The Washington Post reviews this new book:
One thing that had seemed to go out of favor in recent decades was irredentism, the urge for states to annex the territory of their neighbors. Nationalist leaders in recent decades tended to build walls against the outside world, not conquer it. That trend was dramatically interrupted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and self-proclaimed annexation of territory in the east of that country. In Israel, an increasingly influential political movement seeks to not simply occupy the Palestinian territories but formally annex them. A globally catastrophic war sparked by China’s desire to “reunify” with Taiwan may loom on the horizon.
As for kinship as the basis for nationhood, there are many peoples who share the same identity, language and culture yet do not have their own state. Think of the Kurds, for instance, oppressed almost everywhere; or, more contentiously, the Catalans, who are oppressed nowhere, contrary to the claims of their more florid politicians. Mr. Storm points out that the United Nations currently has 193 member-states, only a fraction of which are ethnically or culturally homogeneous. (As a dinner-table exercise, readers might like to name a dozen and see how far they get.) In truth, the conventional understanding of the nation as a group of people united by common descent does not reflect reality.
Dutch professor Eric Storm writes in this new book:
* Religious differences between Christians, Jews, Muslims, and heathens were much more important than those between “nations,” and the identarian boundaries between them were much sharper. Christianity was seen as a fundamentally coherent unity. Both the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire cherished the Roman heritage and had universal pretensions. This entailed a bipolar relationship with the non – Christian world, which was seen as essentially inferior. 20 The view was not very different in the Muslim empires — which drew a sharp distinction between the “territory of Islam” and the “territory of war” — or in China. 21
Due to the feudal system, political and military authority was highly fragmented in Europe. Social and legal differences were very pronounced, and members of the different social groups — nobles, clerics, burghers, and peasants — behaved and dressed in distinct ways, which were often codified in sumptuary laws. Often, peasants and serfs were not even regarded as fully human; they were depicted as degraded, dark – skinned creatures who were ignorant of the true faith and therefore barely distinguishable from animals. 22 “Nations,” as a consequence, were not stable, fixed entities; instead, they were categorized according to circumstance. Moreover, the often quite vague “ethnic” boundaries rarely overlapped with state borders, which in this period were equally fluid. Social and religious cleavages were much more pronounced, and these often coincided with differences in rights, language, and behavior.
The rise of centralized states in Europe from the late medieval period onward slowly undermined the supremacy of the pope and the emperor and seriously weakened the territorial power of the landed nobility, leading to a new, multipolar state system. The process of state centralization started around the twelfth century, when improved infrastructures and the growing use of written communication increased the center’s hold over local affairs. Military innovations, however, were critical…In Europe, the state – building process was further reinforced by both the Reformation and the age of exploration. The sixteenth – century Reformation disrupted the fundamental unity of Western Christianity, and the wars of religion finished off the universal aspirations of the Holy Roman Empire. Principalities that went over to Protestantism dismantled the independent power of the Catholic Church by confiscating monastic properties and creating new state churches, as in England and the Lutheran parts of Europe. Although Catholic monarchs did respect the earthly possessions of the Church, they also succeeded in increasing their control over the clergy. At about the same time, the exploration of the sea routes to Asia and the “discovery” and conquest of the Americas strengthened the European states on the borders of the Atlantic, which now became the most dynamic part of the Old World. Long – distance trade (which was largely organized through chartered companies) and colonial settlement required protection by the navy and, in many instances, the presence of armed forces as well, so state support was crucial. 24
As a consequence, states had to increase their fiscal resources, which also implied more control over their territory, both at the borders and in the interior. Many states began to adopt mercantilist policies, supporting domestic industries and shipping while reducing internal tariffs, all with the goal of increasing the country’s wealth. Internal communications were improved by the construction of new roads. Maps increasingly showed state borders, and fortifications were built to protect the territory of the state. To this end, toward the end of the seventeenth century, Louis XIV, the French “Sun King” who became the embodiment of royal absolutism, ordered Vauban to construct hundreds of new fortresses to defend the borders of the kingdom.* In most parts of Europe, the identification of the inhabitants with the state was on the rise [in the 17th Century].
* the division of humanity into peoples with different, ill – defined characteristics was widely acknowledged.
* Almost everywhere, the clergy used a dead but sacred language for liturgic purposes: Latin for Catholicism, Church Slavonic or Byzantine Greek for Orthodox Christianity, Hebrew for Judaism, Classical Arabic for Islam, Sanskrit for Hinduism, and Pali or Classical Tibetan for Buddhism. Often, these languages were also used in the scientific realm, in courts, and in the state administration. In Europe, Latin was the main language of international diplomacy until it was largely displaced by French during the seventeenth century. In many cases, monarchs and aristocrats spoke a prestigious literary language. Thus, thanks to the glamorous court of Versailles, French became the dominant language of the polite classes in Western Europe, while Persian had a comparable role in large parts of the Islamic world and Chinese was predominant in East Asia.
* In Muslim and Orthodox areas, the printing press was ignored or prohibited, and primary education was not a priority. Here, literacy rates remained below 10 percent.
* Sacred script languages were considered “emanations from reality” and therefore an “inseparable part” of the divine truth, and this was not the case with the new standardized vernacular languages.
* In salons and coffeehouses throughout Europe and the Americas [in the 18th Century], all kinds of issues were debated among a growing number of well – educated people. Thus a new egalitarian and meritocratic sphere came into being, where the strength of a person’s argument no longer depended on their social standing or religious authority, but on the argument’s coherence and persuasiveness. At first, these public debates were concerned primarily with cultural, scientific, and philosophical topics, but politics was increasingly a subject of interest.
* Nation – states and national citizenship did not exist before the end of the eighteenth century.
* The first Naturalization Act, which was adopted in 1790, was even more explicit, awarding U.S. nationality only to “free white people” of “good character.” In most British and French colonial assemblies the Indigenous population was excluded, as were slaves and, in most instances, free people of color.
* the legal separation between the European metropole (a nation – state with a constitution) and the overseas colonies, which had “special,” more restrictive laws, would become the dominant model in the nineteenth and large parts of the twentieth century. As a consequence, the invention of the nation – state replaced the legislative pluralism of the ancien r é gime with legal equality and written constitutions in the metropolitan areas. At the same time, it hardened the boundaries between insiders (mostly white male property owners) and outsiders (women, people of color, Native Americans, and foreigners) and between metropole and colonies.
* In general, the inhabitants of the countryside were more reluctant to accept the new revolutionary regime, and in many instances opposed it outright. Michael Broers argues that in many parts of Europe and Spanish America the revolution degenerated into a civil war between well – educated urban elites and more conservative rural folk. Although peasants welcomed the repeal of seigneurial dues, many resented the attacks on the monarchy and organized religion.
* Before 1789 [in France], one’s social position was largely defined by an individual’s standing and legal status. Thus, the clergy, the nobility, burghers of a city, members of a guild, free farmers, and the rest of the population were subject to different rules… With the introduction of a constitution based on legal equality, all inhabitants of France suddenly were subject to the same rules, and there was one tax regime for all. This meant that all Frenchmen became equal and that one’s nationality — or one’s membership of the demos — now was more important than social identities.