrew). The war that began on October 7th, 2023, and the exploratory research findings prompted us to continue using qualitative methods for this study. The subsequent findings resulted from 21 semi-structured interviews conducted in seven villages deprived of recognition. Based on these findings, we recommend developing an emergency plan for situations when the movement of Bedouin people is restricted to their villages; otherwise, future emergencies could lead to starvation.

Chapter one examines the consequences of the October 2023 war on food security in unrecognized villages. First, a traditional food rationing system in these villages, used in times of crisis, tends to promote isolationism. Second, at the war’s onset, tourism-related jobs and employment along the Gaza border ceased, which were the primary sources of income for women in the villages. Third, the war drove up the cost of living, reducing the variety of products available, mainly fresh fruits, vegetables, and meat. The loss of income, rising cost of living, and increased socioeconomic isolation has severely impacted the regular food supply in households. These three effects of the ongoing war are expected to undermine food security and compound into worsening long-term health issues.

Chapter two addresses the measuring of food security in unrecognized villages. The interviewees noted that discussing food insecurity is considered shameful in Bedouin society. Shame complicates access to accurate quantitative measurements of Bedouin food insecurity. Additionally, the approach to identifying food insecurity differs from that of most people in Israel. Some interviewees described reliance on the land and living modestly as a healthy Bedouin tradition. For instance, in response to a standard food security questionnaire, “Did you skip a meal in the last two weeks?” the answers are likely to be negative, as olive oil in pita bread is regarded as a meal. Food security questionnaires must be tailored to local contexts, or else connotative discrepancies can lead to inaccurate results.

Chapter three examines the gendered division of labor concerning food security within the household. Traditionally, women leave their homes to move into a home within the men’s community. It is important to note that the Bedouin household is traditionally organized as a network instead of a nuclear unit. Dependents frequently experience flexibility within their family structure. As a result, the husband’s extended family dependents may live in the husband’s household. Gender-based power dynamics within the home are typically dictated by conservative patriarchal norms that enforce gender roles in the context of food security. Women are expected to perform domestic and reproductive labor, while men are expected to be the breadwinners. Both gendered labors attribute to food security in the household.

The conclusion emphasizes the need for comprehensive research and locally focused policy. Regarding research, conducting studies that resonate with the culture and challenges of daily life in each village is recommended instead of relying on standard food security questionnaires. Furthermore, it is essential to adapt measurements and responses to reflect the perceptions of Bedouin villagers and ensure that all questions are tailored with gender sensitivity. Regarding policy, protocols must be established to protect Bedouin villagers from starvation in emergencies and non-emergencies. A consistent and storable source of fresh food must be developed to promote self-sufficiency. During non-emergency periods, it is advisable to adopt a flexible definition of the household, ensuring it includes everyone who may share a meal. Lastly, we strongly advocate for integrating women into stable employment that aligns with their customs and raising awareness of food security in high schools as teenagers start taking active roles in their households.

הפוסט Food Insecurity in Bedouin Villages Deprived of Recognition in the Negev Region of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The figures show that government investment in early education in Israel is 54% lower than the average in OECD countries: while Israel spends on average $5,864 for every child, the OECD average spending per child is actually more than double: $12,750.

Graph: Per Pupil Expenditure by Level in 2021, Israel and OECD Average, in PPP dollars

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD.  Education at a Glance 2024.

The situation of early education in the public sector is of special concern. Only about a fourth of children aged 0-3 are to be found in subsidized educational frameworks, like family and institutional day care systems. There is a shortage of day care due to the low rate of construction of new institutions and also a shortage of care workers, due to heavy workloads and low remuneration. In addition, staff members are responsible for more children than recommended by professionals, making it more difficult to provide high-quality care and education.

The construction of day care centers has been progressing at a painfully slow pace, mainly due to problems like the lack of public spaces designated for building. Thus, the usage of budgets allocated for the construction of day care centers remains low at all types of local authority. The problem is especially serious in Arab localities, where between 2014 and 2020, these local authorities utilized only 50% of the budgets allocated for day care centers. This contrasts with the situation in non-Haredi Jewish localities, where 61% of such budgets were utilized, and Haredi localities, where 79% of designated budgets were utilized.

As mentioned above, the problem is not only construction but also personnel, from the standpoint of both quality and quantity.

At the level of early education, the figures reveal that Israel’s investment in this level of education in 2021 was significantly lower than the OECD average: Israel invested some $6,800 per child, a sum that was 42% lower than the OECD average, which stood at $11,735 per child.

When it comes to higher levels, Israel invests comparatively more in elementary than in secondary education. At the elementary level, Israel’s outlays per student are only 5% lower than the OECD average. However, in secondary education, which includes both middle and high school, the gap is larger: 21%.

In 2023, the average annual expenditure per student from elementary through high school was higher in state religious education than in state secular education: NIS 25,634, compared with NIS 22,153.

Graph: Percentage Disparity in Per Pupil Expenditure between Israel and the OECD Average, 2021

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD. Education at a Glance 2024.

As indicated in the above figure, Israel’s investment in post-secondary education is especially low – 52% less than the average in OECD countries; Israel also spends much less on occupational training and non-academic degree programs. Thus, in 2021, the public expenditure on direct training for the job market amounted to 0.13% of GDP, compared to the average of 0.63% of GDP in OECD countries. When it comes to active labor policies, Israel ranks second from the bottom, with only the United States spending relatively less.

Despite the fact that in Israel higher education is subsidized, its investment per student is 33% lower than the average in OECD countries. This means fewer supplementary services like libraries and laboratories, lower investment in research and development and a higher student/instructor ratio.

הפוסט Per Student Investment in Education in Israel is Lower than the Average among OECD Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.