<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Research reports and blog posts on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/</link><description>Recent content in Research reports and blog posts on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://ooni.org/post/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Censorship Chronicles: The systematic suppression of independent media in Russia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-russia-report/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-russia-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>Nearly three years ago, when Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, it also initiated a parallel campaign: a censorship war targeting independent news media within the country.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Merely a week after the conflict started, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">started blocking&lt;/a> access to several foreign news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.bbc.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">BBC&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.dw.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">Deutsche Welle&lt;/a>) and independent Russian news media websites (such as &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#meduza">Meduza&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#new-times">New Times&lt;/a>). Within a year, independent news media censorship in Russia had become pervasive. In our previous report, we &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/#blocked-websites">confirmed the blocking of 139 news media domains&lt;/a> in Russia.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Launch: Next generation OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/images/image22.png">
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&lt;p>&lt;strong>Image:&lt;/strong> OONI Run.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today we are thrilled to announce the &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/">launch of OONI Run v2&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>: the next generation version of OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Originally &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/">launched&lt;/a> in September 2017, &lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/">OONI Run&lt;/a> is a platform for creating mobile deep links that you can share with &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe&lt;/a> users to coordinate the testing of websites for censorship. Over the past 7 years, OONI Run has been &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns#examples-of-ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns">used extensively by community members&lt;/a> in Venezuela, Malaysia, India, and around the world as part of their censorship measurement campaigns aimed at monitoring and rapidly responding to emergent censorship events. To improve the OONI Run platform and better meet community needs, we previously conducted an &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/">OONI Run usability study&lt;/a>, through which we documented extensive community feedback.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Animation: OONI Partner Gathering 2024</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</guid><description>&lt;p>Earlier this year, we had the opportunity to host the &lt;strong>OONI Partner Gathering 2024&lt;/strong>: a two-day event in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where we brought our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners&lt;/a> from Asia and the Middle East together to exchange skills and knowledge on internet censorship research. Our goal was to strengthen global and regional collaborations on censorship measurement research and advocacy. We previously published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/">report&lt;/a> which shares details about the event and its outcomes.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today, we are excited to share a &lt;strong>new animation&lt;/strong> about the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/">OONI Partner Gathering 2024&lt;/a>. This animation provides a glimpse into the event, highlighting the importance of community participation in censorship measurement research. Watch the animation below!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Backend Developer</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</link><pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</guid><description>&lt;p>Are you a backend developer interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team (a non-profit measuring internet censorship
globally) is looking for a dedicated &lt;strong>Backend Developer&lt;/strong> to work on our
backend components and infrastructure, and to provide OONI data analysis
support for our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">research&lt;/a> efforts.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="job-description">Job description&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>By joining our team, you will work on OONI’s backend components, ensuring the
stable and reliable performance of our infrastructure in response to the
growing global coverage of measurements. You will also provide OONI data
analysis support for OONI &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">research reports&lt;/a> and in
support of the research of our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Chido Musodza</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today we are excited to publish an interview with &lt;strong>Chido Musodza&lt;/strong>, Program Associate, Community Engagement at &lt;a href="https://www.localizationlab.org/">Localization Lab&lt;/a>. Chido is passionate about supporting minority language communities through the localization of open-source technology. Localization, on the one hand, makes tech products more inclusive and on the other hand, empowers the development of minority languages and their presence in digital space.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Watch Chido’s interview to learn more about the need for localization and community engagement!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Russia blocked OONI Explorer, a large open dataset on Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>&lt;p>As of 11th September 2024, Russia has &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&amp;since=2024-08-01&amp;until=2024-09-25&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=explorer.ooni.org">blocked&lt;/a> one of our platforms: &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a> is one of the largest open datasets on internet censorship around the world. We &lt;a href="https://blog.torproject.org/ooni-explorer-censorship-and-other-network-anomalies-around-world/">first launched&lt;/a> this web platform back in 2016 with the goal of enabling researchers, journalists, and human rights defenders to investigate internet censorship based on empirical network measurement data that is contributed by &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> users worldwide. Every day, we publish &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">new measurements&lt;/a> from around the world in real-time.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Kazakhstan: TLS MITM attacks and blocking of news media, human rights, and circumvention tool sites</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>In recent years, internet censorship in Kazakhstan has been &lt;a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-net/2023">reported&lt;/a> quite extensively. As part of this study, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ifkz.org/en">Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ)&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://www.digitalrights.asia">Eurasian Digital Foundation&lt;/a> collaborated to investigate internet censorship in Kazakhstan over the past year (between June 2023 to June 2024) through the analysis of empirical network measurement data.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=KZ&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;failure=false&amp;category_code=NEWS&amp;only=anomalies">news media&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=KZ&amp;axis_y=domain&amp;domain=www.ipetitions.com%2Cwww.change.org%2Cegov.press%2Camnesty.org.ru">human rights&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-06-01&amp;until=2024-06-01&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=KZ&amp;axis_y=domain&amp;category_code=ANON">circumvention tool websites blocked&lt;/a> in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference. We also found 7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan. We share more details below.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Gathering 2024 in Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/images/image7.png">
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&lt;nav id="TableOfContents">
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#background-ooni-partners-and-previous-events">Background: OONI partners and previous events&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#about-the-ooni-partner-gathering-2024">About the OONI Partner Gathering 2024&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#objectives">Objectives&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#why-malaysia">Why Malaysia?&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#sessions">Sessions&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#day-1--8th-may-2024">Day 1 – 8th May 2024&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#day-2--9th-may-2024">Day 2 – 9th May 2024&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#unconference-style-sessions">Unconference style sessions&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#inclusiveness">Inclusiveness&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#partner-feedback">Partner feedback&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#challenges">Challenges&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#needs">Needs&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#outcomes">Outcomes&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
&lt;/nav>

&lt;p>We are excited to share that on 8th and 9th May 2024, we hosted an in-person &lt;strong>OONI Partner Gathering in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia&lt;/strong>. As part of this 2-day event, we brought our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners&lt;/a> (primarily from Asia and the Middle East) together to exchange skills and knowledge and strengthen our collaborations on internet censorship research and advocacy.
In this report, we share details about the event and its outcomes.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Tawanda Mugari</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today we are excited to publish an interview with &lt;strong>Tawanda Mugari, Co-Founder &amp;amp; Geek in Chief of Digital Society of Africa (DSA)&lt;/strong>. Through our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/digital-society-of-africa/">partnership with DSA&lt;/a>, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on research and training activities across southern Africa. Tawanda is a digital security expert, community leader and trainer who has been part of the OONI community for years. Watch Tawanda’s interview to learn more about his important work!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</guid><description>&lt;p>This report documents the blocking of LGBTIQ websites and other targeted blocks in Tanzania based on the analysis of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;since=2023-12-01&amp;until=2024-01-31&amp;time_grain=day&amp;probe_cc=TZ">OONI data&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;nav id="TableOfContents">
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#methods">Methods&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgement-of-limitations">Acknowledgement of limitations&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#findings">Findings&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-lgbtiq-websites">Blocking of LGBTIQ websites&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#lgbtiq-social-networks">LGBTIQ social networks&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#lgbtiq-rights">LGBTIQ rights&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#lgbtiq-news-and-culture">LGBTIQ news and culture&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#lgbtiq-suicide-prevention">LGBTIQ suicide prevention&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-websites-that-support-human-rights">Blocking of websites that support human rights&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-online-dating-websites">Blocking of online dating websites&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-clubhouse-and-4chan">Blocking of Clubhouse and 4chan&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-protonvpn">Blocking of ProtonVPN&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
&lt;/nav>

&lt;h2 id="key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Our analysis of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&amp;since=2023-12-01&amp;until=2024-01-31&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity">OONI data&lt;/a> collected from Tanzania over the last year (between 1st January 2023 to 31st January 2024) reveals the &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&amp;since=2023-12-01&amp;until=2024-01-31&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;axis_y=domain&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;category_code=LGBT">extensive blocking of LGBTIQ sites&lt;/a>, which correlates with the &lt;a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/11/bachelet-tanzania-has-duty-protect-not-further-endanger-lgbt-people">escalating discrimination and crackdown on LGBTIQ communities&lt;/a> in Tanzania in recent years. Many other blocks identified as part of this study appear to be targeted in nature, as they involve very specific websites, while other (more popular) sites from the same category (e.g. social media, human rights) were found accessible.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet sanctions on Russian media: diverging actions and mixed effects</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>The original post appeared on the blog of &lt;a href="https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/internet-sanctions-on-russian-media-diverging-actions-and-mixed-effects">SIDN Labs&lt;/a>.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on organisations affiliated with the Russian Federation prohibiting them from broadcasting content in the EU, including online distribution. In a collaborative effort with researchers from the University of Illinois Chicago, Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the University of Twente and the University of Amsterdam, we carried out a longitudinal traffic analysis to understand how internet service providers (ISPs) in different EU member states implement these sanctions. We found that the degree of blocking varies widely, both between and within individual EU member states. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the EU sanctions. This blog is a summary of the paper we published last month.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2023</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-year-in-review/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-year-in-review/</guid><description>&lt;p>As the end of 2023 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be
working on in 2024!&lt;/p>
&lt;nav id="TableOfContents">
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-non-profit-legal-entity">New OONI non-profit legal entity&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-project-manager">New OONI Project Manager&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-measurement-tools">New OONI measurement tools&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#launched-ooni-probe-web">Launched OONI Probe Web&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#launched-news-media-scan-app-with-deutsche-welle-dw">Launched News Media Scan app with Deutsche Welle (DW)&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#building-ooni-run-v2">Building OONI Run v2&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-explorer-features">New OONI Explorer features&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#censorship-findings-22-reports">Censorship Findings: 22 reports&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#domain-centric-pages">Domain-centric pages&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#network-centric-pages">Network-centric pages&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#user-feedback-reporting-mechanism">User feedback reporting mechanism&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#charts-on-internet-outages">Charts on internet outages&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#research">Research&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-research-reports">OONI research reports&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-reports-for-isoc-pulse-shutdown-timeline">OONI reports for ISOC Pulse shutdown timeline&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#community">Community&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-partnerships">New partnerships&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-outreach-kit">New OONI Outreach Kit&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-screencasts-and-documentation">New OONI screencasts and documentation&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#localization">Localization&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-explorer">OONI Explorer&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-run">OONI Run&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-documentation">OONI documentation&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#new-ooni-community-interviews">New OONI Community Interviews&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-workshops-and-presentations">OONI workshops and presentations&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-verse">OONI-verse&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#2024">2024&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
&lt;/nav>

&lt;h2 id="new-ooni-non-profit-legal-entity">New OONI non-profit legal entity&lt;/h2>











&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-year-in-review/images/image4.png">
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&lt;/div>


&lt;p>OONI is now a registered NGO in Italy!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Ihueze Nwobilor</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with &lt;strong>Ihueze Nwobilor&lt;/strong>: Senior Programs Officer with &lt;a href="https://paradigmhq.org/team/ihueze-nwobilor/">Paradigm Initiative&lt;/a>. Through our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/paradigm-initiative/">partnership with Paradigm Initiative&lt;/a>, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on several research reports examining internet censorship in Nigeria. Ihueze’s work is focused on digital inclusion and on making digital technologies accessible to the under-served communities in numerous African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Since the &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/nigeria-blocks-twitter-keepiton/">blocking of Twitter in Nigeria in 2021&lt;/a>, Ihueze has become an active &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> user and gained a unique experience of using &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data/">OONI data&lt;/a> in his advocacy and government engagement work. Through his advocacy and litigation efforts with Paradigm Initiative, the Twitter ban in Nigeria was &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/ecowas-court-nigeria-unlawful-twitter-ban/">declared unlawful&lt;/a> and access to the platform was restored.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Launch: New OONI Censorship Findings platform</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</link><pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</guid><description>&lt;p>










&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings_hu17962422820562351912.png"

 
 srcset="https://ooni.org/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings_hu17956862074008836710.png 2x"
 

 title="Censorship Findings"
 
 alt="Censorship Findings"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;strong>Image:&lt;/strong> OONI Censorship Findings platform.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today we are thrilled to announce the launch of the OONI &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/findings">Censorship
Findings&lt;/a> platform!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Internet censorship is frequently being reported around the world, but
how can we verify such events with empirical evidence?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/findings">new platform provides short reports&lt;/a> on internet censorship around the world based on OONI&amp;rsquo;s &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data/">open data&lt;/a>. With the launch of the platform, we are &lt;strong>publishing 20 reports on internet censorship&lt;/strong> that emerged in 2023. In response to emergent censorship events, this
platform will be updated with new reports on an ongoing basis.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measure all the Things! IMC Hackathon 2023</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 23rd October 2023, right before the &lt;a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/">Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC)&lt;/a> 2023, we
co-hosted an &lt;strong>internet measurement hackathon&lt;/strong> in collaboration with
the &lt;a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">Internet Society
(ISOC)&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">M-Lab&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored Planet&lt;/a> and
&lt;a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/">IODA&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post we would like to share some of the projects that were
developed as part of the hackathon. It was great to see how much was
accomplished in such a short period of time!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The day started with an &lt;a href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1DHhGcpCMTbSJE0QKO6ZTSnIPFixLxxBXwZLkqv0wdJA/edit#slide=id.g1723ddbd698_0_18">introduction to the various datasets&lt;/a>
from OONI&amp;rsquo;s Arturo, Censored Planet&amp;rsquo;s Armin, IODA&amp;rsquo;s Zach, ISOC&amp;rsquo;s Amreesh
and M-Lab&amp;rsquo;s Lai Yi. Following the brief presentations, the participants
formed teams to work on some of the specific challenges that &lt;a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bmCwU0ZJCu-xKlIBKqh3rdIJLHZ-vS7UCOfHI-0RxVE/edit#heading=h.nhvc5bssegtl">we had
proposed&lt;/a>
or came up with new ones.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Siti Nurliza</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with Siti Nurliza: a talented data analyst and technologist with &lt;a href="https://sinarproject.org/">Sinar Project&lt;/a>, one of our most dedicated and long-term &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">partners&lt;/a> who have led OONI censorship measurement efforts in Southeast Asia for more
than 6 years!&lt;/p>
&lt;iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/DOTjOR7zA2Y" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen>&lt;/iframe>

&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://sinarproject.org/">Sinar Project&lt;/a> is a civic tech initiative using open technology, open data and policy analysis to systematically make important information public and more accessible to
the Malaysian people. Over the years, we &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project">collaborated&lt;/a> with Sinar Project on measuring and reporting on internet censorship in
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/">Malaysia&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/">Indonesia&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/">Thailand&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/">Myanmar&lt;/a>
through the use of OONI tools and data.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Grindr blocked in Jordan: Shrinking LGBTQ spaces</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</guid><description>&lt;p>Jordan recently &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20230808211935.881250_JO_webconnectivity_6b7549126aabe25d">blocked&lt;/a> access to &lt;a href="https://www.grindr.com/">Grindr&lt;/a> — the world’s largest social networking app for gay, bi, trans, and queer people — adding to the list of social media apps banned in the country, including &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&amp;since=2023-08-13&amp;until=2023-09-13&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.tiktok.com">TikTok&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&amp;since=2023-08-13&amp;until=2023-09-13&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.clubhouse.com">Clubhouse&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&amp;since=2023-08-01&amp;until=2023-09-10&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.grindr.com">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a> collected from Jordan suggests that ISPs started blocking access to Grindr on August 8th 2023, and that the block &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&amp;since=2023-08-01&amp;until=2023-09-21&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.grindr.com">remains ongoing&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This report shares &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&amp;since=2023-08-01&amp;until=2023-09-10&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.grindr.com">OONI data&lt;/a> on the blocking of Grindr in Jordan.&lt;/p>
&lt;nav id="TableOfContents">
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#methods">Methods&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-grindr-in-jordan">Blocking of Grindr in Jordan&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-findings">OONI findings&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#impact-of-the-block">Impact of the block&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
&lt;/nav>

&lt;h2 id="background">Background&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Jordan is one of the few Middle Eastern countries where consensual same-sex sexual acts are not criminalised. Previously, the colonial-era &lt;a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20LEG%20-%20Criminal%20Code%20Bill%20(1936)%20-%20OR-OFF(en).pdf">Criminal Code Bill (1936)&lt;/a> banned same-sex relations, but this was repealed in 1951 with the enactment of the country’s &lt;a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20LEG%20-%20Penal%20Code%20(1951)%20-%20TR(en).pdf">Penal Code&lt;/a>. While homosexual conduct is technically legal in Jordan, the General Iftaa Department issued a &lt;a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20JUD%20-%20Fatwa%203670%20on%20Sexual%20Relations%20from%20an%20Islamic%20Perspective%20(2021)%20-%20OR(ar).pdf">religious ruling&lt;/a> (Fatwa) in December 2021, declaring that &amp;ldquo;homosexuality is illegal under Islamic law&amp;rdquo;. Such religious rulings are not legally binding, but the General Iftaa Department acts in an advisory capacity to government branches and courts.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Join us at the IMC 2023 Hackathon on Network Interference using Open Data</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</link><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</guid><description>&lt;p>Are you attending the &lt;a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/">Internet Measurement Conference (IMC)
2023&lt;/a>?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Join us at the &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/hackaton/">IMC Hackathon on Network Interference using Open
Data&lt;/a>&lt;/strong> on Monday, &lt;strong>23rd
October 2023&lt;/strong>, in Montreal, Canada. The hackathon is organized by the
&lt;a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">Internet Society (ISOC)&lt;/a>, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open
Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">M-Lab&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored
Planet.&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>IMC is a yearly academic conference focusing on Internet measurement and
analysis. The conference is sponsored by ACM SIGCOMM.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This IMC Hackathon will be about exploring, analyzing, and visualizing open
network measurement data with a focus on identifying Internet censorship and
Internet shutdown events.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Senegal: Social media blocks and network outages amid political unrest</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</guid><description>&lt;p>Violent protests &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/6/4/death-toll-mounts-as-unrest-flares-in-senegal">erupted&lt;/a> in Senegal on 1st June 2023 over the sentencing of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. On the same day, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SN&amp;since=2023-05-10&amp;until=2023-06-30&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=whatsapp">OONI data&lt;/a> collected from Senegal showed that ISPs started blocking access to several instant messaging apps and social media platforms (which were also &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65788534">reported&lt;/a> by several news outlets). Those blocks appear to have been in place for a week (until 7th June 2023). Meanwhile, Cloudflare observed &lt;a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as37649?dateStart=2023-06-03&amp;dateEnd=2023-06-10">three disruptions&lt;/a> to traffic from AS37649 (Free/Tigo), and two disruptions at Sudatel Senegal during this period. Following the &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/senegals-ousmane-sonko-charged-with-fomenting-insurrection">arrest&lt;/a> of Ousmane Sonko on 28th July 2023, the Senegalese Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications and the Digital Economy issued another shutdown order on 31st July 2023 to cut off mobile internet access.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>China is blocking OONI</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/images/image4.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/images/image4_hu9808324584859745139.png"

 

 title="China blocks OONI"
 
 alt="China blocks OONI"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>We usually &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">report&lt;/a> on how other services are blocked. This time, we’re reporting on how our own services are blocked.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>China recently started blocking access to our website (&lt;code>ooni.org&lt;/code>) and censorship measurement app (&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This is not too surprising, given the fact that our work and tools center around measuring and exposing internet censorship (in &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">China and around the world&lt;/a>), and China has one of the most advanced and pervasive levels of internet censorship in the world. However, we’re not sure why China decided to start blocking us at this specific moment in time (as opposed to years ago), given that OONI measurements have been &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/country/CN">collected from China&lt;/a> since 2014. The timing of OONI blocking in China (which seems to have started on 7th July 2023) leads us to think that it might be related to our recent &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1673659531639894019">reporting on the blocking of F-Droid&lt;/a> in China in late June 2023. But we also reported on the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/">blocking of Wikipedia in China&lt;/a> back in 2019 (among other &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">reports&lt;/a> on censorship observed in China), and China did not block our services at the time.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New OONI Explorer features for investigating internet censorship through open data</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</guid><description>&lt;p>We’re excited to share that &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a> includes new features for investigating internet censorship worldwide based on open data.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Specifically, these features include:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>New &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/domains">domain-centric pages&lt;/a>;&lt;/li>
&lt;li>New &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/networks">network-centric pages&lt;/a>;&lt;/li>
&lt;li>New “internet outage” charts (integrating IODA, Google traffic, and Cloudflare Radar data), available in each &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/countries">country-specific&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/networks">network-specific&lt;/a> page;&lt;/li>
&lt;li>New user feedback reporting mechanism, available through the “Verify” button in the banner of each OONI measurement page.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>In this blog post, we share information about these new features.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Project Manager</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</link><pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>This job posting is now closed. Any applications received after 2023-06-28 will not be considered&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Are you a project manager interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team (a non-profit measuring
internet censorship globally) is looking for a dedicated &lt;strong>project
manager&lt;/strong> to help us manage our software development work.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We will be reviewing applications on a rolling basis.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="job-description">Job description&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>By joining our team, you will help ensure that our software projects are
on track, supporting a global community that relies on our tools for
measuring and fighting internet censorship.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Brazil: OONI data on the blocking of Telegram</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</guid><description>&lt;p>Encontre a versão em português do relatório localizada pela &lt;a href="https://codingrights.org/">Coding Rights&lt;/a> aqui: &lt;a href="https://codingrights.org/library-item/brasil-dados-da-ooni-sobre-o-bloqueio-do-telegram/">https://codingrights.org/library-item/brasil-dados-da-ooni-sobre-o-bloqueio-do-telegram/&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Two days ago, on 26th April 2023, Brazil started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=BR&amp;since=2023-03-29&amp;until=2023-04-29&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=telegram">blocking&lt;/a> access to Telegram.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>On the same day, a federal judge in Brazil &lt;a href="https://www.dw.com/en/brazil-court-orders-temporary-suspension-of-telegram-over-neo-nazi-probe/a-65446224">reportedly&lt;/a> ordered the temporary suspension of Telegram in response to the messaging service’s alleged failure to share all information on neo-Nazi chat groups requested by the police. This information was &lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/briefing/brazil-telegram-ban.html">reportedly&lt;/a> requested as part of a school attacks inquiry, as Brazilian authorities investigate neo-Nazi groups that are believed to have used Telegram to incite school attacks. However, Telegram’s CEO &lt;a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/04/27/telegram-brazil-block/2ec1c1de-e554-11ed-9696-8e874fd710b8_story.html">claims&lt;/a> (&lt;a href="https://web.telegram.org/z/#-1006503122">on his Telegram channel&lt;/a>) that it’s impossible for them to comply with the order, as the judge requested data that is not feasible for them to obtain.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Throttling of news media amid Kazakhstan’s 2022 presidential election</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</guid><description>&lt;p>Snap presidential elections were held in Kazakhstan in November 2022, following a &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59927267">wave of unrest&lt;/a> that started in January 2022. Following the victory of incumbent president Tokayev, early legislative elections were held in March 2023.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Through the analysis of OONI data, we observe the throttling of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Kazakhstan&amp;rsquo;s service websites in Kazakh and Russian (&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&amp;since=2022-09-19&amp;until=2023-04-19&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.azattyq.org">www.azattyq.org&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&amp;since=2022-09-19&amp;until=2023-04-19&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=rus.azattyq.org">rus.azattyq.org&lt;/a>)  in Kazakhstan, starting from 27th September 2022 and lasting until at least 11th April 2023. We also observe the temporary throttling of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&amp;since=2022-09-19&amp;until=2023-04-19&amp;time_grain=day&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.currenttime.tv">www.currenttime.tv&lt;/a> during Kazakhstan’s 2022 presidential elections.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Introducing OONI Probe Web</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/images/image1.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/images/image1_hu8271175250346792258.png"

 

 title="OONI Explorer"
 
 alt="OONI Explorer"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Today, we are excited to announce the launch of &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://probe-web.ooni.org/">OONI Probe Web&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>: a new browser-based tool for measuring the blocking of websites.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We built OONI Probe Web in response to long-term community feedback, requesting a censorship measurement tool that can be run from a browser, without requiring the installation of any software. Our goal is to support rapid response efforts to emergent censorship events.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>However, please note that OONI Probe Web is experimental, and what can be measured from a browser is very limited in comparison to what can be measured from an app. We therefore hope that the use of OONI Probe Web encourages further use of the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe app&lt;/a> for more extensive and accurate testing.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How we're improving OONI data quality: An analysis of failed measurements</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</link><pubDate>Mon, 13 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</guid><description>&lt;p>In this blog post, we manually analyse &lt;code>failed&lt;/code> OONI measurements to assess why they were classified as such, whether they are symptomatic of censorship, and whether they still carry helpful information for researchers. We focus on measurements from three countries (India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) and outline steps on how we will improve overall data quality.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#results">Results&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#pakistan">Pakistan&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#india">India&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#indonesia">Indonesia&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#overall">Overall&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#limitations">Limitations&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#conclusions-and-future-work">Conclusions and Future Work&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="background">Background&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity&lt;/a> is a network test that determines whether a web resource is accessible from the network where the user runs &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>. To this end, Web Connectivity measures accessing the resource and compares the measurement results with another measurement performed by a control vantage point. After the measurement, OONI Probe submits a JSON document summarising its findings and the control vantage point findings to the OONI backend. In turn, the &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/pipeline/">OONI data processing pipeline&lt;/a> classifies all Web Connectivity measurements into four categories:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI measurements show ongoing internet censorship in Azerbaijan</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>Azerbaijan is known to block access to independent news media websites – we previously &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/">reported&lt;/a> on this in July 2021. At the time, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021 and found that ISPs in Azerbaijan were &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocked-news-media-websites">blocking access to several independent news media&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocked-circumvention-tool-sites">circumvention tool sites&lt;/a>. We also found that amid the &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54324772">2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war&lt;/a>, ISPs in Azerbaijan &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocking-of-social-media-amid-2020-nagorno-karabakh-war">temporarily blocked access to social media&lt;/a> services, and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#tor-and-psiphon">attempted to block&lt;/a> access to &lt;a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://psiphon.ca/">Psiphon&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How Internet censorship changed in Russia during the 1st year of military conflict in Ukraine</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</guid><description>&lt;p>As of today, last year, Russia started its &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60525350">military operation in Ukraine&lt;/a>. This was followed by increased levels of internet censorship, as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia started &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">blocking access to several news media websites&lt;/a>. In early March 2022, OONI published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/">report&lt;/a> documenting these blocks, as well as the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocked-website-about-captured-and-killed-russian-soldiers">blocking of a site&lt;/a> (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine. OONI also reported that Russian ISPs started &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#twitter-throttled">throttling access to Twitter&lt;/a> on 26th February 2022, and switched to &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#twitter-and-facebook-blocked">blocking&lt;/a> it by 4th March 2022 – at which point, they also started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.facebook.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">blocking access to Facebook&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Ongoing blocking of social media</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 9th February 2023, amid church split tensions and calls for
anti-government protests, access to social media platforms (TikTok,
Facebook, Telegram) was &lt;a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ethiopias-social-media-blocked-amid-church-split-tensions/2023/02/10/15781c44-a93d-11ed-b2a3-edb05ee0e313_story.html">reportedly blocked&lt;/a>
in Ethiopia. Access Now also published a
&lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/ethiopia-social-media-protest/">statement&lt;/a>
urging authorities in Ethiopia to stop blocking access to social media.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>OONI data collected from Ethiopia provides signals of these blocks.
Specifically, OONI data shows the ongoing blocking of
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.facebook.com&amp;since=2023-01-11&amp;until=2023-02-15&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">Facebook&lt;/a>
and
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&amp;test_name=telegram&amp;since=2023-01-11&amp;until=2023-02-15&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">Telegram&lt;/a>
(since 9th February 2023) and
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.youtube.com&amp;since=2023-01-11&amp;until=2023-02-15&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">YouTube&lt;/a>
(since 10th February 2023).&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/#blocking-of-facebook">Blocking of Facebook&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Pakistan: Blocking of Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle (DW)</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the past weeks, access to Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle’s (DW)
website was &lt;a href="https://time.com/6253154/wikipedia-blocked-pakistan-blasphemy/">reportedly&lt;/a>
blocked in Pakistan.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As part of this report, we share OONI data from Pakistan that provides
signals of these blocks. Specifically, OONI data shows that access to
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.wikipedia.org&amp;since=2023-01-01&amp;until=2023-02-14&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">Wikipedia was temporarily restricted&lt;/a>
between 1st to 6th February 2023, while access to &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.dw.com&amp;since=2023-01-01&amp;until=2023-02-15&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">Deutsche Welle (DW) remains blocked&lt;/a>
since (at least) 16th January 2023.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#blocking-of-deutsche-welle">Blocking of Deutsche Welle&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#blocking-of-wikipedia">Blocking of Wikipedia&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Turkey: Throttling and DNS blocking of Twitter following deadly earthquake</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 6th February 2023, a &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/13/middleeast/turkey-earthquake-building-construction-intl/index.html">devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake&lt;/a>
(followed by many strong aftershocks) struck (southern and central)
Turkey and (northern and western) Syria, resulting in more than 36,000
deaths.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In the aftermath of the earthquake (on 8th February 2023), access to
Twitter was
&lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/08/tech/turkey-twitter-restriction/index.html">reportedly&lt;/a>
temporarily restricted. OONI data collected from Turkey provides
evidence that the block was implemented through targeted throttling and
DNS interference.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The following
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=twitter.com&amp;since=2023-01-09&amp;until=2023-02-10&amp;axis_x=measurement_start_day">chart&lt;/a>
aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of Twitter
(&lt;code>twitter.com&lt;/code>) on multiple networks in Turkey between 9th January
2023 to 9th February 2023.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP 2022: New Research Reports on Internet Censorship in 8 Asian countries</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 21st December 2022, our long-term partner, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">Sinar Project&lt;/a>, published &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022">8 new research reports&lt;/a>&lt;/strong> on
internet censorship in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in collaboration with their
&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/">Internet Monitoring and Action Project (iMAP)&lt;/a> partners. We are particularly
excited about these reports as they make use of &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data&lt;/a>!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/about">Internet Monitoring Action Project (iMAP)&lt;/a> aims to establish regional
and in-country networks that monitor network interference and
restrictions to the freedom of expression online in 8 countries:
Myanmar, Cambodia, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Cambodia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-cambodia/2022-cambodia-translation">បកប្រែជាភាសាខ្មែរ&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>News and other websites are periodically blocked in Cambodia, particularly those that disseminate information that could be perceived as a threat to the ruling government.&lt;sup id="fnref:1">&lt;a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In July 2018, the government ordered internet service providers (ISPs) to block at least 15 news websites during the country’s election.&lt;sup id="fnref:2">&lt;a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has reportedly blocked access to news sites.&lt;sup id="fnref:3">&lt;a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In June 2020, the Ministry of Post telecommunications (MPTC) blocked six online gambling sites.&lt;sup id="fnref:4">&lt;a href="#fn:4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">4&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In November 2021, TRC blocked 79 illegal online gambling websites.&lt;sup id="fnref:5">&lt;a href="#fn:5" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">5&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In December 2021, TRC blocked 9 websites and URLs that posted child pornographic images and videos.&lt;sup id="fnref:6">&lt;a href="#fn:6" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">6&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> In February 2022, TRC blocked 15 illegal lottery websites.&lt;sup id="fnref:7">&lt;a href="#fn:7" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">7&lt;/a>&lt;/sup>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Hong Kong</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</guid><description>&lt;p>Hong Kong, a place geographically conjunct to the soil of Mainland China, has been previously known as a free society, endured and still enduring multiple historical occasions. Once, there was no nationwide internet censorship until the latest development that local authorities and Beijing forcefully implemented the Hong Kong national security law in late June 2020. Currently, at least four websites are known to be censored, and a few ongoing discussions among pro-Beijing parties and the government to put censorship up on instant messaging and social platforms.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Indonesia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>In July 2014, Regulation of the Minister of Communications and Informatics Number 19 of 2014 on the Handling of Negative Internet Sites came into force as part of the regulator&amp;rsquo;s programme for Healthy and Safe Internet (INSAN or Internet Sehat dan Aman). The law mandated ISPs to block any internet content that is deemed to carry &amp;ldquo;negative&amp;rdquo; elements such as pornography, hoaxes, or SARA conflicts.&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>As of September 2022, the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication (Kominfo) has blocked over 1,000,000 websites through TrustPositif,&lt;sup id="fnref:1">&lt;a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> a filtering application that has been operational since 2010 per Ministerial Regulation No 19 of 2014.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</guid><description>&lt;p>It is a codified guarantee that the internet will not be censored except for illegal, obscene and indecent content, while in reality the extent of censorship and its implementation are wider than projected and remain to be explored.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-malaysia/2022-malaysia-translation">Diterjemah ke dalam bahasa Melayu&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>The Ministry of Communications and Multimedia (MCMC) do not publish list of blocked sites, however statements were released from time to time to announce the number of sites blocked. It was revealed that 2,195 websites promoting online gambling were blocked as of March 2021.&lt;sup id="fnref:1">&lt;a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> Between 2020 to July 2021, 960 phishing sites were blocked.&lt;sup id="fnref:2">&lt;a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> From 2018 to September 2021, 4,068 pornography sites were blocked by MCMC.&lt;sup id="fnref:3">&lt;a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3&lt;/a>&lt;/sup>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-myanmar/2022-myanmar-translation">မြန်မာဘာသာသို့ ပြန်ဆိုပါသည်။&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Blocking of independent New Media&lt;/strong>. 112 out of 2,130 websites were detected 1,473 confirmed blocking counts through 6 local vantages under DNS level interference and HTTP level interference. There were 11 out of 31 websites’ categories from OONI were found as confirmed blocking. Among 11 categories, News Media was experiential as the highest confirmed blocking measurement, following to pornography to the second largest blocking counts. Interestingly, within 117 government websites, OONI detects 15 websites were blocked from 2 vantage points of 2 ISPs.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Sign of internet outages:&lt;/strong> IODA and Google Traffic data indicate that no major internet connectivity outages have been reported between January 1, 2022, and June 30, 2022. However, on May 16, 2022, and May 20, 2022, there were alerts regarding an Internet disruption and a possible internet outage.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Potential blocking of Instant Messaging Apps&lt;/strong>: Apart from this finding period, we found no confirmed blocking in Facebook Messengers, Signal, and Telegram. In spite of this, Facebook Messenger found a large volume of anomalies during the test, which could be a sign of possible blocking. WhatsApp also detected a sign of potential blockings.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Circumvention Tools&lt;/strong>: Circumvention tools appear to be blocked after the coup. As part of this study, Psiphon and Tor circumvention tools were detected accessible across the local networks.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="table-of-contents">Table of Contents&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Philippines</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>In recent years, and with the COVID-19 pandemic increasing people’s reliance on digital technologies and with it the role of ICT regulators, agencies such as the NTC have come under fire for the “politicization” of the country’s telecommunications sector.&lt;sup id="fnref:1">&lt;a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> This was most apparent under the administration of former president Rodrigo Duterte, whose six-year presidency was marred by the systematic undermining of democratic institutions and countless attacks against critical media and activists.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Thailand</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</guid><description>&lt;p>Thailand, a country situated on the mainland of Southeast Asia, was under military junta for five years from 2014 to 2019. Upon the general election in 2019, the country has been nominally a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, although with lèse-majesté laws continuing to be invoked especially with regard to internet censorship. Adding the COVID-19 pandemic into the picture, the Thai government introduced Regulation 29 to curb fake news, which led to reported incidences of internet censorship.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Vietnam</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</guid><description>&lt;p>Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam Pereric Högberg affirmed that Vietnam is making good use of opportunities from the internet, being one of the leading countries in Southeast Asia in terms of internet connection and development&lt;sup id="fnref:1">&lt;a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1&lt;/a>&lt;/sup>. Vietnam is not limited to using the Internet and social networks&lt;sup id="fnref:2">&lt;a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2&lt;/a>&lt;/sup>. However, there are still websites with controlled access in Vietnam.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-vietnam/2022-vietnam-translation">Dịch sang tiếng Việt&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Under the authoritarian political system, freedom of assembly, association, expression, press and religion, as well as civil society activism, is tightly restricted and controlled by the party despite legislation recognising civil and political rights in the Constitution.&lt;sup id="fnref:3">&lt;a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3&lt;/a>&lt;/sup> Certain contents and topics related to curtailing political opposition, unfavourable to the party, corruption, and human rights issues are censored in various ways.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2022</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>As the end of 2022 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be
working on in 2023!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-team">OONI Team&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-ooni-probe-experiments">New OONI Probe experiments&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-test-lists-editor">New Test Lists Editor&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-run-improvements">OONI Run improvements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-probe-web-prototype">OONI Probe Web prototype&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-data">OONI data&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#1-billion-measurements">1 billion measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-ooni-measurement-aggregation-toolkit-mat">New OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-circumvention-tool-reachability-dashboard">New Circumvention Tool Reachability Dashboard&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2022/#advancing-ooni-data-analysis">Advancing OONI data analysis&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Video</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-video/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-video/</guid><description>&lt;p>We are happy to celebrate OONI&amp;rsquo;s 10th anniversary together with our
amazing community, who have been at the heart of our work over the past
decade.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today, we are excited to share a &lt;strong>new video with OONI community
members&lt;/strong>, where they discuss how OONI has been useful to their work,
while sharing what they would like to see OONI do in the future.&lt;/p>
&lt;iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/zrclQ2QZjVo" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen>&lt;/iframe>

&lt;h2 id="featured-community-members-and-partners">Featured community members and partners&lt;/h2>
&lt;h3 id="andrés-azpúrua-venezuela-inteligentehttpsveinteligenteorg">Andrés Azpúrua, &lt;a href="https://veinteligente.org/">Venezuela Inteligente&lt;/a>&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Andrés is the co-founder and Director of Venezuela Inteligente, a
non-profit organization that aims to facilitate information,
communication and collaboration between citizens and civil society
organizations to create impact from a non-partisan perspective. They
promote, facilitate and develop digital tools, improving access to
information, collaboration and responsiveness, empowering organizations,
activists and citizens. They fight for the rights of Venezuelans online
and offline.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Highlights: 10 Years of OONI</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</link><pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/images/01.png">
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 src="https://ooni.org/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/images/01_hu11060568953675838338.png"

 
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&lt;p>Today is OONI’s 10th anniversary!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As of today, 10 years ago, the first OONI measurement was published.
Today, 10 years later, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">more than a billion OONI measurements&lt;/a> have been published, shedding
light on &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">internet censorship&lt;/a> worldwide.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share some &lt;strong>OONI highlights from the past 10 years&lt;/strong>,
as well as some of our future plans.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>You can start off by getting a glimpse of “OONI in 10 years” through the
following animation, which shares some highlights from the past decade.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Technical multi-stakeholder report on Internet shutdowns: The case of Iran amid autumn 2022 protests</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Coordinators:&lt;/strong> OONI, ISOC&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Contributors:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/">IODA&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">Measurement Lab (M-Lab)&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/">Cloudflare&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.kentik.com/">Kentik&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored Planet&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">ISOC&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.article19.org/">Article19&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Facilitators:&lt;/strong> European Commission, United States&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/documents/OONI-Iran-multi-stakeholder-report.pdf">Download in PDF&lt;/a>

&lt;p>This report shares empirical technical findings on the recent Internet
shutdown events that emerged in Iran following the death of Jhina
(Mahsa) Amini in September 2022. The report is intended to be the first
among a series of multi-stakeholder reports aimed at shedding light on
what is becoming a widespread and increasingly sophisticated practice of
certain governments around the world. The stakeholders participating in
the report share a concern about the global trend in Internet shutdowns,
but are contributing to the analysis only on the basis of their
technical expertise.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Join the 10th Ooniversary Events!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</link><pubDate>Thu, 24 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/10th-ooniversary-events/images/ooniversary.jpg">
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&lt;/div>


&lt;a class="youtube-subscribe" href="https://www.youtube.com/c/OONIorg?sub_confirmation=1">
Subscribe on YouTube
&lt;/a>

&lt;p>You’re invited to join us for the celebration of OONI’s 10th
anniversary!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>To share OONI highlights from the last 10 years, as well as how
community members have used OONI tools and data as part of their work,
we’ll be hosting &lt;strong>2 live-streamed events&lt;/strong>:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI Highlights&lt;/strong>:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Date and time: &lt;strong>5th December 2022 at 14:00 UTC&lt;/strong> (1 hour event)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Location: Live-streamed on &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f4D4gq9TBMg">OONI YouTube channel&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Survey: Help shape OONI’s strategic priorities</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</guid><description>&lt;p>OONI will celebrate its 10th anniversary on 5th December 2022!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This is a time for celebration, but also a time for reflection: What
worked well? What should we improve? What should we do differently going
forward?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The OONI community has been at the heart of our work over the past
decade, and so we invite our community to help shape OONI’s strategic
priorities for the future.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Please take a few minutes to &lt;strong>complete our survey&lt;/strong>:
&lt;a href="https://ooni.typeform.com/2022-survey">https://ooni.typeform.com/2022-survey&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New online OONI training course launched by Advocacy Assembly</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</guid><description>&lt;p>We are excited to share that a &lt;strong>free, online OONI training course&lt;/strong>
(“Measuring Internet Censorship with OONI tools”) has been launched
today on Small Media’s &lt;a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/">Advocacy Assembly&lt;/a> platform!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Through this course, you will learn how to &lt;strong>measure internet
censorship&lt;/strong> through the use of &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI tools&lt;/a>. You will also learn how to access
and interpret real-time &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data&lt;/a> on internet
censorship around the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today, the course is available in
&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/en/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">English&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/ar/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Arabic&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/es/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Spanish&lt;/a>,
and
&lt;a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/fa/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Farsi&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>.
Over the next months, the course will also be available in French,
Swahili, Portuguese and Russian.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Iran blocks social media, app stores and encrypted DNS amid Mahsa Amini protests</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</link><pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</guid><description>&lt;p>Protests &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/17/iran-protests-death-kurdish-woman-mahsaa-amini-morality-police">erupted&lt;/a> in Iran over the last week following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who was reportedly beaten to death by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating strict hijab rules. Amid the &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62994003">ongoing protests&lt;/a>, which have &lt;a href="https://iranhr.net/fa/articles/5496/">reportedly&lt;/a> resulted in at least 31 civilian deaths, Iranian authorities &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/iran-blocks-capitals-internet-access-as-amini-protests-grow">cracked down on the internet&lt;/a> in an attempt to curb dissent.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Over the past week, Iran experienced &lt;a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?from=1663279200&amp;until=1664143140">severe mobile network outages&lt;/a>, in addition to increased levels of internet censorship. In this report, we share &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-22&amp;until=2022-09-25&amp;probe_cc=IR&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;failure=false">OONI network measurement findings from Iran&lt;/a> on the blocking of WhatsApp, Instagram, Linkedin, Skype, Google Play Store, Apple App Store, and encrypted DNS (DNS over HTTPS). We also share &lt;a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?from=1663279200&amp;until=1664143140">IODA&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/asn/44244?date_filter=last_7_days">Cloudflare Radar&lt;/a> data on mobile network outages over the last few days.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Azerbaijan and Armenia block TikTok amid border clashes</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</guid><description>&lt;p>Earlier this week, on 12th September 2022, fighting &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62828239">erupted&lt;/a> between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. Over the next few days, community members in Azerbaijan reported that the TikTok app was blocked locally.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We analyzed &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a> to investigate the block. We found that TikTok has been blocked in both &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-17&amp;until=2022-09-17&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=AZ&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.tiktok.com">Azerbaijan&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-17&amp;until=2022-09-17&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=AM&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=tiktok.com">Armenia&lt;/a> over the last few days.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share our technical findings. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, we found TLS and DNS level interference of TikTok domains and endpoints during the border clashes.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New Test Lists Editor: Contribute websites for censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-test-lists-editor/images/01.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2022-test-lists-editor/images/01_hu3102870722549096828.png"

 

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 alt="Test Lists Editor"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is
excited to announce the public launch of our new &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://test-lists.ooni.org/">Test Lists Editor&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This platform enables the public to &lt;strong>review and contribute to the lists
of websites&lt;/strong> (“&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists">test lists&lt;/a>”) that are
&lt;strong>tested for censorship&lt;/strong> by &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>
users around the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Help the internet freedom community discover website blocks around the
world by contributing through the new &lt;a href="https://test-lists.ooni.org/">Test Lists Editor&lt;/a>!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measuring DoT/DoH Blocking Using OONI Probe: A Preliminary Study</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</guid><description>&lt;p>When you enter a URL such as &lt;code>https://example.com/&lt;/code>, under the
hood, your web browser resolves the &lt;code>example.com&lt;/code> domain to one or
more IP addresses using the Domain Name System (DNS), a set of
federated servers and protocols providing this name-to-IP-address
mapping. For example, as of 2022-06-16, &lt;code>example.com&lt;/code> resolves to
the &lt;code>93.184.216.34&lt;/code> (IPv4) and &lt;code>2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946&lt;/code>
(IPv6) addresses. Once it knows the IP addresses for the domain,
the browser then uses them to fetch the requested webpage. Conceptually,
the browser tries the IP addresses in sequence until it finds one
that works. If no returned IP address works, the request fails.
Therefore, domain name lookups are key to browsing and, incidentally,
are also key to website censorship and surveillance.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>A Quick Look at QUIC Censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>This blog post was &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/news/a-quick-look-at-quic/">originally published by the Open Technology Fund&lt;/a> to disseminate Kathrin
Elmenhorst&amp;rsquo;s QUIC-and-HTTP/3 censorship research as part of her &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/about/people/kathrin-elmenhorst/">ICFP fellowship
with OONI&lt;/a>.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Last year, the new network protocol &lt;strong>QUIC&lt;/strong> was introduced. QUIC
is a general-purpose transport layer network with the goal of
reducing latency compared to existing protocols. Since the introduction
of QUIC, we have seen rising volumes of QUIC-based web traffic in
the form of &lt;strong>HTTP/3&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As QUIC usage increases, it has become the target of censorship
efforts. From the perspective of censors, the emergence of QUIC and
HTTP/3 means two things:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI’s submission for the OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</guid><description>&lt;p>Currently, the &lt;a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/regular-session">50th session of the UN Human Rights Council&lt;/a> is taking place.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In response to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’s &lt;a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/calls-input/call-comments-report-internet-shutdowns-and-human-rights-fiftieth">call for submissions&lt;/a>
in support of the &lt;a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/list-reports">OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights&lt;/a>
to the 50th session of the Human Rights Council in June 2022, the OONI team provided a submission with relevant
information on the &lt;strong>occurrence of mandated disruptions of access to
social media and messaging platforms over the past 5 years&lt;/strong> based on
empirical OONI network measurement data.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Community Coordinator</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</link><pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</guid><description>&lt;p>Are you passionate about defending human rights on the internet? Are you
extremely organized and enjoy supporting communities around the world?
We have a job opening for you!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team (a non-profit fighting internet
censorship) is looking for a dedicated &lt;strong>community coordinator&lt;/strong> to help
grow and support the OONI community around the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The application deadline is &lt;strong>Sunday, 12th June 2022&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="job-description">Job description&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>By joining our team, you will support our
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners&lt;/a> and global community of human
rights defenders to measure and fight internet censorship. Our community
is at the heart of our work, and you will play an important role in
helping to ensure that our tools meet the needs of our community.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New Launch: OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01_hu12525868713435091778.png"

 
 srcset="https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01_hu11932821530926714788.png 2x"
 

 title="MAT"
 
 alt="MAT"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is
thrilled to announce the public launch of the &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat">OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat">MAT&lt;/a> is a tool that enables
you to &lt;strong>create your own custom charts based on aggregate views of
real-time OONI data&lt;/strong> collected from around the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Use the MAT to &lt;strong>track internet censorship worldwide&lt;/strong> based on
real-time OONI data!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/#about-the-mat">About the MAT&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-mat/#what-is-ooni-data">What is OONI data?&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New blocks emerge in Russia amid war in Ukraine: An OONI network measurement analysis</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</guid><description>&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/documents/OONI-Report-New-blocks-emerge-in-Russia-amid-war-in-Ukraine.pdf">Download in PDF&lt;/a>

&lt;p>Information controls are known to occur during conflicts, and that’s exactly what we’re seeing in Russia following the recent invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In recent days, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=RU">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a> collected from Russia shows that many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;only=anomalies">blocking&lt;/a> access to several news media websites, as well as to a &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;only=anomalies&amp;domain=200rf.com">website&lt;/a> (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine. OONI data also shows that Russian ISPs started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-26&amp;until=2022-03-04&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=twitter.com&amp;probe_cc=RU">throttling access to Twitter&lt;/a> on 26th February 2022, and switched to &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/20220306T202033Z_webconnectivity_RU_51604_n1_oVoIGdnUmlxCWmyR?input=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2F">blocking&lt;/a> it by 4th March 2022 – at which point, they also started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&amp;until=2022-03-07&amp;failure=false&amp;domain=www.facebook.com&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;only=anomalies">blocking access to Facebook&lt;/a>. Censorship in Russia is generally implemented in a &lt;a href="https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/decentralized-control-a-case-study-of-russia/">decentralized&lt;/a> way, as blocks are not observed on all networks, while ISPs adopt a variety of different censorship techniques.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measuring HTTP/3 censorship with OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last year, QUIC emerged as a new internet protocol for creating reliable connections and encrypting communications between clients over the new HTTP/3 protocol. Observing the emergence and growing deployment of HTTP/3, we want to enable &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> to measure HTTP/3 censorship and monitor how censors respond and adapt to technical innovation.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We therefore added HTTP/3 support (in early 2021) into &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> (through our &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/spec/blob/master/nettests/ts-027-urlgetter.md">urlgetter&lt;/a> research tool) to conduct measurements in &lt;strong>China, Iran, India and Kazakhstan to investigate the state of HTTP/3 censorship&lt;/strong> in these countries.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2021</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/</guid><description>&lt;p>In light of the ongoing global &lt;a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019">COVID-19 pandemic&lt;/a>,
2021 continued to be a challenging year for everyone.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Yet, several exciting things happened in the censorship measurement
world. In this post, we share some OONI highlights from 2021, as well as
some upcoming OONI projects for 2022!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/#ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/#automated-ooni-probe-testing">Automated OONI Probe testing&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-debian-package-for-ooni-probe">New Debian package for OONI Probe&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-ooni-probe-command-line-interface-for-linux-and-macos">New OONI Probe Command Line Interface for Linux and macOS&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-ooni-probe-experimental-card">New OONI Probe Experimental card&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>iThena integration of OONI Probe boosts censorship measurement coverage worldwide</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last months, the &lt;a href="https://root.ithena.net/">iThena&lt;/a> project
&lt;a href="https://root.ithena.net/usr/forum_thread.php?id=151">integrated OONI Probe&lt;/a> into their
platform, resulting in a &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1443944726235856901">major spike&lt;/a>
in &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data/">OONI censorship measurement coverage&lt;/a>
around the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this blog post, we’re excited to introduce you to iThena and discuss
how they helped support censorship measurement worldwide.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/#about-ithena">About iThena&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/#ooni-probe-integration-into-ithena">OONI Probe integration into iThena&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="about-ithena">About iThena&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://root.ithena.net/">iThena&lt;/a>, developed by the &lt;a href="https://cybercomplex.net/">Cyber-Complex Foundation&lt;/a>, is a distributed computation
and measurement project based on the &lt;a href="https://boinc.berkeley.edu/">Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC)&lt;/a> platform.
iThena &lt;a href="https://boinc.berkeley.edu/forum_thread.php?id=13966">aims&lt;/a> to
generate a dynamic topological model of the Internet, based on
measurements from distributed devices.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Russia started blocking Tor</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 1st December 2021, some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia
started
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-11-08&amp;until=2021-12-09&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;test_name=tor&amp;only=anomalies">blocking&lt;/a>
access to the &lt;a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor&lt;/a> anonymity network.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-11-08&amp;until=2021-12-09&amp;failure=false&amp;probe_cc=RU&amp;test_name=tor&amp;only=anomalies">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a>
on the blocking of the Tor network and &lt;code>www.torproject.org&lt;/code> in Russia.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#about-tor">About Tor&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#methods">Methods&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#findings">Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#blocking-of-the-tor-network">Blocking of the Tor network&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#blocking-of-the-tor-project-website">Blocking of the Tor Project website&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="about-tor">About Tor&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>If you want real privacy and anonymity on the internet, the answer is
simple: use &lt;a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/">Tor&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>[Event Report] India, Let's Build the List</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;p>This is a &lt;strong>guest post by &lt;a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/">The Bachchao Project&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>, originally published
&lt;a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/event-report-india-lets-build-the-list/">here&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/">Bachchao Project&lt;/a> in partnership with &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> hosted an online event on 9th and
10th October 2021 to update the &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/in.csv">Citizen Lab test list for India&lt;/a>. The event,
which was called “India, Lets build the list”, was organised to help strengthen
community based monitoring of internet censorship in India. The event allowed
experts from different fields to contribute to a curated &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/in.csv">list of websites&lt;/a> that
are relevant to India and which are regularly tested for censorship by
volunteers in India.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Why Collaboration and Transparency is Key to Internet Measurement</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;p>This post was originally published on the &lt;a href="https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-measurements-collaboration-and-transparency">Internet Society Pulse blog&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>With Internet shutdowns, disruptions and censorship events on the increase
around the world, tracking where such events are happening and gathering
evidence to help in the fight against them is becoming more and more
important.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Tracking these events is crucial because of the impact they have on society and
the economy. When social media apps are blocked, for example, freedom of
speech, access to information, and movement-building is hampered. When access
to the Internet is shut down completely, people may not have access to vital
services or be able to work and study.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description>&lt;p>In the wake of a &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489">military coup&lt;/a> in February 2021,
Myanmar experienced unprecedented levels of internet censorship.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In response, we collaborated with CAIDA’s &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/ioda/">Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)&lt;/a> team and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners/mido/">Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO)&lt;/a> on publishing a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/">research report&lt;/a>
which documents a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/#internet-outages">series of nightly internet outages&lt;/a>
and the
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/#findings">blocking&lt;/a>
of social media, Wikipedia, and circumvention tool sites in Myanmar
following the military coup.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In the months that followed, we continued to examine internet censorship
in Myanmar quite closely. We collaborated with
&lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">IODA&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://www.kentik.com/">Kentik&lt;/a>,
and other researchers from &lt;a href="https://ucsd.edu/">UC San Diego&lt;/a> and the
&lt;a href="https://umich.edu/">University of Michigan&lt;/a> to expand our analysis.
We used diverse datasets and measurement methods to offer a holistic
view into the censorship events in Myanmar that occurred since the coup
and show how internet censorship &lt;em>evolved&lt;/em> between &lt;strong>1st February 2021
to 30th April 2021&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Investigating Internet shutdowns through Mozilla telemetry</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</link><pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</guid><description>&lt;p>More than &lt;a href="https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/user-activity">200 million users&lt;/a> worldwide use
the &lt;a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/">Firefox&lt;/a> web browser
(developed by Mozilla) every month.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>If access to the Internet is shut down in a country, Mozilla should
expect to see a dramatic drop in Firefox usage from that country. Given
how &lt;a href="https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/user-activity">widespread&lt;/a> the
use of Firefox is around the world, could Mozilla telemetry be a
valuable resource for the Internet freedom community to investigate
Internet shutdowns?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>To explore this question, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)&lt;/a> teams joined forces to analyze a
dataset of potential outage signals gathered through regular Mozilla
telemetry, access to which was provided by Mozilla as part of a relevant
research project to validate assumptions about the data.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How countries attempt to block Signal Private Messenger App around the world</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/images/01.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/images/01_hu6429735702460217004.png"

 

 title="Signal blocked in Iran"
 
 alt="Signal blocked in Iran"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://signal.org/">Signal Private Messenger&lt;/a>, commonly used by
human rights defenders worldwide, is widely considered the
state-of-the-art app for private and secure communications. But as its
&lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/12/tech/signal-growth-whatsapp-confusion/index.html">popularity surged&lt;/a>
recently, we have started to observe its
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-29&amp;since=2021-08-30&amp;test_name=signal&amp;only=anomalies">blocking&lt;/a>
in several countries.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share our analysis of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-29&amp;since=2021-08-30&amp;test_name=signal&amp;only=anomalies">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a>
on the blocking of the Signal Private Messenger app in &lt;strong>Iran, China,
Cuba, and Uzbekistan&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Currently, circumvention is &lt;a href="https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/83b9fbac11868833925f9395364b8167a1c6615a/app/src/main/java/org/thoughtcrime/securesms/push/SignalServiceNetworkAccess.java#L53">enabled by default&lt;/a>
for Signal users in Iran, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. If Signal
users in other countries are unable to use the app, they can enable the
“Censorship Circumvention” setting on iOS. On Android, Signal blocking
can be circumvented through the use of &lt;a href="https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support">Signal TLS proxies&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: Mobile Developer for OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</guid><description>&lt;p>Are you a mobile developer interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team (a non-profit fighting internet
censorship, originally born out of the &lt;a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor
Project&lt;/a>) is looking for a dedicated
&lt;strong>mobile developer&lt;/strong> to work on &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe&lt;/a>: a free software app designed
to measure internet censorship and network performance.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The application deadline is &lt;strong>Sunday, 31st October 2021&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="job-description">Job description&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>If you join our team, you will lead the development of the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe mobile app&lt;/a>, supporting human rights
defenders worldwide to investigate and fight internet censorship.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Italy blocks Gutenberg book publishing website</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/images/image-1.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/images/image-1_hu17998570920261562788.png"

 

 title="Gutenberg blocked in Italy"
 
 alt="Gutenberg blocked in Italy"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Cases of internet censorship (that affect public interest) are rarely reported
in Europe. Yet, &lt;code>www.gutenberg.org&lt;/code>, a book-publishing website run by
a non-profit organization, has been &lt;a href="https://www.wired.it/internet/web/2020/06/30/progetto-gutenberg-sequestro/">blocked in Italy since May 2020&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-08&amp;since=2021-08-09&amp;domain=www.gutenberg.org&amp;probe_cc=IT">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a>
on the ongoing blocking of &lt;code>www.gutenberg.org&lt;/code> across networks in
Italy.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#methods">Methods&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#findings">Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#blocking-methods-by-isp">Blocking methods by ISP&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#vodafone-italia-as30722">Vodafone Italia (AS30722)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#fastweb-as12874">Fastweb (AS12874)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#wind-as1267">Wind (AS1267)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#tim-as16232">TIM (AS16232)&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/images/report-cover.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/images/report-cover_hu14604463933570315610.png"

 

 title="Report cover"
 
 alt="Report cover"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Today, in collaboration with &lt;a href="https://outrightinternational.org/">OutRight Action International&lt;/a> and the &lt;a href="https://citizenlab.ca/">Citizen Lab&lt;/a>, we are excited to share our new research report, “&lt;strong>No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries&lt;/strong>”,
which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report-v2.pdf">READ FULL REPORT&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/annotated-bibliography.pdf">Annotated Bibliography&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Below we share some of our key research findings.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="summary-of-findings">Summary of findings&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>We joined forces with &lt;a href="https://outrightinternational.org/">OutRight Action International&lt;/a> and the &lt;a href="https://citizenlab.ca/">Citizen Lab&lt;/a> to examine the blocking of LGBTIQ websites
in six countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We selected these countries because they
are (a) known to serve &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#block-page">block pages&lt;/a> (i.e., pages that
website visitors may see when access is restricted), which enable us to
automatically confirm the blocking of LGBTIQ websites, and (b) known to
censor LGBTIQ related content, based on prior research.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>A brief introduction to OONI</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</guid><description>&lt;p>This is gentle introduction to OONI that does not require readers to have a technical background.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>If you are familiar with how the Internet works and how it can be censored you can skip &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/#the-basics">The basics&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For frequently asked questions and answers, please refer to the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/faq/">OONI FAQ&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="the-basics">The basics&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>You might be connecting to the &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet">Internet&lt;/a>
from a &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_area_network">local network&lt;/a>
or using an &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#isp">Internet Service Provider&lt;/a> (ISP).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>ISPs are usually not connected to each other. Rather they connect to large
&lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_network">carriers&lt;/a> or simply to a &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_2_network">bigger ISP&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Accessing OONI data</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/mining-ooni-data/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/mining-ooni-data/</guid><description>&lt;p>This page has moved to: &lt;a href="https://docs.ooni.org/data/">https://docs.ooni.org/data/&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zambia: Social media blocked amid 2021 general elections</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/images/zm-whatsapp-measurement.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/images/zm-whatsapp-measurement_hu4701194345777220979.png"

 

 title="Blocking of WhatsApp"
 
 alt="Blocking of WhatsApp"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Recently, on 12th August 2021, &lt;a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/category/2021-general-election/">general elections&lt;/a>
were held in Zambia, during which access to popular online social media
platforms was &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/12/africa/zambia-election-social-media-blackout-intl/index.html">reportedly blocked&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share relevant &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-08-20&amp;since=2021-07-21&amp;probe_cc=ZM">OONI data&lt;/a>
on the blocking of
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-08-20&amp;since=2021-08-10&amp;probe_cc=ZM&amp;test_name=whatsapp&amp;only=anomalies">WhatsApp&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-08-20&amp;since=2021-07-21&amp;domain=twitter.com&amp;probe_cc=ZM&amp;only=anomalies">Twitter&lt;/a>,
and
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-08-20&amp;since=2021-07-21&amp;domain=www.facebook.com&amp;probe_cc=ZM&amp;only=anomalies">Facebook&lt;/a>
amid Zambia’s 2021 general election.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#methods">Methods&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#findings">Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#blocking-of-whatsapp">Blocking of WhatsApp&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#blocking-of-twitter-and-facebook">Blocking of Twitter and Facebook&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="background">Background&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>While Zambia hasn’t experienced pervasive forms of internet censorship
(such as the blocking of popular social media apps) over the last years,
various forms of
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#previous-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">censorship&lt;/a>
have been reported in the country.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Training 2021</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/</link><pubDate>Wed, 07 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last week, we had the pleasure to host &lt;strong>two 3-day OONI Partner
Training events&lt;/strong> for our &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners&lt;/a> in
Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. As part of these
events, our goal was to share OONI-specific knowledge and skills, and to
collect feedback to better serve community needs.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share information about the training events.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/#about">About&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/#sessions">Sessions&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/#session-1-information-controls-around-the-world-day-1">Session 1: Information Controls Around the World (Day 1)&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Media censorship in Azerbaijan through the lens of network measurement</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/</link><pubDate>Fri, 02 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img src="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/images/image19.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;nav id="TableOfContents">
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#methods">Methods&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#ooni-network-measurement">OONI network measurement&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgement-of-limitations">Acknowledgement of limitations&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#background">Background&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#internet-censorship-and-media-freedom-environment">Internet censorship and media freedom environment&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#findings">Findings&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocked-news-media-websites">Blocked news media websites&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-social-media-amid-2020-nagorno-karabakh-war">Blocking of social media amid 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-social-media-websites">Blocking of social media websites&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocking-of-instant-messaging-apps">Blocking of instant messaging apps&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#whatsapp">WhatsApp&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#telegram">Telegram&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#blocked-circumvention-tool-sites">Blocked circumvention tool sites&lt;/a>
 &lt;ul>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#tor-and-psiphon">Tor and Psiphon&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;li>&lt;a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
 &lt;/li>
 &lt;/ul>
&lt;/nav>

&lt;h2 id="key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>As part of our analysis of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-05-16&amp;probe_cc=AZ">OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan&lt;/a> between January 2020 to May 2021, we found:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Making the OONI Probe Android app more resilient</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/</link><pubDate>Thu, 27 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/</guid><description>&lt;p>We recently made &lt;a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.openobservatory.ooniprobe">OONI Probe Android&lt;/a>
more robust against accidental or deliberate blocking of our backend
services. Specifically, we implemented support for specifying a proxy
that speaks with OONI’s backend services. We also improved the build
process to influence the TLS Client Hello fingerprint, which helps with
avoiding accidental blocking.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/#adding-support-for-a-proxy">Adding support for a proxy&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/#changing-our-android-tls-fingerprint">Changing our Android TLS fingerprint&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/#future-improvements">Future improvements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="adding-support-for-a-proxy">Adding support for a proxy&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Since late 2020, community members have been reporting specific OONI
Probe Android failures. The symptom is that all tests fail with the “all
available probe services failed” error. This issue has been publicly
documented, for example, in
&lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe/issues/1324">ooni/probe#1324&lt;/a>. The
following screenshot shows what a user would see under this specific
error condition.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Myanmar: Data on internet blocks and internet outages following military coup</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 1st February 2021, the military in Myanmar carried out a &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489">coup d’etat&lt;/a>, seizing power
and detaining the country’s State Counsellor (equivalent to a prime
minister) and other democratically elected leaders.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A few days after the coup, ISPs in Myanmar started &lt;a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-facebook-idUSKBN2A32ZE">blocking access to Facebook services&lt;/a>.
On 5th February 2021, they started &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/05/tech/myanmar-blocks-twitter-instagram/index.html">blocking access to Twitter and Instagram&lt;/a>
as well. On 6th February 2021, access to &lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&amp;entity=country/MM&amp;lastView=overview&amp;from=1612437274&amp;until=1612782874">the internet was shut down entirely for nearly 30 hours&lt;/a>.
When internet connectivity was restored, social media blocks remained in
place and they are currently ongoing. Since 15th February 2021, access
to the internet has been &lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&amp;entity=country/MM&amp;lastView=overview&amp;from=1613219264&amp;until=1614774464">shut down every night&lt;/a>
(between around 1am to 9am local time) in Myanmar. More recently, some
ISPs in Myanmar appear to have started &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-02-01&amp;probe_cc=MM&amp;test_name=web_connectivity&amp;domain=www.wikipedia.org&amp;until=2021-03-05">blocking access to Wikipedia&lt;/a>
as well.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Uganda: Data on internet blocks and nationwide internet outage amid 2021 general election</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last week, amid its &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55573581">2021 general election&lt;/a>, Uganda was
&lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&amp;entity=country/UG&amp;lastView=overview&amp;from=-1w&amp;until=now">disconnected&lt;/a>
from the internet entirely. The country experienced a &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/the-world-is-watching-uganda-elections/">widespread internet blackout that lasted 4 days&lt;/a>,
starting on the eve of the election (13th January 2021) and ending in
the morning of 18th January 2021. In the days leading up to the
election, access to major social media platforms and circumvention tools
was &lt;a href="https://www.facebook.com/MTNUG/posts/5644233898936144">blocked&lt;/a>
&amp;ndash; &lt;em>even when the &lt;a href="https://www.mtn.co.ug/product/ott-tax/">OTT (Over the Top) tax&lt;/a> (commonly referred to as
the “Social Media Tax”) was paid&lt;/em>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2020</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/</guid><description>&lt;p>In light of the global &lt;a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019">COVID-19 pandemic&lt;/a>,
2020 has been a challenging year for everyone.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Yet, several exciting things happened in the censorship measurement
world. In this post, we share some OONI highlights from 2020, as well as
some upcoming OONI projects for 2021!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#new-ooni-probe-desktop-app-for-windows-and-macos">New OONI Probe Desktop App for Windows and macOS&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#new-ooni-probe-measurement-engine">New OONI Probe measurement engine&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#ooni-run-usability-study">OONI Run usability study&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#measurement-methodologies">Measurement methodologies&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#new-circumvention-tool-tests">New circumvention tool tests&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2020/#new-experiments">New experiments&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Investigating Encrypted DNS Blocking in India</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-encrypted-dns-blocking-india/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-encrypted-dns-blocking-india/</guid><description>&lt;p>In October 2020, we collaborated with Divyank Katira and Gurshabad Grover,
researchers at the &lt;a href="https://cis-india.org/">Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society, India&lt;/a>,
to implement and evaluate a new OONI experiment focused on detecting DNS censorship.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This new OONI experiment, called &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe-engine/tree/v0.19.0/experiment/dnscheck">dnscheck&lt;/a>,
focuses on detecting the blocking of encrypted DNS
transports such as &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS">DNS over TLS&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS">DNS over HTTPS&lt;/a>. Its
methodology improves upon the measurement methodology OONI previously used to measure
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot">DoT blocking in Iran&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The implementation, &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe-engine/pull/950">written by Divyank Katira&lt;/a>, is currently only available
to users of the &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe-engine/tree/v0.19.0#building-miniooni">miniooni&lt;/a>
research client. We are however &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe/issues/1262">planning on promoting the dsncheck experiment
as a first class experiment&lt;/a> that will run
by default as part of the &amp;ldquo;websites&amp;rdquo; experiments group.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Tanzania blocks social media (and Tor?) on election day</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/</link><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/images/tz-image.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/images/tz-image_hu15442670431547280122.png"

 

 title="WhatsApp blocked in Tanzania on election day"
 
 alt="WhatsApp blocked in Tanzania on election day"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Starting from yesterday (27th October 2020) &amp;ndash; &lt;em>on the eve of
&lt;a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/tanzania-election-tanzanias-democracy-faces-a-critical-test-in-wednesdays-presidential-election/2020/10/27/b1620b64-17c3-11eb-8bda-814ca56e138b_story.html">Tanzania&amp;rsquo;s 2020 general election&lt;/a>&lt;/em>
&amp;ndash; OONI measurements continue to
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2020-10-29&amp;since=2020-09-28&amp;probe_cc=TZ&amp;only=anomalies">show&lt;/a>
the ongoing blocking of social media (and of the
&lt;a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor&lt;/a> circumvention tool) in Tanzania.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we share &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2020-10-29&amp;since=2020-09-28&amp;probe_cc=TZ&amp;only=anomalies">OONI data collected from Tanzania&lt;/a>
on these blocks, as well as relevant instructions for further OONI Probe
testing.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/#methods">Methods&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/#blocking-of-social-media">Blocking of social media&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Probe ASN Incident Report</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-asn-incident-report/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-asn-incident-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last week we &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/explorer/issues/495">noticed&lt;/a>
that some OONI measurements were available on &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a> under a report ID containing a
valid &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#asn">Autonomous System Number (ASN)&lt;/a>, even though the raw
JSON data contained zero as the ASN (i.e. encoded as &lt;code>AS0&lt;/code>). We
initially thought that this was caused by a bug in our API code, but it
actually turned out to be an &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>
bug in our &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe-engine">probe engine&lt;/a> (which
powers the OONI Probe apps).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Please &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">update your OONI Probe mobile app to the latest version (2.7.0)&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>, which fixes this bug.
If you are an OONI Probe desktop app user and prefer not to share your
network ASN, please refrain from running tests until we have released a
fix for OONI Probe desktop (&lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/explorer/issues/495#issuecomment-705518245">hopefully this will be possible next week&lt;/a>).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Belarus protests: From internet outages to pervasive website censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/images/by-blockpage.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/images/by-blockpage_hu6980547774342713408.png"

 

 title="Block page served in Belarus"
 
 alt="Block page served in Belarus"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>&lt;strong>Image:&lt;/strong> Block page served in Belarus.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>This report was prepared in collaboration with &lt;a href="https://humanconstanta.by/">Human Constanta&lt;/a> and the &lt;a href="https://t.me/zabynet">Digital Observers Community Belarus&lt;/a>.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>More than 70 websites have been &lt;a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/28/belarus-internet-disruptions-online-censorship">blocked&lt;/a>
in Belarus over the last weeks, following a &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/10/its-outrageous-belarus-election-result-sparks-night-of-defiance-and-violence">controversial presidential election&lt;/a>
and amid &lt;a href="https://time.com/5880593/belarus-protests-lukashenko/">ongoing anti-government protests&lt;/a>. Many
of the blocked sites include news media and are related to the
elections, while several other sites expressing political criticism were
blocked as well. At the time of writing, many of these sites remain
blocked in Belarus.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet Measurement Village 2020: Slides &amp; Video Recordings</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/images/imv2020-banner.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/images/imv2020-banner_hu311103607854719990.png"

 
 srcset="https://ooni.org/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/images/imv2020-banner_hu495236815503009730.png 2x"
 

 title="Internet Measurement Village 2020"
 
 alt="Internet Measurement Village 2020"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Over the last month, between 10th June 2020 to 3rd July 2020, we
organized and hosted the &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/">Internet Measurement Village (IMV) 2020&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>, an
online community event aimed at sharing skills, knowledge, and resources
on internet measurement, in defense of a free and open internet.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As all the IMV sessions were live-streamed and will continue to live on
the &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/OONIorg">OONI YouTube channel&lt;/a>, we hope
that these recordings will serve as a valuable resource on internet
measurement for the internet freedom community.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Support the OTF: Support a Free and Open Internet</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-support-otf/</link><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-support-otf/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last month, the &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/">Open Technology Fund (OTF)&lt;/a> &amp;ndash; &lt;em>one of the main funders of free
censorship circumvention and privacy-enhancing technologies that human
rights defenders worldwide rely on&lt;/em> &amp;ndash; has been under threat, following
the &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/17/media/us-agency-for-global-media-michael-pack/index.html">ousting of its leadership&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We previously published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-19-save-internet-freedom-support-the-open-technology-fund/">statement in support of the OTF&lt;/a>,
explaining &lt;strong>why we think the OTF is essential for internet freedom&lt;/strong>
and encouraging the public to &lt;a href="https://saveinternetfreedom.tech/">sign the letter to congress&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share our experience working with the OTF, and discuss
how they have played a crucial role in supporting the fight against
internet censorship worldwide.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measurement observations on network performance during the COVID-19 pandemic in Northern Italy</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-network-performance-covid19-italy/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-network-performance-covid19-italy/</guid><description>&lt;p>We were recently invited to participate in a &lt;a href="https://www.netgainpartnership.org/">NetGain Partnership webinar&lt;/a> (titled “&lt;a href="https://www.netgainpartnership.org/events/covid19/global-infrastructure">Surging Demand and The Global Internet Infrastructure&lt;/a>”)
to discuss the changing landscape for internet infrastructure and
technology in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As part of our preparation for this webinar, we looked at network
performance measurements collected from northern Italy over the last
months (i.e. when Italy was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic) in an
attempt to understand whether and to what extent there was a correlation
between increased internet use and reduced network performance. As our
observations may be of public interest, we decided to share them through
this blog post.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Investigating TLS blocking in India</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-tls-blocking-india/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-tls-blocking-india/</guid><description>&lt;p>This report investigates Transport Layer Security
(&lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">TLS&lt;/a>)-based
blocking in India. &lt;a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reliance-jio-is-using-sni-inspection-to-block-websites">Previous
research&lt;/a>
by the &lt;a href="https://cis-india.org/">Centre for Internet &amp;amp;
Society, India&lt;/a> (CIS) has already
exposed TLS blocking based on the value of the &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication">SNI
field&lt;/a>.
OONI has also &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/">implemented and started
testing&lt;/a>
SNI-based TLS blocking measurements.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Recently, the Magma Project
&lt;a href="https://blog.magma.lavafeld.org/post/women-on-web-blocking/">documented&lt;/a>
cases where CIS India and OONI&amp;rsquo;s methodologies could be improved. They
specifically found that blocking sometimes appears to depend not only on
the value of the SNI field but also on the address of the web server
being used. These findings were later confirmed by OONI measurements in
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-engine-evaluation-spain">Spain&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot/">Iran&lt;/a> through
the use of an extended measurement methodology.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Azərbaycan: OONI Probe Test üçün çağırış</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-azerbaijan-ooni-probe-testing/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-azerbaijan-ooni-probe-testing/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;p>This is a &lt;strong>guest post by Arzu Geybullayeva&lt;/strong> (&lt;a href="https://www.az-netwatch.org/">Azerbaijan Internet Watch&lt;/a>), originally published
&lt;a href="https://www.facebook.com/arzu.geybullayeva/posts/10101500262414261">here&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://www.az-netwatch.org/">Azerbaijan Internet Watch&lt;/a> Azərbaycanda
internet senzurasını izləyir və bu çərçəvədə aşkar etdiyi pozuntuları öz
səhifəsində sənədləşdirir. Bu barədə daha ətraflı məlumatı
&lt;a href="https://www.az-netwatch.org/about/">buradan&lt;/a> əldə edə bilərsiniz.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Layihənin bir vacib cəhətlərindən biri də ölkədə bloklanan veb
səhifələri izləmək ve bu bloklamaların necə baş verdiyini araşdırmaqdır.
Bu barədə isə daha ətraflı
&lt;a href="https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/how-websites-are-blocked-in-azerbaijan/">buradan&lt;/a>
və &lt;a href="https://www.az-netwatch.org/technical-analysis/measuring-website-blocks-in-azerbaijan-ooni-forensics/">buradan&lt;/a>
məlumat əldə edə bilərsiniz.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Gördüyünüz kimi, bu testleri aparmaq üçün Azerbaijan Internet Watch
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> ilə əməkdaşlıq edir. OONI dünyada internet
senzurasının şəffaflığını artırmağı hədəfləyən layihədir.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>DNS over TLS blocked in Iran</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot/</link><pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7858">DNS over TLS&lt;/a> (DoT) is a network protocol that
allows one to use &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System">DNS&lt;/a> over
&lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">TLS&lt;/a> (i.e. with encryption
and authentication of the remote DNS server).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We investigated whether DoT works in Iran by gathering a list of 31
well-known DoT endpoints and running experiments from four distinct
Iranian mobile and fixed-line Internet Service Providers (ISPs):
&lt;a href="https://ipinfo.io/AS197207">MCI&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ipinfo.io/AS58224">TCI&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ipinfo.io/AS44244">Irancell&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://ipinfo.io/AS31549">Shatel&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We discovered that:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>57% of the endpoints are blocked on a least one ISP;&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>the blocking is not implemented uniformly across ISPs;&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Save Internet Freedom: Support the Open Technology Fund</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-19-save-internet-freedom-support-the-open-technology-fund/</link><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:48:11 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-19-save-internet-freedom-support-the-open-technology-fund/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last Wednesday was &lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/17/media/us-agency-for-global-media-michael-pack/index.html">dubbed&lt;/a> as a “Wednesday night massacre”, following the firing of the directors of four organizations overseen by the &lt;a href="https://www.usagm.gov/">US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)&lt;/a>: Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Middle East Broadcasting, and the Open Technology Fund (OTF).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Out of these four organizations, we would like to draw your attention to the &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/">OTF&lt;/a>, not only because they have been a long-term funder of our project but, more importantly, because they have been essential in creating the internet freedom community as we know it.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Those Unspoken Thoughts: A study of censorship and media freedom in Manipur, India</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/images/lily.jpg">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/images/lily_hu10051184052894055228.jpg"

 

 title="Report cover image"
 
 alt="Report cover image"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>This research report was produced by &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/about/people/chinmayi-sk/">OTF Information Controls Fellow, Chinmayi S K&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>. OONI
served as her host organization throughout her fellowship.&lt;/p>
&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/documents/those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow.pdf">Read full report&lt;/a>

&lt;p>The northeastern Indian state of Manipur has long been an area of conflict and
crackdowns. But although human rights violations are &lt;a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/29/these-fellows-must-be-eliminated/relentless-violence-and-impunity-manipur">well documented&lt;/a> in the
state, few studies have examined the impact of censorship and internet shutdowns
in the region. In 2019, research fellow Chinmayi S K sought to address this
critical gap by documenting the blocking of websites in Manipur and assessing
how the use of information controls in the state compares to that in the rest of
India. Of particular note, the in-depth research project studied the impact of
online censorship on the identities, livelihoods, and activities of womxn living
in Manipur.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Run Usability Study: Findings</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 09:38:02 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img src="https://ooni.org/images/uploads/dscf7168.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/">OONI Run&lt;/a> is a platform (&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/">launched&lt;/a> in September 2017) that you can use to generate mobile deep links and widget code to coordinate &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> testing. To enable community members to more effectively use&lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/"> OONI Run&lt;/a>, we researched its limitations and collected structured community feedback through an &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/">OONI Run usability study&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This report outlines the objectives, personas, assumptions, and methods of this study.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We also share the outcomes based on the analysis of information collected through our &lt;a href="https://ooni.typeform.com/to/r9c5ee">survey&lt;/a> and interviews with community members, as well as some of the next steps towards improving OONI Run.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Join the online Internet Measurement Village 2020</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/images/imv2020-banner.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/images/imv2020-banner_hu9743658825744276811.png"

 
 srcset="https://ooni.org/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/images/imv2020-banner_hu5501900478008247774.png 2x"
 

 title="Internet Measurement Village 2020"
 
 alt="Internet Measurement Village 2020"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;a class="youtube-subscribe" href="https://www.youtube.com/c/OONIorg?sub_confirmation=1">
Subscribe on YouTube
&lt;/a>

&lt;p>We are excited to bring the first online Internet Measurement Village to
you this month.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Interested in learning all about Internet measurement and how to detect
Internet censorship? Curious to explore open datasets on Internet
censorship and Internet outages? Eager to learn how advocates are
pushing back against Internet shutdowns and defending a free and open
Internet?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Join us for the online Internet Measurement Village, &lt;strong>starting on
Wednesday, 10th June 2020 and ending on Friday, 3rd July 2020&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Evaluating OONI’s New Measurement Engine in the Context of the Blocking of Women on Web in Spain</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-engine-evaluation-spain/</link><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-engine-evaluation-spain/</guid><description>&lt;p>Reproduction rights site
&lt;a href="https://www.womenonweb.org">www.womenonweb.org&lt;/a> has been
blocked in Spain over the last months by several local Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). Once Spanish hacktivist communities noticed that
&lt;a href="http://www.womenonweb.org">www.womenonweb.org&lt;/a> was
inaccessible, they coordinated on running &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI
Probe&lt;/a> tests to collect
measurement data that could serve as evidence. The findings of this
investigation have been published in &lt;a href="https://blog.magma.lavafeld.org/post/women-on-web-blocking/">an excellent
report&lt;/a>,
whose writing was coordinated by our former colleague, Vasilis Ververis.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We were involved in the technical review of the report. We found their
methodology particularly interesting. They used the OONI &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web
Connectivity experiment&lt;/a>
along with OONI&amp;rsquo;s &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/">experimental SNI based blocking
methodology&lt;/a>,
and they also performed manual experiments with
&lt;a href="https://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL&lt;/a> and
&lt;a href="https://curl.haxx.se/">cURL&lt;/a>. Because OONI&amp;rsquo;s mission is
to simplify and automate the collection of censorship evidence, we are
always interested in learning how we can expand &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">our Web Connectivity
methodology&lt;/a> to
automatically gather more data that is useful in specific cases.
Coincidentally, as part of &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/probe-engine/issues/40">rewriting the Web Connectivity
implementation in Go&lt;/a>, we
have already written experimental code that combines &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">vanilla Web
Connectivity&lt;/a>
with &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/">SNI blocking&lt;/a>
and other techniques. We therefore asked them to run this experimental
code with &lt;a href="https://www.womenonweb.org">www.womenonweb.org&lt;/a>
as a target. Our goal was to evaluate whether our working prototype
would have allowed them to obtain the same research results, without
resorting to manually running specifically tailored network experiments.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Burundi blocks social media amid 2020 general election</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-burundi-blocks-social-media-amid-election/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-burundi-blocks-social-media-amid-election/</guid><description>&lt;p>Yesterday, access to &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52737081">social media was reportedly blocked in Burundi&lt;/a> amid its 2020
general election.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The lead-up to the election was &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/lead-up-burundi-election-marred-unrest-200517163130410.html">marred by violence and unrest&lt;/a>,
as seven candidates vied to replace Incumbent President Nkurunziza, who
has been in power over the last 15 years. Despite &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/burundi-protests-deaths-man-set-ablaze">widespread deadly protests&lt;/a>
and a &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32724083">coup attempt&lt;/a>,
President Nkurunziza won a third term in 2015 following &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">disputed elections&lt;/a>.
While President Nkurunziza &lt;a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/burundi-will-hold-presidential-parliamentary-and-municipal-elections-2020">reportedly announced&lt;/a>
that he would not contest the next elections, he is set to become a
“&lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52682171">supreme guide to patriotism&lt;/a>” as he
steps down now in 2020.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Myanmar blocks “fake news” websites amid COVID-19 pandemic</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/images/mm-blockpage-3.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/images/mm-blockpage-3_hu15627163551353397360.png"

 

 title="Block page served in Myanmar"
 
 alt="Block page served in Myanmar"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>In March 2020, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Myanmar received a
directive from the Ministry of Transport and Communications to &lt;a href="https://www.telenor.com.mm/en/article/blocking-230-websites-myanmar-based-directive-authorities">block 230 websites&lt;/a>,
most of which contain adult content. However, 67 of these sites were
blocked on the grounds of spreading “fake news”. The list of these 230
websites has not been published.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In an attempt to potentially identify the newly blocked websites, we
analyzed &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/country/MM">OONI network measurements collected from Myanmar&lt;/a> over the last months,
between 1st January 2020 to 9th April 2020.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measuring SNI based blocking in Iran</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/</guid><description>&lt;p>In this blog post we start evaluating &lt;a href="https://github.com/ooni/spec/blob/adf9537c43ef848b96792f8dea99fbd7f93fe608/nettests/ts-024-sni-blocking.md">OONI&amp;rsquo;s new SNI blocking
experiment&lt;/a>.
To this end, we will use measurements performed in Iran, where the
blocking technique measured by this experiment is deployed.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>OONI&amp;rsquo;s SNI blocking experiment discovers cases where &lt;a href="https://tls.ulfheim.net/">a Client Hello
packet&lt;/a> carrying a specific SNI
triggers blocking. In this context, SNI means &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication">Server Name
Indication&lt;/a>.
It is an extension to the &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security">Transport Layer
Security&lt;/a>
(TLS) protocol that allows a client to specify the domain name that it
wants an HTTP server to serve. This extension is used in many TLS use
cases. For example, when you access
&lt;a href="https://www.google.com">https://www.google.com&lt;/a> with your
browser, the code will send a Client Hello packet containing the string
&lt;code>www.google.com&lt;/code> in the SNI extension.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Run Survey &amp; Interviews: Share your feedback</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/images/ooni-run.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/images/ooni-run_hu17043667162593774499.png"

 

 title="OONI Run"
 
 alt="OONI Run"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/">OONI Run&lt;/a> is a platform that you can
use to generate mobile deep links and widget code to coordinate &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> testing.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Researchers and human rights defenders around the world have used &lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/">OONI Run&lt;/a> to coordinate OONI Probe censorship
measurement campaigns, particularly leading up to and during political
events (such as elections and protests).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We’re excited to hear more about your experience with OONI Run so that
we can improve it.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Launched: New OONI Probe Desktop App for Windows and macOS</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/</link><pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/images/desktop-feature.png">
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/images/desktop-feature_hu15263499433944027071.png"

 

 title="OONI Probe desktop app"
 
 alt="OONI Probe desktop app"
 
 />
 &lt;/a>
 
&lt;/div>


&lt;p>Today, OONI is thrilled to announce the public launch of the &lt;strong>new OONI
Probe desktop app&lt;/strong> that you can download and install on &lt;strong>Windows&lt;/strong> and
&lt;strong>macOS&lt;/strong> to measure internet censorship and network performance.&lt;/p>
&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/install/desktop">Install OONI Probe Desktop app&lt;/a>

&lt;p>By running the tests in the new OONI Probe desktop app, you can measure:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Blocking of &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">websites&lt;/a>;&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Blocking of &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/whatsapp/">WhatsApp&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/facebook-messenger/">Facebook Messenger&lt;/a>, and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/telegram/">Telegram&lt;/a>;&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Blocking of &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/tor/">Tor&lt;/a> and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/psiphon/">Psiphon&lt;/a>;&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Presence of systems (“&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/">middleboxes&lt;/a>”)
that could potentially be responsible for censorship and/or surveillance;&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Building a smart URL list system: Policy for URL prioritization</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-smart-url-list-system/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-smart-url-list-system/</guid><description>&lt;p>To improve the monitoring of website censorship around the world, OONI
aims to create a smart URL list system, while ensuring, to the extent
possible, the safety of the URL lists themselves by running them through
the usual &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists">Citizen Lab URL review process&lt;/a>. This will help
ensure smarter test target selection and by extension, it will enable us
&amp;ndash; and the broader internet freedom community &amp;ndash; to more effectively
monitor, analyze, and respond to cases of website censorship around the
world.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Let's measure the accessibility of COVID-19 websites around the world</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/covid-19-ooni-measurement/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/covid-19-ooni-measurement/</guid><description>&lt;p>Ensuring a free and open internet during an emergency, like the current
&lt;a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen">COVID-19 pandemic&lt;/a>,
is more important than ever. However, access to information related to
the coronavirus pandemic has already been censored by certain
governments. &lt;a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2020/03/censored-contagion-how-information-on-the-coronavirus-is-managed-on-chinese-social-media/">China censored information on the coronavirus&lt;/a>
on Chinese social media platforms, while &lt;a href="https://vesinfiltro.com/noticias/bloqueado_portal_coronavirus_AN">Venezuela’s state-owned CANTV blocked access to a coronavirus information portal&lt;/a>
last week.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We therefore invite you to participate in a measurement campaign to
check if COVID-19 sites are accessible in your country (and on the
network you’re using) and to &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">share relevant measurement data&lt;/a> with the world.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2019</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/</guid><description>&lt;p>As the new decade begins, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from 2019. We also share some thoughts for 2020.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#new-apps">New Apps&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app">Revamped OONI Probe Mobile App&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#new-ooni-probe-desktop-app">New OONI Probe Desktop App&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#near-real-time-publication-of-ooni-measurements">Near real-time publication of OONI measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#revamped-ooni-explorer">Revamped OONI Explorer&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#ooni-postgresql-metadb">OONI PostgreSQL MetaDB&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#improved-measurements">Improved measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#new-ooni-probe-tests">New OONI Probe tests&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#new-ooni-probe-measurement-engine">New OONI Probe measurement engine&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#community">Community&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#new-partnerships">New partnerships&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#research-publications">Research publications&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#ooni-workshops-and-presentations">OONI workshops and presentations&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#community-resources">Community resources&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2019/#ooni-verse">OONI-verse&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Iran temporarily blocks the Farsi language edition of Wikipedia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last days, between 2nd to 3rd March 2020, &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=IR&amp;until=2020-03-04&amp;domain=fa.wikipedia.org&amp;test_name=web_connectivity">OONI measurements&lt;/a>
collected from 6 different networks in Iran showed that access to the
Farsi edition of Wikipedia (fa.wikipedia.org) was temporarily
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/20200302T194052Z_AS197207_islb8RlGpTL7QYRJW5YqbATYCtS17SkETdmEPpkCQJbeSVtUf7?input=https%3A%2F%2Ffa.wikipedia.org%2F">blocked&lt;/a>
by means of &lt;strong>DNS tampering&lt;/strong> and &lt;strong>SNI filtering&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share relevant OONI data.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="blocking-of-farsi-wikipedia-and-wikinews">Blocking of Farsi Wikipedia and Wikinews&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>In the past, Iran mainly &lt;a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&amp;context=iranmediaprogram">blocked the HTTP version of specific Wikipedia articles&lt;/a>.
But over the last years, this probably wasn’t very noticeable because
Wikipedia used &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#https">HTTPS&lt;/a> with
HSTS enabled, meaning that Iranian internet users could easily access
the censored pages.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Highlights: 2017-2019</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-highlights-2017-2019/</link><pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-highlights-2017-2019/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;em>This post was originally published on the &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/news/ooni-highlights-2017-2019/">OTF website&lt;/a>.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Back in 2012, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> was born with &lt;a href="https://www.opentech.fund/results/supported-projects/ooni-open-observatory-of-network-interference/">OTF support&lt;/a>
to create the first open methodologies that would enable anyone around
the world to measure internet censorship and other forms of network
interference.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today, OONI comprises a global community that runs its censorship
measurement software (&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>) in
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">more than 200 countries every month&lt;/a>.
Millions of measurements have been collected from tens of thousands of
networks in 236 countries since 2012, all of which are openly published
on &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer&lt;/a> &amp;ndash; arguably the largest
publicly available resource on internet censorship to date.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Togo: Instant messaging apps blocked amid 2020 presidential election</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2020-togo-blocks-instant-messaging-apps/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2020-togo-blocks-instant-messaging-apps/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last Saturday, on 22nd February 2020, &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/22/togo-votes-president-faure-gnassingbee-fourth-term">presidential elections&lt;/a>
were held in Togo. These elections follow a &lt;a href="https://www.acleddata.com/2018/12/13/togo-another-wave-of-demonstrations-washes-over-gnassingbes-regime/">wave of protests&lt;/a>
over the last years against the 53-year rule of Gnassingbe Eyadema and,
subsequently, his son, Faure Gnassingbe. A few days before the election,
non-partisan election monitoring was restricted as &lt;a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/statement-expulsion-ndi-staff-togo-and-restrictions-election-monitoring">National Democratic Institute (NDI) staff were expelled&lt;/a>
from the country. According to preliminary results from the electoral
commission, incumbent President Faure Gnassingbe &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51606972">won re-election&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Amid concerns that the Togolese government would restrict access to the
internet during the elections (similarly to other West African
countries, such as
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/">Benin&lt;/a> and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/">The Gambia&lt;/a>), Access
Now’s &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/">KeepItOn campaign&lt;/a>
published an &lt;a href="http://www.lamanchette.net/singlepost-togo-election--risque-de-coupure-dinternet--une-coalition-internationale-saisit-la-ministre-cina-lawson-5-154-775">open letter&lt;/a>
encouraging the government of Togo to ensure a free and open internet
during the election. Access Now also &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/togo-election-2020/">encouraged the use of OONI Probe&lt;/a> so that locals in
Togo could monitor the accessibility of online sites and services
through network measurement.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Call to Action: Let’s measure the blocking of LGBTQI websites around the world!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-measure-blocking-lgbtqi-sites/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-measure-blocking-lgbtqi-sites/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Grindr blocked in Iran" src="https://ooni.org/post/lgbtqi-site-testing/confirmed-blocked-measurement.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>LGBTQI websites are blocked in several countries around the world, such
as
&lt;a href="https://sinarproject.org/digital-rights/updates/online-lgbt-censorship-malaysia">Malaysia&lt;/a>
and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#lgbt">Indonesia&lt;/a>.
This includes popular dating apps and sites, like
&lt;a href="https://www.grindr.com/">grindr&lt;/a>, which is blocked in
&lt;a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/lebanon-ban-on-gay-dating-app-grindr-a-blow-for-sexual-rights-and-freedom/">Lebanon&lt;/a>
and
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#human-rights-issues">Iran&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>How can we track the blocking of LGBTQI sites around the world?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We have teamed up with &lt;a href="https://outrightinternational.org/">OutRight Action International&lt;/a> &amp;ndash; a leading international LGBTQI human rights organization &amp;ndash; to investigate the blocking of LGBTQI sites worldwide.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We invite you to contribute to this research!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Iran’s nation-wide Internet blackout: Measurement data and technical observations</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Nov 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last week, Iran experienced a nation-wide Internet blackout.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Most Iranians were barred from connecting to the global Internet and the
outside world, but they had access to Iran’s national Intranet: the
domestic network that hosts Iranian websites and services—all under the
government’s watch.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This major Internet blackout was rolled out on 16th November 2019, right
after &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/iran-protests-600-words-191118060831036.html">protests erupted&lt;/a>
across multiple cities in Iran. The protests (against economic
mismanagement and government corruption) were
&lt;a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/world/middleeast/iran-gasoline-prices-rations.html">sparked&lt;/a>
by the government’s abrupt announcement to increase the price of fuel
(as much as
&lt;a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/20/middleeast/iran-fuel-protests-intl/index.html">300%&lt;/a>)
and to impose a strict rationing system. According to Amnesty
International, &lt;a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/iran-more-than-100-protesters-believed-to-be-killed-as-top-officials-give-green-light-to-crush-protests/">more than 100 protesters are believed to have been killed&lt;/a>
over the last week, but this figure has been
&lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/iran-blasts-amnesty-protest-toll-calling-disinformation-191120195212119.html">disputed&lt;/a>
by Iranian authorities. Amid the protests—which began on 15th November
2019 and are ongoing—access to the Internet was &lt;a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutoff/">reportedly shutdown&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On the blocking of abortion rights websites: Women on Waves &amp; Women on Web</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Cover image" src="https://ooni.org/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web/wow-cover-image.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Image:&lt;/strong> By Clarote (Coding Rights)&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>Read the &lt;a href="https://medium.com/codingrights/brasil-bloqueia-women-on-waves-site-que-traz-informa%C3%A7%C3%B5es-sobre-aborto-seguro-91cd6ae64ba3">Portuguese version&lt;/a> by Coding Rights.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>View the report&amp;rsquo;s &lt;a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/12/12/net-claro-e-vivo-bloqueiam-site-aborto-seguro/">press coverage&lt;/a> by The Intercept.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>As abortion remains partially or totally
&lt;a href="https://reproductiverights.org/worldabortionlaws">criminalized&lt;/a> in
numerous countries, the fight to promote sexual and reproductive rights,
as well as women&amp;rsquo;s health, also relies on access to information. But
recently, we were told that the website of the abortion rights
non-governmental organization womeonwaves.org, which provides
reproductive health services and education to women in countries with
restrictive abortion laws, was inaccessible in Brazil.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Egypt blocks BBC and Alhurra: Expanding media censorship amid political unrest</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/</link><pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last weekend, &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49786367">protests erupted in Egypt&lt;/a> in response
to corruption allegations against President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s
government.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Protests have been rare since President Sisi took power in 2014, but
amid policies of economic austerity and recent corruption allegations,
hundreds of Egyptians took to the streets. It was subsequently
&lt;a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/facebook-messenger-social-media-and-news-sites-disrupted-in-egypt-amid-protests-eA1Jd7Bp">reported&lt;/a>
that BBC News and the US-funded Alhurra news website were amongst
blocked services. The head of Egypt’s Supreme Council for Media
Regulation &lt;a href="https://cpj.org/2019/09/egypt-authorities-arrest-3-journalists-block-websi.php">reportedly stated&lt;/a>
that the BBC and other news websites may have been blocked because of
their “inaccurate” coverage of the protests.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Next Generation OONI Explorer Launched!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Next Generation OONI Explorer" src="https://ooni.org/post/2019-explorer-revamp/explorer-revamped.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is
thrilled to announce the public launch of the revamped, &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">next generation OONI Explorer&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI Explorer is an open data resource on internet censorship around
the world.&lt;/strong> This new platform offers access to millions of censorship
measurements collected from 233 countries since 2012.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/#about-ooni-explorer">About OONI Explorer&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/#why-use-ooni-explorer">Why use OONI Explorer?&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/#who-is-ooni-explorer-for">Who is OONI Explorer for?&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/#ooni-explorer-2-0">OONI Explorer 2.0&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Resurgence of Internet Censorship in Ethiopia: Blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, and African Arguments</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/resurgence-internet-censorship-ethiopia-2019/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/resurgence-internet-censorship-ethiopia-2019/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last year in June 2018, following years of &lt;a href="https://ooni.io/post/ethiopia-report/">pervasive internet censorship&lt;/a>, Ethiopia
&lt;a href="https://ooni.io/post/ethiopia-unblocking/">unblocked&lt;/a> hundreds of
websites as part of &lt;a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/reform-ethiopia-turning-promise-progress">political reforms&lt;/a>
under a new government. But merely a year later, we observe a resurgence
of internet censorship in the country.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In mid-June 2019, Ethiopia
&lt;a href="https://ooni.io/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/">experienced&lt;/a>
several internet blackouts and once internet access was restored, access
to WhatsApp and Telegram was blocked. These events coincided with
Ethiopia’s national high school exams and it is
&lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48653392">believed&lt;/a> that
internet access was restricted in an attempt to prevent exam leakage as
has &lt;a href="https://addisstandard.com/national-higher-education-entrance-exam-cancelled-due-to-leakage/">happened in the past&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: From internet blackouts to the blocking of WhatsApp and Telegram</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/</link><pubDate>Fri, 21 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/</guid><description>&lt;p>Communication access in Ethiopia has significantly been disrupted over the last week. Internet access and Short Message Services (SMS) were &lt;a href="https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1139127606211727360">disconnected&lt;/a> intermittently across the country.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>During the first half of the week, internet connectivity was &lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&amp;entity=country/ET&amp;lastView=overview&amp;from=1560166834&amp;until=now">shut down completely&lt;/a>. After access was restored, both &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.io/measurement/20190615T215418Z_AS24757_NKzIEujAd7rEN95SsIZnraLm1yjqdU79EqczVKFLUzsOJh4DLE">WhatsApp&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.io/measurement/20190615T222820Z_AS24757_4flsDD8gZDpmh2jr60nmgLuGGymkNsRA8HOejGDOFZZDEWr6EP">Telegram&lt;/a> were blocked. A few days ago, Ethio Telecom (the only telecom in the country) &lt;a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190619122350/https:/twitter.com/ethiotelecom_/status/1141013304762146817">published a notice&lt;/a>, acknowledging the internet disruptions, but came short on details about the extent of communication disruptions or why they occurred in the first place.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Jordan: Measuring Facebook live-streaming interference during protests</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/jordan-measuring-facebook-interference/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/jordan-measuring-facebook-interference/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last December, &lt;a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/20/youth-revolts-and-political-opposition-in-jordan/?utm_term=.80244368c558">anti-austerity protests&lt;/a> erupted in Jordan against a controversial fiscal reform bill. The protests ensued once a week for several weeks thereafter. Amid the protests, locals reported that they were unable to view live-streaming from Facebook. But they also reported that viewing live-streaming was otherwise possible when protests were not taking place.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Therefore, our first hypothesis was that perhaps people in Jordan couldn’t load videos on Facebook because they were using overloaded networks (rather than Facebook live streaming being interfered with).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Nigeria’s 2019 elections through the lens of network measurements</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>Censorship events are increasingly being reported during political
events in Africa (and elsewhere around the world). A few examples
include the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/">social media disruptions in Mali&lt;/a>
amid its 2018 presidential election, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/">blocking of social media in Uganda&lt;/a>
during its 2016 general elections, and the complete &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/">internet blackout in The Gambia&lt;/a>
during its 2016 presidential election.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Leading up to and during Nigeria’s 2019 general elections, we
collaborated with our local partner, &lt;a href="https://paradigmhq.org/">Paradigm Initiative&lt;/a>, on measuring networks in the
country to monitor potential censorship events.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>China is now blocking all language editions of Wikipedia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/</link><pubDate>Sat, 04 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking.zh/">translation: 中国封锁了所有语言版本的维基百科&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>China recently started blocking all language editions of Wikipedia. Previously, the blocking was limited to the Chinese language edition of Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org), but has now expanded to include all &lt;code>*.wikipedia.org&lt;/code> language editions.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share &lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/CN">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a> on the blocking of Wikipedia in China. We found that all wikipedia.org sub-domains are blocked in China by means of DNS injection and SNI filtering.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="dns-injection">DNS injection&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Through the use of &lt;a href="https://ooni.io/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a>, Wikipedia domains have been &lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/CN">tested&lt;/a> from multiple local vantage points in China since 2015. Most measurements have been collected from China Telecom (AS4134).  &lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Benin: Social media blocking and Internet blackout amid 2019 elections</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/</guid><description>&lt;p>Two days ago, social media was &lt;a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-blocked-in-benin-on-election-day-aAwqknyM">reportedly&lt;/a> blocked and access to the Internet was shutdown in Benin during its 2019 parliamentary elections.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.io/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> and the &lt;a href="https://www.caida.org/">Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)&lt;/a> teams share &lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/BJ">OONI&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&amp;entity=country/BJ&amp;lastView=overview&amp;from=1556385008&amp;until=1556557928">IODA&lt;/a>, and &lt;a href="https://atlas.ripe.net/">RIPE Atlas&lt;/a> network measurement data that corroborate and provide insight into these recent censorship events in Benin.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#social-media-blocking">Social media blocking&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#ooni-measurements">OONI measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#ripe-atlas-measurements">RIPE Atlas measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#internet-blackout">Internet blackout&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/#about-ioda">About IODA&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Cuba blocks independent media amid 2019 constitutional referendum</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/cuba-referendum/</link><pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/cuba-referendum/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 24th February 2019, Cubans voted on a new constitution for the first time in decades.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>But a few hours before the referendum, independent news outlet Tremenda Nota &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/TremendaNota_cu/status/1099465370585518080?s=19">reported&lt;/a> that their &lt;a href="https://www.tremendanota.com/">website&lt;/a> got blocked in Cuba.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.io/country/CU">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a> that confirms the blocking of tremendanota.com, as well as the blocking of several other independent media websites during the referendum.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We also found that ETECSA, Cuba’s only telecommunications company, has changed its censorship techniques, now censoring access to sites that support HTTPS by means of IP blocking.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Software Development Guidelines</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-software-development-guidelines/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2019 01:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-software-development-guidelines/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img src="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-software-development-guidelines/QuattroEngineer.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The goal of this document is to explain and explicit some of the best practices relevant to software development that we follow at the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>By following these development guidelines we aim to produce &lt;strong>higher quality code&lt;/strong>, which contains &lt;strong>less defects&lt;/strong> and allows us to iterate more quickly &lt;strong>delivering greater value&lt;/strong> to our end &lt;strong>users is a shorter amount of time&lt;/strong>!&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="version-control">Version control&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Also known as: “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the &lt;strong>Git&lt;/strong>!”&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Probe Android 2.0.0 Incident Report</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-probe-android-200-incident/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-probe-android-200-incident/</guid><description>&lt;p>The first public release of OONI Probe Android 2.0.0 (since 2.0.0-alpha.7) included a very serious bug: we lost measurements and collected measurements that we shouldn’t have. As soon as the problem was identified, we quickly released a fix (OONI Probe Android 2.0.1). All measurements that should not have been uploaded have been deleted and we are working on a new OONI Probe release (OONI Probe Mobile 2.1.0) that will allow you to manually re-upload measurements. No other OONI Probe platforms (&lt;a href="https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id1199566366">iOS&lt;/a>, [macOS](&lt;a href="https://ooni.io/install/OONI">https://ooni.io/install/OONI&lt;/a> Probe), [Linux](&lt;a href="https://ooni.io/install/OONI">https://ooni.io/install/OONI&lt;/a> Probe), &lt;a href="https://ooni.io/install/lepidopter/">Lepidopter&lt;/a>) were affected.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>From the blocking of Wikipedia to Social Media: Venezuela's Political Crisis</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-blocking-wikipedia-and-social-media-2019/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-blocking-wikipedia-and-social-media-2019/</guid><description>&lt;p>As political tension escalated in Venezuela over the last few weeks, so
did internet censorship.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>It started off with edits to Wikipedia pages earlier this month,
referencing the opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, as the President of
Venezuela. This resulted in the &lt;a href="https://vesinfiltro.com/noticias/wikipedia_2019-01/">blocking of Wikipedia&lt;/a>. Then a
group of Venezuelan soldiers &lt;a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/01/21/clashes-caracas-venezuelan-forces-arrest-rebelling-soldiers/">circulated videos&lt;/a>,
announcing an uprising against the government of President Maduro and
calling on the public to join them in the streets. This led to the
&lt;a href="https://vesinfiltro.com/noticias/twitter_youtube_instagram_2019-01/">temporary blocking of YouTube, Twitter and Instagram&lt;/a>
on the same day. During last week’s &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/23/venezuela-protests-thousands-march-against-maduro-as-opposition-sees-chance-for-change">anti-government protests&lt;/a>
(where Juan Guaidó &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/15/juan-guaido-venezuelan-opposition-leader-challenging-maduros-rule">swore himself in as interim president&lt;/a>),
further network anomalies were
&lt;a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/major-internet-disruptions-in-venezuela-amid-protests-4JBQ2kyo">reported&lt;/a>.
All cases were only observed on CANTV (AS8084), Venezuela’s state-owned
and largest telecommunication service.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zimbabwe protests: Social media blocking and internet blackouts</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/zimbabwe-protests-social-media-blocking-2019/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/zimbabwe-protests-social-media-blocking-2019/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last week, protests
&lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46938679">erupted&lt;/a> in Zimbabwe
in response to the government’s announcement that the price of fuel
would more than double. According to Zimbabwe’s government, the price
hikes &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46878267">aim&lt;/a> to avert
fuel shortages and to crackdown on the illegal trading of fuel. The new
prices, however, mean that Zimbabwe now has the &lt;a href="https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/gasoline_prices/World-top10/">most expensive fuel&lt;/a>
in the world.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Zimbabwe’s fuel protests lasted for three days (14th to 17th January
2019), during which 12 people were
&lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46938679">reportedly&lt;/a> killed
and many more beaten by security forces. It is estimated that 78 people
were &lt;a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/news/on-the-days-of-darkness-in-zimbabwe/">treated for gunshot wounds&lt;/a>,
while hundreds of protesters were
&lt;a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/news/zimshutdown-violations-updates/">arrested&lt;/a>
by the police.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2018</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/</link><pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/</guid><description>&lt;p>As the new year begins, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from 2018. We also share some of the exciting new projects
we’ll be launching in 2019!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#new-partnerships">New partnerships&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#research-publications">Research publications&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#dev-work-behind-the-scenes">Dev work behind the scenes&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app">Revamped OONI Probe mobile app&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#revamped-ooni-explorer">Revamped OONI Explorer&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#new-ooni-probe-desktop-apps">New OONI Probe desktop apps&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#probe-orchestration">Probe Orchestration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#ooni-workshops-and-presentations">OONI workshops and presentations&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#videos">Videos&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2018/#expanding-ooni-verse">Expanding OONI-verse&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="new-partnerships">New partnerships&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Our network of partners grew significantly in 2018!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Major Revamp: OONI Probe Mobile App 2.0 Launched!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/</link><pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI Probe: old vs. new" src="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/old-vs-new-app.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> project is thrilled to announce
the release of a major, new OONI Probe mobile app version!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Are websites and social media apps blocked? Is your network unusually
slow?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Install &lt;strong>OONI Probe&lt;/strong> now on
&lt;a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.openobservatory.ooniprobe">Android&lt;/a>
or &lt;a href="https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id1199566366">iOS&lt;/a> to find
out!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#why-run-ooni-probe">Why run OONI Probe?&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#ooni-probe-2-0-highlights">OONI Probe 2.0 Highlights&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#major-ui-overhaul">Major UI overhaul&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#overview-of-test-results">Overview of Test Results&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#enhanced-website-testing">Enhanced Website Testing&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/#test-websites-of-your-choice">Test websites of your choice&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet disruption in Gabon amid coup attempt</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/gabon-internet-disruption/</link><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/gabon-internet-disruption/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 7th January 2019, a &lt;a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46779854">military coup was attempted in Gabon&lt;/a> in a bid to end
more than 50 years of rule by President Ali Bongo’s family. The coup
attempt was quickly foiled. Security forces
&lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/gabon-coup-attempt-foiled-190107131011483.html">reportedly&lt;/a>
killed two suspects, arrested seven others, and Gabon’s government
retained control.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Meanwhile, a &lt;a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/gabon-coup-attempt-foiled-190107131011483.html">curfew&lt;/a>
has been imposed and &lt;a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/evidence-of-gabon-full-internet-shutdown-coup-attempt-dQ8oo18n">NetBlocks reported&lt;/a>
that access to the Internet has been shut down.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this post, we share data that provides signals of network disruptions
in Gabon.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Uganda's Social Media Tax through the lens of network measurements</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/</link><pubDate>Mon, 12 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Cover image" src="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/ug.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Image by &lt;a href="https://www.instagram.com/neemascribbles/">@neemascribbles&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> MTN (AS20294), Africell (AS36991), Airtel (AS37075), Smile Telecom (AS37122), Africa Online Uganda (AS29039), DATANET (AS29032), Sombha Solutions (AS328015), Roke (AS37063), Airtel (AS36977), Uganda Telecom (AS21491)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/">HTTP Invalid Request Line&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/">HTTP Header Field Manipulation&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/whatsapp/">WhatsApp&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/facebook-messenger/">Facebook Messenger&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/telegram/">Telegram&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/vanilla-tor/">Vanilla Tor&lt;/a>. &lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Testing/analysis period:&lt;/strong> 1st July 2018 to 24th October 2018&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship methods:&lt;/strong> HTTP blocking (resetting connections) and TCP/IP blocking&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#social-media-tax">Social Media Tax&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#findings">Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-tax/#blocking-of-social-media">Blocking of social media&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Venezuela</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Cover image" src="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela/ve-image.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A study by IPYS Venezuela, Venezuela Inteligente, and the Open
Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Update (2018-10-19):&lt;/strong> The section on &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#tor-unblocking">Tor becoming accessible&lt;/a> was added.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#political-environment">Political environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship">Reported cases of internet censorship&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#methodology-measuring-internet-censorship-in-venezuela">Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Venezuela&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#acknowledgement-of-limitations">Acknowledgement of limitations&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#findings">Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#blocked-websites">Blocked websites&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#media">Media&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#political-criticism">Political criticism&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#zello">Zello&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#currency-exchange">Currency exchange&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#blocking-of-tor">Blocking of Tor&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#about-tor">About Tor&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#testing">Testing&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#tor-unblocking">Tor unblocking&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/#conclusion">Conclusion&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Most recent measurements collected from Digitel
(AS264731), CANTV (AS8048), Movistar (AS6306) and Movilnet (AS27889).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>South Sudan: Measuring Internet Censorship in the World's Youngest Nation</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/south-sudan-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/south-sudan-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="South Sudan flag" src="https://ooni.org/post/south-sudan/ss-flag.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Image by &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_map_of_South_Sudan.svg">Mandavi&lt;/a>&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Established in July 2011, South Sudan is the youngest country in the
world. But the transition to independence from Sudan has been far from
smooth, as the country experiences an ongoing civil war. Even though
&lt;a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/es/system/files/filedepot/78/paradigmhq-digital_rights_in_africa_report_2017.pdf">internet penetration levels remain quite low&lt;/a>, two media websites and two independent blogs were &lt;a href="https://cpj.org/2017/07/south-sudan-authorities-block-access-to-at-least-f.php">reportedly blocked&lt;/a>
last year.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This report is a joint research effort by the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> and South
Sudan’s &lt;a href="http://tahurid.jovanjulien.com/">The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID)&lt;/a>. We examine internet
censorship in South Sudan through the collection and analysis of
&lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/SS">network measurements&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Mali: Social media disruptions amid 2018 presidential election?</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/</guid><description>&lt;p>Two days ago, on 29th July 2018, Malians went to the polls to vote in &lt;a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/07/26/mali-2018-presidential-election-top-10-facts/">presidential elections&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/Internet_SF/status/1023883426208915456">reported&lt;/a> that social media was inaccessible.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This is &lt;em>not&lt;/em> the first time that social media is reportedly blocked in Mali.
Facebook and Twitter were &lt;a href="https://qz.com/762082/mali-is-the-latest-african-country-to-impose-a-social-media-blackout/">blocked two years ago&lt;/a>
amidst violent protests against the detention of a popular radio host. Last
month, Internet Sans Frontieres &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/fighting-censorship-in-2018-elections/">reported&lt;/a>
that social media was disrupted in Mali, following a violent police crackdown
on banned opposition protests calling for transparency and accountability in
the 2018 presidential elections.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Do you use OONI Probe? We want your feedback!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooniprobe-ux-survey-and-interviews/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooniprobe-ux-survey-and-interviews/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooniuxteam.typeform.com/to/a1P0cn">Survey&lt;/a>&lt;/strong> (self-hosted &lt;a href="https://storm.torproject.org/shared/VpAFK13fdAozTGTolFd2EsT1CkLY8-YlBLbRERy5EwI">mirror&lt;/a>)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Since last year’s &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/">launch of the OONI Probe mobile apps&lt;/a>, tens of
thousands of people have been &lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/stats">measuring internet censorship in around 200 countries&lt;/a> every month. But &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> is far from perfect.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We’re excited to hear more about your experience with the apps so that
we can improve them.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We invite you to complete our survey and/or participate in an interview
to provide feedback.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="survey">Survey&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>We’d love to hear your thoughts on the &lt;em>current&lt;/em> OONI Probe mobile apps.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Egypt</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 02 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;div class="report-cover">
 &lt;img src="https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/EgyptCover.png" title="" srcset="https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/EgyptCover@2x.png 2x" alt="">
&lt;/div>

&lt;p>&lt;em>&lt;strong>The report uncovers anomalies on Egyptian networks, including
censorship and the hijacking of unencrypted HTTP connections for
advertising and cryptocurrency mining.&lt;/strong>&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/documents/Egypt-Internet-Censorship-AFTE-OONI-2018-07.pdf">Read full report in English&lt;/a>

&lt;a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.org/documents/Egypt-Internet-Censorship-AFTE-OONI-2018-07.AR.pdf">Read full report in Arabic&lt;/a>

&lt;p>&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/summary-egypt-internet-censorship-arabic.pdf">Read the summary of the report in Arabic&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Last year, Egypt &lt;a href="https://cpj.org/2017/05/egypt-blocks-access-to-21-news-websites.php">ordered the blocking of 21 news websites&lt;/a>.
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a>, a censorship measurement project
under the Tor Project, responded by publishing a
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/egypt-censors/">report&lt;/a> on the
blocking of (at least) 10 media websites, including &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/20170527T022637Z_AS24863_a2cVejuvTKddBoVLe3DyDGnPfEnaoUAmP51zo3jTJNEdF6iJJT?input=https:%2F%2Fmadamasr.com">Mada Masr&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/20170524T220920Z_AS36935_oaDJX0uN8fMLncEu9NQ794dvX4bC3zFejdVouFgsmlHukkjCsn?input=https:%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.net">Al Jazeera&lt;/a>.
In an attempt to identify the remaining blocked sites, Egypt’s
&lt;a href="https://afteegypt.org/">Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE)&lt;/a> ran &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> across multiple networks
in Egypt. They subsequently published &lt;a href="https://afteegypt.org/right_to_know-2/publicationsright_to_know-right_to_know-2/2017/06/04/13069-afteegypt.html?lang=en">two research reports&lt;/a>,
uncovering the blocking of hundreds of URLs (which expand beyond media
sites).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Verifying the unblocking of websites</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-unblocking/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jun 2018 19:49:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-unblocking/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Rally at Meskel Square" src="https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-unblocking/cover.jpg">
Pro PM Abiy Ahmed Rally at Meskel Square, June 2018 - Photo by Berhan Taye&lt;/p>
&lt;p>On 22nd June 2018, the Ethiopian government &lt;!-- raw HTML omitted -->reported&lt;!-- raw HTML omitted --> that it had unblocked 264 websites. This (great) news was also &lt;!-- raw HTML omitted -->reported by ESAT&lt;!-- raw HTML omitted -->, a major Ethiopian media website that was &lt;!-- raw HTML omitted -->blocked&lt;!-- raw HTML omitted --> over the last years.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Nigeria: Measuring Internet Censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/nigeria-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/nigeria-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last October, Nigeria’s National Communications Commission (NCC)
&lt;a href="https://pinigeria.org/president-buharis-secret-war-on-free-speech/">reportedly ordered&lt;/a>
the blocking of 21 websites. In response, we collaborated with Nigeria’s
&lt;a href="https://pinigeria.org/">Paradigm Initiative&lt;/a> to test those websites
and collect network measurement data that can shed light on whether and
how they’re blocked.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our findings are included in a joint research report that we published today
with Paradigm Initiative. The full report, titled &lt;strong>“Tightening the Noose on
Freedom of Expression: Status of Internet Freedom in Nigeria 2018”&lt;/strong>, can be
&lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/nigeria-report.pdf">downloaded here&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>. A summary of the report
is available &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/nigeria-report-summary.pdf">here&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Julie Owono</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-interviews-julie-owono/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-interviews-julie-owono/</guid><description>&lt;p>If you’ve met &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/JulieOwono">Julie Owono&lt;/a>, you’ll probably agree that her passion and
determination for defending digital rights is one of the things that
stands out about her.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In her capacity as the Executive Director of &lt;a href="https://internetwithoutborders.org/">Internet Sans Frontières&lt;/a> (Internet Without
Borders), Julie has spearheaded advocacy efforts in defense of online
freedoms in many West African countries. Notably, Julie led campaigns
against internet shutdowns in Cameroon, as well as in Togo and Chad.
Over the last two years, Julie has championed OONI community engagement
in West Africa and used OONI data as part of campaigns.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI at RightsCon 2018</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-rightscon-2018/</link><pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-rightscon-2018/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="RightsCon 2018" src="https://ooni.org/post/events/rightscon-2018.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We are excited to participate at
&lt;a href="https://www.rightscon.org/">RightsCon&lt;/a> next week: the world’s leading
event on human rights in the digital age. Annually hosted by &lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/">Access Now&lt;/a>, this three-day conference will take
place in Toronto between 16th-18th May 2018.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Over the last years, RightsCon has provided us the opportunity to
participate in critical discussions in the digital rights field, meet
many fascinating people and organizations, and to form new coalitions.
We therefore look forward to participating at RightsCon and are eager to
meet many new faces!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Moses Karanja</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-interviews-moses-karanja/</link><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-community-interviews-moses-karanja/</guid><description>&lt;p>We first met &lt;a href="https://moseskaranja.com/">Moses Karanja&lt;/a> several years
ago at the &lt;a href="https://citizenlab.ca/summerinstitute/">Citizen Lab Summer Institute&lt;/a>. He’s a Kenyan
information controls researcher, having previously worked with
Strathmore University Law School research centre,
&lt;a href="http://cipit.org/">CIPIT&lt;/a>. Currently, he’s a PhD student at the
University of Toronto.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Over the last years, Moses has championed OONI community engagement
across Africa. Thanks to his tireless efforts, communities in many
African countries are now running &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe&lt;/a> and using &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/data/">OONI data&lt;/a> to examine internet censorship
and other forms of network interference. We have worked with Moses on a
number of research reports and are grateful for his commitment to
defending a free and open internet.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>ParkNet: Short Documentary on Internet Censorship in Cuba</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/parknet-short-documentary-cuba/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/parknet-short-documentary-cuba/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last year we had the opportunity to travel to Cuba to explore its internet
landscape. We spent most of our time hopping from one public WiFi hotspot to
another, measuring networks in Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba. You
might remember that we published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/">research report&lt;/a> on our findings.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today we publish a &lt;strong>short documentary (“ParkNet”)&lt;/strong> on our study of internet
censorship in Cuba.&lt;/p>
&lt;iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/QslsL84jx4E" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen>&lt;/iframe>

&lt;p>“ParkNet” is a term that we coined to refer to parks that serve as public WiFi
hotspots in Cuba. You can also access the internet from many other public
spaces, but we found parks to be particularly interesting due to the sort of
collective experience that they offer when &amp;ldquo;visiting” the internet.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI's recent participation at events in Africa, India, and Europe</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-africa-india-europe-conferences/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-africa-india-europe-conferences/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Quattro" src="https://ooni.org/post/2018-conferences/quattro.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Over the last months, the OONI team had the opportunity to host
workshops, give presentations, and participate in discussions at the
following conferences and events:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="http://www.students.uct.ac.za/event/internet-censorship-measurements">Seminar at the University of Cape Town&lt;/a> (South Africa)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="http://globalnetpolicy.org/event/research-methods-africa/">Internet Policy in Africa: Research Methods for Advocacy workshop&lt;/a> (Uganda)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://nullcon.net/website/">Nullcon 2018&lt;/a> (India)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://internetfreedomfestival.org/">Internet Freedom Festival (IFF) 2018&lt;/a> (Spain)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018Rome">Tor Meeting&lt;/a> (Italy)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>These events provided us a great opportunity to meet many fascinating
people from various communities, learn about their work, form new
collaborations, and collect feedback for the improvement of our tools
and methodologies.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Sierra Leone: Network disruptions amid 2018 runoff elections</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/sierra-leone-network-disruptions-2018-elections/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/sierra-leone-network-disruptions-2018-elections/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last weekend, two network disruptions occurred in Sierra Leone right
before and after the country’s runoff elections.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This post examines these disruptions and shares data that corroborates
local
&lt;a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/04/01/why-sierra-leone-temporarily-shutdown-internet-after-runoff-vote/">reports&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>It seems that the network disruptions were caused by an ACE submarine
cable cut. &lt;a href="https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1520294400000;end:1522886400000;product:19;region:SL&amp;lu=fraction_traffic">Google traffic&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/widget/country-routing-stats#w.resource=sl&amp;w.zoom_start=1522368000000&amp;w.zoom_end=1522627200000&amp;w.comparison=no">BGP data&lt;/a> suggest that the second disruption, following the runoff
elections, could be an internet blackout.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="2018-general-elections">2018 general elections&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>President Koroma is stepping down, having served ten years in office.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Investigating Internet Blackouts from the Edge of the network: OONI's new upcoming methodology</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/investigating-internet-blackouts/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/investigating-internet-blackouts/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>The OONI team is creating a new methodology aimed at automatically
detecting and examining internet blackouts.&lt;/strong> Learn all about our
methodology &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/investigating-internet-blackouts/Investigating-Internet-Blackouts-Methodology-2018-03.pdf">here&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>Imagine a day where the internet is shut down completely. You have to
work, check the news, and communicate with your friends and family. All
of a sudden, you can’t do any of that, because there simply is no
internet. It feels like a strange form of time travel has taken place:
you’re thrown several decades into the past, into a world without
internet, but in one which has learned to heavily rely on it. And
sometimes, you remain in that world for several days (or
&lt;a href="https://qz.com/964927/caemroons-internet-shutdown-is-over-after-93-days/">months&lt;/a>,
in the case of the anglophone region of Cameroon). None of this makes
sense, and there’s no clear justification for it either.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Iran Protests: DPI blocking of Instagram (Part 2)</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests-pt2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests-pt2/</guid><description>&lt;p>In early January 2018, OONI published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests/">post&lt;/a>
reporting on the blocking of Telegram and Instagram amidst protests in Iran. We
have since been analyzing RIPE data and other network measurements collected
from Iran in an attempt to better understand the blockages. Upon further
analysis, we found that Instagram was in fact blocked (during the Iran
protests) through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology which
targeted the TLS protocol. And it was configured in an interesting way.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Iran Protests: OONI data confirms censorship events (Part 1)</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jan 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests/</guid><description>&lt;p>At this point, you have probably read all about the
&lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/02/iran-protests-how-did-they-start-and-where-are-they-heading">major anti-government protests&lt;/a>
that erupted across Iran over the last week. You may have even read about how services like
&lt;a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wjpxjy/iran-is-blocking-the-internet-to-shut-down-protests">Telegram and Instagram were blocked&lt;/a>,
reportedly as part of a government attempt to stifle the unrest.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We publish this post to share &lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/IR">OONI network measurement data&lt;/a>
collected from Iran between 28th December 2017 (when the protests started) to
2nd January 2018. OONI data confirms the blocking of Telegram, Instagram, and
Facebook Messenger amidst Iran’s protests and reveals how blocks were
implemented.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/</link><pubDate>Sat, 30 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/</guid><description>&lt;p>As the end of 2017 approaches, we publish this blog to share some OONI
highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be working
on in 2018!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#ooni-probe-mobile-apps">OONI Probe mobile apps&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#speed-and-performance-tests">Speed and performance tests&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#ooni-run">OONI Run&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#ooni-api">OONI API&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#ooni-partner-gathering">OONI Partner Gathering&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#research-reports">Research reports&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-in-2017/#ooni-in-2018">OONI in 2018&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="ooni-probe-mobile-apps">OONI Probe mobile apps&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI Probe mobile app" src="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-2017/01.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In February 2017, measuring internet censorship with &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a> suddenly became
easier than ever before! With the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/">launch of the OONI Probe mobile apps&lt;/a>, hundreds
of thousands of people from around the world started testing their networks for
censorship. Thanks to their testing, millions of measurements have been
collected (and &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/world/">published&lt;/a>) from thousands of local vantage points in more than
200 countries, shedding light on numerous &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/">cases of internet censorship&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI at the 34th Chaos Communication Congress (34C3)</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-34c3/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-34c3/</guid><description>&lt;p>Next week the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team will be
attending the &lt;a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2017/wiki/index.php/Main_Page">34th Chaos Communication Congress (34C3)&lt;/a>:
Europe’s largest hacker conference on technology, society, and utopia.
Are you going? We hope to see you there!&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="ooni-lecture">OONI lecture&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>OONI&amp;rsquo;s founder and project lead, Arturo Filastò, will be &lt;a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2017/Fahrplan/events/8923.html">presenting
OONI at 34C3&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;table>
 &lt;thead>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;th>Lecture&lt;/th>
 &lt;th>OONI: Lets Fight Internet Censorship Together!&lt;/th>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;/thead>
 &lt;tbody>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Day&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>&lt;a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2017/Fahrplan/events/8923.html">29th December 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Time&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>&lt;a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2017/Fahrplan/events/8923.html">14:30&lt;/a>&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Room&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>&lt;a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2017/Fahrplan/events/8923.html">Saal Borg&lt;/a>&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;/tbody>
&lt;/table>
&lt;p>Attend the lecture to learn all about OONI, recent censorship findings
from around the world, and how you can join the fight against internet
censorship.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI at LAVITS and Primavera Hacker 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-lavits-phacker-2017/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-lavits-phacker-2017/</guid><description>&lt;p>Earlier this month we had the opportunity to present OONI at two conferences in Chile: LAVITS and Primavera Hacker.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="lavits">LAVITS&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="http://lavits.org">LAVITS&lt;/a> is a Latin American network of surveillance
technology and society studies that organizes international symposiums since
2009. It features publications, talks and workshops related to
surveillance and technology, internet censorship, resistance and counter
surveillance, identification, biometrics, protection of personal data and
privacy. The fifth series of the &lt;a href="http://lavits2017.datosprotegidos.org/">LAVITS symposium&lt;/a> took place in Santiago, Chile from 29th November to 1st December 2017.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How Pakistan blocked news outlets, social media sites, and IM apps amidst protests</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/how-pakistan-blocked-social-media/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/how-pakistan-blocked-social-media/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last weekend, a number of social media sites and news outlets were
&lt;a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/147132/social-media-goes-down-in-pakistan/">blocked&lt;/a>
in Pakistan during &lt;a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/25/pakistan-calls-on-army-to-restore-order-as-blasphemy-protests-spread">Islamist protests&lt;/a>.
Protesters gathered in Islamabad alleged that Mr. Zahid Hamid, the
Federal Law Minister, should be removed from his position because he
omitted a reference to the Prophet Muhammad in a parliamentary bill. On
Saturday, 25th November 2017, law enforcement agencies initiated an
operation to disperse the sit-in at the Faizabad Interchange linking
Islamabad and Rawalpindi.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Identifying cases of DNS misconfiguration: Not quite censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/not-quite-network-censorship/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/not-quite-network-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Brazil, worldwide&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-requests/">HTTP requests&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS1916">AS1916&lt;/a> (Associação Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS262650">AS262650&lt;/a> (Kyatera Informatica Ltda),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS2715">AS2715&lt;/a> (Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa/RJ),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS27699">AS27699&lt;/a> (TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS28573">AS28573&lt;/a> (CLARO S.A.),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS52873">AS52873&lt;/a> (SOFTDADOS CONECTIVIDADE),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS7738">AS7738&lt;/a> (Telemar Norte Leste S.A.),
&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS8167">AS8167&lt;/a> (Brasil Telecom S/A - Filial Distrito Federal)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Measurement period:&lt;/strong> July 2016 — November 2017&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Website inaccessibility reasons:&lt;/strong> IPv6 or DNS misconfiguration&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We recently noticed that &lt;a href="http://pernambuco.com">pernambuco.com&lt;/a>, a
regional news portal, has not been reachable from several networks in Brazil for quite some
time. By looking at &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/not-quite-network-censorship/measurements.br.pernambuco.csv">OONI data&lt;/a>, we found that the site was not reachable and that it presented signs of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/s3YPvS70pxtUQXG5qLv8z2wfafZ98eUzCmxcbYkvSRELpYS2mBWksZCacvAr5GqS?input=http:%2F%2Fwww.pernambuco.com%2Fdiario">DNS-based
blocking&lt;/a>
due to empty DNS responses that is usually a symptom of potential internet censorship. But upon further analysis, we found a number of DNS
misconfigurations of the nameservers hosting the domain in question. A
&lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server">nameserver&lt;/a> is a function of a DNS server that implements a
network service for providing responses to queries against a directory service.
In this article we present an analysis of possible DNS misconfigurations that
may have caused &lt;code>pernambuco.com&lt;/code> to be inaccessible. We also provide some
solutions to resolve DNS misconfiguration for &lt;code>pernambuco.com&lt;/code> and other sites potentially affected in Brazil and worldwide.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Writing a modern cross-platform desktop app</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/writing-a-modern-cross-platform-desktop-app/</link><pubDate>Mon, 30 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/writing-a-modern-cross-platform-desktop-app/</guid><description>&lt;p>The goal of this article is to outline some of the architecture &amp;amp; design considerations made while thinking about how we would implement the OONI Probe desktop apps. This is the result of research and experimentation with a variety of different libraries and approaches. For each part of the technical stack we will outline the rationale leading to our choices.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="requirements--design-goals">Requirements &amp;amp; design goals&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Our primary goal with the OONI Probe desktop apps is to enable &lt;strong>Windows&lt;/strong> and &lt;strong>macOS&lt;/strong> desktop users to run &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a> network measurement tests without knowledge of the command line. These tests will use the &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://github.com/measurement-kit">Measurement Kit&lt;/a>&lt;/strong> implementation of OONI tests.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Team Meeting: Montreal 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI team meeting in Montreal" src="https://ooni.org/post/montreal-meeting/ooni-team.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Last week, right before the &lt;a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2017Montreal">Tor meeting&lt;/a>,
the OONI team gathered in Montreal for a 4-day meeting to reflect,
regroup, hack, and plan.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This post shares information from our meeting and future plans with the
broader community. All session notes are available on
&lt;a href="https://github.com/OpenObservatory/gatherings/tree/master/internal/2017-10-montreal">GitHub&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/#summary-what-ooni-is-working-on">Summary: What OONI is working on&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/#sessions">Sessions&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/#day-1-7th-october-2017">Day 1 - 7th October 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/#day-2-8th-october-2017">Day 2 - 8th October 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/#day-3-9th-october-2017">Day 3 - 9th October 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet Censorship in Pakistan: Findings from 2014-2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Pakistan" src="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan/pakistan.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Islamabad: Political dissent in Pakistan under threat, government
censors online content - PC: Haroon Baloch&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
and Bytes for All Pakistan.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#freedom-of-expression">Freedom of expression&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#press-freedom">Press freedom&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#access-to-information">Access to information&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#privacy-and-digital-surveillance">Privacy and digital surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#censorship">Censorship&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/#methodology-measuring-internet-censorship-in-pakistan">Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Pakistan&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Evidence of Internet Censorship during Catalonia's Independence Referendum</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Seized referendum site" src="https://ooni.org/post/catalonia/seized.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Image: Catalan Independence Referendum site seized&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Two days ago, Catalonia held a
&lt;a href="http://time.com/4951665/catalan-referendum-2017/">referendum&lt;/a> seeking
independence from Spain. As the world awaits to see what happens next,
we publish this post to share
&lt;a href="https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/ES">evidence&lt;/a> of recent
censorship events that occurred during and leading up to the referendum.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We &lt;strong>confirm the blocking of at least 25 sites related to the Catalan
referendum&lt;/strong> by means of DNS tampering and HTTP blocking, based on
&lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/country/ES">OONI Probe network measurements&lt;/a>
collected from three local networks. OONI data shows that these sites
were blocked every day from (at least) 25th September 2017 (when the
testing started) leading up to the referendum day, on 1st October 2017.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet Censorship in Iran: Network Measurement Findings from 2014-2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Iran block page" src="https://ooni.org/post/iran/blockpage.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Image: Blockpage in Iran&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI),
ASL19, ARTICLE 19, and Small Media.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#network-landscape">Network landscape&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#internet-use">Internet use&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship">Reported cases of internet censorship&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#methodology-measuring-internet-censorship-in-iran">Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Iran&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#review-of-the-citizen-labs-test-list-for-iran">Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s test list for Iran&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#ooni-network-measurement-testing">OONI network measurement testing&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#web-connectivity">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#http-invalid-request-line">HTTP Invalid Request Line&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/#http-header-field-manipulation">HTTP Header Field Manipulation&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Run: Let's fight internet censorship together!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/</link><pubDate>Wed, 27 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI Run" src="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/ooni-run.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today we released &lt;strong>&lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/">OONI Run&lt;/a>&lt;/strong>, a website linked to an exciting new OONI Probe mobile app feature that enables you to:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Engage your friends (and the world) to run censorship measurement tests&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Monitor the blocking of &lt;em>your&lt;/em> website around the world&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>OONI Run includes a variety of &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI Probe software tests&lt;/a>designed to:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Test the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">blocking of websites&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Find &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/">middleboxes&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Measure the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/ndt/">speed and performance&lt;/a> of networks&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Measure &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/dash/">video streaming performance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>By choosing the tests that interest you and the sites you want to test, generate a link via &lt;a href="https://run.ooni.org/">OONI Run&lt;/a> and share it. Alternatively, embed the widget code to monitor the accessibility of your site. The global OONI Probe community can then respond!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba's ParkNets</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</link><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</guid><description>&lt;div>
 &lt;img
 src="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/cu-01.jpg"
 title="Image by Arturo Filastò (CC-BY-SA-3.0)"
 srcset="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/cu-01@2x.jpg 2x"
 
 alt="Image by Arturo Filastò (CC-BY-SA-3.0)"
 
 />
 
 &lt;span style="display: inline-block;font-style: italic;padding-bottom: 20px">Image by Arturo Filastò (CC-BY-SA-3.0)&lt;/span>
 
&lt;/div>

&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>View the &lt;strong>pdf&lt;/strong> version of the report &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/cuba-internet-censorship-2017.pdf">here&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#etecsa">ETECSA&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#parknets">ParkNets&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#joven-club">Joven Club&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#streetnets">StreetNets&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#el-paquete">El Paquete&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#summary">Summary&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#measuring-internet-censorship-in-cuba">Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#collection-and-analysis-of-ooniprobe-network-measurements">Collection and analysis of OONI Probe network measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/#custom-tests">Custom tests&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Gathering 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</link><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI Partner Gathering" src="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/01.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Two weeks ago we hosted the &lt;em>first OONI Partner Gathering&lt;/em> in Toronto,
Canada. This report provides an overview of the event, partner needs and
challenges, and future goals to address them.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>View the &lt;strong>pdf&lt;/strong> version of the report &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/ooni-partner-gathering-2017.pdf">here&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#about">About&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#objectives">Objectives&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#sessions">Sessions&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#day-1-10th-july-2017">Day 1 - 10th July 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#day-2-11th-july-2017">Day 2 - 11th July 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#inclusiveness">Inclusiveness&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#challenges-and-needs">Challenges and needs&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#future-goals-and-priorities">Future goals and priorities&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#outcomes">Outcomes&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h1 id="about">About&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Over the last year, the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> project has had the opportunity
to collaborate with various digital rights organizations in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. We joined forces to
collaborate on the study of internet censorship by collecting &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/world/">network measurements&lt;/a> from local
vantage points, reviewing and creating &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/tree/master/lists">censorship measurement resources&lt;/a>,
and by publishing findings through &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/">research reports&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>#EgyptCensors: Evidence of recent censorship events in Egypt</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-censors/</link><pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2017 15:30:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-censors/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Egyptian Flag" src="https://ooni.org/post/egypt-network-interference/egypt-flag.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Egypt&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/">HTTP Header Field Manipulation&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/">HTTP Invalid Request Line&lt;/a>,
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/http-host/">HTTP Host&lt;/a>, &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/vanilla-tor/">Vanilla Tor&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Link Egypt (AS24863), Vodafone Egypt (AS36935), Telecom
Egypt (AS8452).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Analysis period:&lt;/strong> 23rd May 2017 to 17th June 2017.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship method:&lt;/strong> Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) used to RESET
connections.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Starting on May 24th, the Egyptian government ordered ISPs to &lt;a href="https://cpj.org/2017/05/egypt-blocks-access-to-21-news-websites.php">block at least 21 news websites&lt;/a>
on the grounds of “supporting terrorism and spreading lies”. In an
attempt to understand which sites were blocked and how, &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI Probe network measurement software&lt;/a> - designed to
examine internet censorship - was run in three local vantage points in
the country.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Indonesia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Indonesian block page" src="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia/indonesian-blockpage.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Image: Block page in Indonesia&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Sinar
Project.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#freedom-of-expression">Freedom of expression&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#press-freedom">Press freedom&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#access-to-information">Access to information&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#privacy">Privacy&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#censorship-and-surveillance">Censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#examining-internet-censorship-in-indonesia">Examining internet censorship in Indonesia&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#collection-of-ooniprobe-network-measurements">Collection of OONI Probe network measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#web-connectivity">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/#http-invalid-request-line">HTTP Invalid Request Line&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI at the CryptoRave 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</link><pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://cryptorave.org/">CryptoRave&lt;/a> is a free, non-commercial and
collectively funded 48 hour event featuring talks, workshops and activities
related to security, privacy, anonymity, hacking and freedom of expression that
attracts more that 2,500 people mainly from South America. The event took place
in São Paulo, Brazil on 5th and 6th May 2017.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A number of people attended the OONI
&lt;a href="https://cpa.cryptorave.org/pt-BR/CR2017/public/events/43">presentation&lt;/a> and
&lt;a href="https://cpa.cryptorave.org/pt-BR/CR2017/public/events/112">workshop&lt;/a>
(&amp;ldquo;Listatona&amp;rdquo;) that was co-organized with &lt;a href="https://www.codingrights.org/">Coding Rights&lt;/a>.
During the workshop participants were able to
better understand OONI&amp;rsquo;s testing methodology, and how OONI Probe performs
network measurements. Participants provided useful feedback regarding
&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/">test-lists&lt;/a>
and URLs from diverse sources from South America.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI at the Internet Freedom Festival &amp; RightsCon 2017</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</link><pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last month the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI&lt;/a> team joined the internet
freedom community at the following events:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://internetfreedomfestival.org/vietnam-cyber-dialogue/">Vietnam Cyber Dialogue (VCD)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://internetfreedomfestival.org/">Internet Freedom Festival (IFF)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://www.accessnow.org/iran-cyber-dialogue-rightscon-brussels-2017-timely-impactful/">Iran Cyber Dialogue (ICD)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://www.rightscon.org/">RightsCon 2017&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="http://www.journalismfestival.com/">International Journalism Festival (IJF)&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>These events provided us with the opportunity to engage with community members,
create new friendships, learn about new projects, and to share skills and
knowledge. We also had the opportunity to facilitate sessions that allowed us to
collect feedback for the improvement of our
&lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">software&lt;/a> and research
methodologies.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2017 13:31:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Myanmar" src="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar/myanmar-flag.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI),
Sinar Project, and the Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#freedom-of-expression">Freedom of expression&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#press-freedom">Press freedom&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#access-to-information">Access to information&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#privacy">Privacy&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#censorship-and-surveillance">Censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#examining-internet-censorship-in-myanmar">Examining internet censorship in Myanmar&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/#review-of-the-citizen-labs-test-list-for-myanmar">Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s test list for Myanmar&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Examining internet blackouts through public data sources</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:39:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</guid><description>&lt;p>Pulling the plug on the internet is one of the ways that governments around the
world attempt to exert control over the flow of information.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>While the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> project has developed numerous &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">software tests&lt;/a> for examining different
forms of internet censorship (such as the blocking of websites, instant
messaging apps, and censorship circumvention tools), we currently do not have
tests that are designed to examine internet blackouts, when the internet as a
whole is rendered inaccessible within a location.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Thailand</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Thailand block page" src="https://ooni.org/post/thailand/thai-blockpage.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Image: Block page in Thailand&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Sinar
Project, and the Thai Netizen Network.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#freedom-of-expression">Freedom of expression&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#press-freedom">Press freedom&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#access-to-information">Access to information&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#privacy">Privacy&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#censorship-and-surveillance">Censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#reported-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#examining-internet-censorship-in-thailand">Examining internet censorship in Thailand&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/#review-of-the-citizen-labs-thai-test-list">Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s Thai test list&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New OONI Probe Mobile App: Measure Internet Censorship &amp; Performance</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/</link><pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="OONI mobile app" src="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-mobile-app/ooni-mobile-app.jpg">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> project is thrilled to
announce the release of a new mobile app (“&lt;strong>OONI Probe - Measure Internet
Censorship &amp;amp; Performance&lt;/strong>”) that can now be installed on &lt;strong>Android&lt;/strong> and &lt;strong>iOS&lt;/strong> for
testing Internet censorship and network performance.&lt;/p>
&lt;div class="row pb-3 pt-4">
		&lt;a class="app-store-badge col-md-12 col-lg-4" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.openobservatory.ooniprobe">
			&lt;img alt="Download ooniprobe for Android"
				src="https://ooni.org/install/play-store-badge.png"
				srcset="https://ooni.org/install/play-store-badge.png 1x, https://ooni.org/install/play-store-badge@2x.png 2x">
		&lt;/a>

		&lt;a class="app-store-badge col-md-12 col-lg-4" href="https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/id1199566366">
			&lt;img alt="Download ooniprobe for iOS"
				src="https://ooni.org/install/app-store-badge.png"
				srcset="https://ooni.org/install/app-store-badge.png 1x, https://ooni.org/install/app-store-badge@2x.png 2x">
		&lt;/a>

		&lt;a class="app-store-badge col-md-12 col-lg-4" href="https://f-droid.org/repository/browse/?fdid=org.openobservatory.ooniprobe">
			&lt;img alt="Download ooniprobe for Android (F-Droid)"
				src="https://ooni.org/install/fdroid-badge.png"
				srcset="https://ooni.org/install/fdroid-badge.png 1x, https://ooni.org/install/fdroid-badge@2x.png 2x">
		&lt;/a>
&lt;/div>

&lt;p>By running the tests included in OONI’s mobile app, you can monitor:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Kenya: Censorship-free internet?</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/kenya-study/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/kenya-study/</guid><description>&lt;p>Over the last five months we ran &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI tests&lt;/a> in Kenya almost every day to examine
whether internet censorship events were occurring in the country. Hundreds of
thousands of &lt;a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/country/KE">network measurements&lt;/a> were collected and analyzed. &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/tree/master/lists">1,357 URLs&lt;/a> were
tested for censorship, including both &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/global.csv">international websites&lt;/a> and &lt;a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/ke.csv">sites that are more relevant to Kenya&lt;/a> (e.g. local news outlets). Yet, after five months of
intensive testing from four local vantage points in Kenya, we found almost no
signs of internet censorship in the country.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Malaysian block page" src="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/block-page.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Block page in Malaysia&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and
Sinar Project.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#key-findings">Key Findings&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#introduction">Introduction&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#background">Background&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">Network landscape and internet penetration&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#legal-environment">Legal environment&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#freedom-of-expression">Freedom of expression&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#press-freedom">Press freedom&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#access-to-information">Access to information&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#privacy">Privacy&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#censorship-and-surveillance">Censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#previous-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">Previous cases of internet censorship and surveillance&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#examining-internet-censorship-in-malaysia">Examining internet censorship in Malaysia&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#methodology">Methodology&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#creation-of-a-malaysian-test-list">Creation of a Malaysian test list&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#ooni-network-measurements">OONI network measurements&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/#web-connectivity">Web connectivity&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>New OONI tests examine the blocking of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference
(OONI)&lt;/a> project is excited to announce the release
of &lt;em>two&lt;/em> new software tests which are designed to examine the blocking of
&lt;strong>WhatsApp&lt;/strong> and &lt;strong>Facebook Messenger&lt;/strong>. You can now run these tests to monitor the
accessibility of these apps across time, and to collect data that can serve as
evidence when/if they are blocked.&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="whatsapp-test">WhatsApp test&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Many of our users have asked us to develop a test to examine the accessibility
of WhatsApp, especially in light of it being &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/">blocked&lt;/a> by various governments
around the world during elections, protests, and other political events.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Evidence of social media blocking and internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-report/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-report/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Ethiopia image" src="https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-report/et-05.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Youth in Addis trying to get Wi-Fi Connection. Credit Addis Fortune Newspaper&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Recently we published a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/">post&lt;/a> about what appeared to be a possible internet
shutdown in Ethiopia during a wave of ongoing protests by ethnic groups. Today,
in collaboration with &lt;a href="https://www.amnesty.org/">Amnesty International&lt;/a> we are releasing a report that
includes evidence of recent censorship events during Ethiopia’s political
upheaval.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>See the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-report/amharic-translation.pdf">Amharic translation&lt;/a> of the report. Translated by Wolete Mariam.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>View the &lt;strong>pdf&lt;/strong> version of the report &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/documents/Ethiopia-Offline-evidence-of.pdf">here&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI releases new Web UI: Run censorship tests from your web browser!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/web-ui-post/</link><pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/web-ui-post/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Image" src="https://ooni.org/post/wui-screenshots/wui-01.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Today we are excited to announce the beta release of our &lt;em>new&lt;/em> web-based user interface
(WUI) that enables OONI Probe users to run censorship tests from a web browser!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Whether you’re running OONI Probe from your desktop or a Raspberry Pi, you can
now easily choose which tests you want to run through OONI’s web UI and run them
with the click of a button. These &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/">tests&lt;/a>
are designed to examine the following:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The Gambia: Internet Shutdown during 2016 Presidential Election</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</guid><description>&lt;p>Last week we attempted to perform &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI network measurement tests&lt;/a> in the Gambia
to examine whether websites were blocked during its 2016 presidential election.
But merely a few hours after we connected our probe to perform tests, it stopped
working completely.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We suspected that this was due to an internet shutdown. To confirm this, we
referred to third-party data to examine whether a country-wide internet blackout
was taking place.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this report, we summarize some of our key findings pertaining to the internet
shutdown that appears to have occurred in the Gambia on the eve of its 2016
presidential election.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Belarus&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Beltelecom (&lt;a href="https://stat.ripe.net/AS6697">AS 6697&lt;/a>)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship method:&lt;/strong> TCP injections&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We have recently heard of &lt;a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-09-07&amp;end=2016-12-06&amp;country=by&amp;events=points">network anomalies in Belarus&lt;/a>.
Tor has been finally blocked in December 2016, although it had been explicitly
declared that Tor should be blocked &lt;a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/02/25/belarus-bans-tor">since February 2015&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Directly connected users from Belarus" src="https://ooni.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/userstats-relay-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-06-points.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>An anonymous cypherpunk has helped to gather some evidence regarding Tor
being blocked in Belarus. It&amp;rsquo;s neither a complete study nor an in-depth
research and it&amp;rsquo;s unclear if any other further evidence will be gathered, so we
decided to share current knowledge as-is:&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI releases Lepidopter Raspberry Pi distribution</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/lepidopter/</link><pubDate>Wed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/lepidopter/</guid><description>&lt;p>The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is happy to announce
the beta release of OONI Probe&amp;rsquo;s distribution for Raspberry Pis, caĺled
&lt;strong>Lepidopter&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="what-is-lepidopter">What is Lepidopter&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Lepidopter is a Raspberry Pi distribution image with all the required
dependencies and software packages in place, configured to run network
measurement tests via the
&lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI Probe&lt;/a> software. It is
developed and designed to require no physical attendance upon first bootstrap
but also allows experienced users to further configure it as they wish. The
&lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/lepidopter">source code&lt;/a> and the building
scripts of the Lepidopter image are free and open source software.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI-dev meeting and hackathon 2016</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</link><pubDate>Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</guid><description>&lt;p>Oonitarians are spread out across the globe, and OONI’s core team is no
exception. We recently met in Berlin to hack on &lt;a href="https://github.com/TheTorProject/ooni-probe">OONI’s software&lt;/a>, work on our
roadmap, and to have all those discussions that are more fruitful to have in
person than on IRC. We also held a &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/">hackathon&lt;/a> to engage new individuals with our project!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Below we document some of the things that we worked on as part of our OONI-dev
meeting and hackathon.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Egypt: Media censorship, Tor interference, HTTPS throttling and ads injections?</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-network-interference/</link><pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/egypt-network-interference/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Egypt&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Noor (AS 20928), TE Data (AS 8452), Vodafone (AS 24835)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship method:&lt;/strong> DPI, network throttling, TCP injections&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> HTTP Requests, Web Connectivity, Vanilla Tor&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Measurement period:&lt;/strong> 2016-08-27 - 2016-10-26&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We recently noticed network anomalies in Egypt and performed a study in an
attempt to understand the situation.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our findings indicate that the Tor anonymity network appeared to be interfered
with in Egypt, while HTTPS connections to DigitalOcean&amp;rsquo;s Frankfurt data centre
were throttled. We also found that access to porn sites appeared to be
interfered with via in-band TCP packet injections of advertisement and malware
content, and that the blocking of &lt;a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk">The New Arab&lt;/a>
website led to the blocking of specific content (such as images) of other sites
that are hosted on the same Content Distribution Network (CDN).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Hackathon: Join us to explore internet censorship!</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="HACKOONI16" src="https://ooni.org/post/berlin-hackathon/ooni-berlin-hackathon.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Interested in exploring (and exposing) internet censorship? Join the &lt;a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)&lt;/a> hackathon in Berlin!&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>When?&lt;/strong> Friday, &lt;strong>11th November&lt;/strong> &amp;amp; Saturday, &lt;strong>12th November&lt;/strong> 2016&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Where?&lt;/strong> The &lt;strong>OnionSpace&lt;/strong> (&lt;a href="http://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=52.54965&amp;mlon=13.3700#map=19/52.54974/13.37001">Gottschedstraße 4, 13357 Berlin, Germany&lt;/a>)&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>What time?&lt;/strong> 10am onwards&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Who?&lt;/strong> Software developers, data analysts, academics, journalists,
bloggers, lawyers, activists, and all those who don’t go by any
particular label, but are curious enough to join! We only have one rule:
&lt;strong>Be excellent to each other&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zambia: Internet censorship during the 2016 general elections?</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</link><pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2016 10:52:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;img alt="Zambia flag" src="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/zambia-flag.png">&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference
(OONI) and Strathmore University’s Centre for Intellectual Property
and Information Technology Law (CIPIT).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Table of contents&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#key-findings">&lt;em>Key Findings&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#introduction">&lt;em>Introduction&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#background">&lt;em>Background&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#network-landscape-and-internet-penetration">&lt;em>Network landscape and internet
penetration&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#legal-environment">&lt;em>Legal environment&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#freedom-of-expression">&lt;em>Freedom of expression&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#press-freedom">&lt;em>Press freedom&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#access-to-information">&lt;em>Access to information&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#privacy">&lt;em>Privacy&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#censorship-and-surveillance">&lt;em>Censorship and surveillance&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#previous-cases-of-internet-censorship-and-surveillance">&lt;em>Previous cases of internet censorship and
surveillance&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#zambia-s-2016-general-elections-and-constitutional-referendum">&lt;em>Zambia’s 2016 general elections and constitutional
referendum&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/post/zambia-election-monitoring/#examining-internet-censorship-during-zambia-s-2016-general-elections">&lt;em>Examining internet censorship during Zambia’s 2016 general
elections&lt;/em>&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Internet Shutdown Amidst Recent Protests?</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</guid><description>&lt;p>Nearly 100 deaths and thousands of arrests have been
&lt;a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37015055">reported&lt;/a> in Ethiopia over the
last days, as part of protests against the marginalization and persecution of
the Oromos and Amharas, Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups. But the attacks
and arrests may not have been the only forms of retribution carried out by the
Ethiopian government in its crackdown against protesters.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Last weekend, the internet was
&lt;a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">reportedly&lt;/a> shut down in the
country.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In an attempt to understand whether the internet was in fact shut down, we
looked at some public sources of data that contain information about internet
traffic. Such data provides strong indicators that the internet was most likely
shut down during the Ethiopian protests last weekend, though it remains unclear
if this occurred in all regions and/or on all types of networks across the
country.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Internet Access Disruption in Turkey - July 2016</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</link><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>With the attempted coup in Turkey, reports went out about social media being throttled and/or blocked. We analysed data about this that we collected with RIPE Atlas and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>On 15 July, a coup was attempted in Turkey. We heard about social media being throttled and/or blocked, but much was unclear about what was actually going on. Here we present measurement data from various platforms that shared their data publicly.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI releases new Web Connectivity test for detecting online censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/web-connectivity/</link><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/web-connectivity/</guid><description>&lt;p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is excited to be
releasing a brand new test, called
&lt;em>&lt;a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity&lt;/a>&lt;/em>,
which is designed to detect three different types of censorship: &lt;em>DNS
tampering&lt;/em>, &lt;em>TCP/IP blocking&lt;/em> and &lt;em>HTTP blocking&lt;/em>.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="advantages-of-running-web-connectivity">Advantages of running Web Connectivity&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>This test allows us to see which websites are blocked and how, more accurately
than ever before!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Previously we relied on running separate (http_request, dns_consistency and
tcp_connect) tests with the aim of identifying various forms of censorship. We
then had to correlate measurements across different tests to identify whether
and how websites were blocked. This process was not only tedious, but it also
led to more false positives.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How Uganda blocked social media, again</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</link><pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Uganda&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Orange (AS36991), SMILE (AS37122)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship method:&lt;/strong> IP blocking&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> HTTP Requests&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Measurement period:&lt;/strong> 2016-05-12&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Last Wednesday, the Ugandan Communications Commission (UCC)
&lt;a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/uganda-social-media-ordered-blocked-museveni-inauguration">ordered&lt;/a>
ISPs to block access to social media leading up to the (fifth) inauguration of
President Yoweri Museveni, who has governed the country since 1986. Authorities
argued that the blocking was ordered for “security purposes”, but the move
directly harms political opposition, which has &lt;a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2016/05/11/social-media-blocked-in-uganda-ahead-of-president-musevenis-inauguration/">relied
on&lt;/a>
social media to organize a “defiance campaign” of protests.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>OONI Data Reveals How WhatsApp Was Blocked (Again) in Brazil</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</link><pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Country:&lt;/strong> Brazil&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Probed ISPs:&lt;/strong> Tim mobile (AS 26615), Oi landline (AS 7738)&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Censorship method:&lt;/strong> DNS Hijacking&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>OONI tests:&lt;/strong> HTTP Requests, DNS Consistency&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Measurement period:&lt;/strong> 2016-05-02 - 2016-05-03&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>19:10 UTC Saturday, 7 May 2016&lt;/strong> Update: Add OONI Explorer measurements links&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Ever since &lt;a href="https://www.whatsapp.com/security/">WhatsApp implemented end-to-end
encryption&lt;/a> to protect the privacy and
security of its 1 billion users worldwide, several cases of censorship have
been ordered by governments who are frustrated with the fact that they can no
longer access users&amp;rsquo; private communications. Having implemented end-to-end
encryption with the Signal protocol, WhatsApp cannot decrypt its users&amp;rsquo; data,
even if it wanted to - which is precisely what makes it secure.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>EEEP and Greek Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</guid><description>Technical analysis of Hellenic gaming commission blacklist in Greece</description></item><item><title>Zambia, a country under Deep Packet Inspection</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/zambia/</link><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/zambia/</guid><description>&lt;pre>&lt;code>&amp;quot;I do not have the details of the blocking of Zambianwatchdog.com, but I
would celebrate.&amp;quot;
 Guy Scott 
 Zambian Vicepresident, Friday 28th June 2013
&lt;/code>&lt;/pre>
&lt;p>The following article is a guest blog post by Mr T. an independent researcher
and provider of hosting to various grass roots organizations.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This article summarizes how we discovered that the grass roots online newspaper
Zambianwatchdog.com was being blocked inside Zambia. This report provides
technical evidence of the unlawful presence of Deep Packet Inspection in the
country to monitor the Internet communications and stop users from browsing the
website.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Tab-Tab, Come in! Bypassing Internet blocking to categorize DPI devices</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/tab-tab-come-in/</link><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/tab-tab-come-in/</guid><description>Analysis of censorship in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan</description></item><item><title>Hadara Palestine</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/hadara-palestine/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/hadara-palestine/</guid><description>This is the technical report on the politically motivated censorship going on in Bethlehem, West Bank</description></item><item><title>T-Mobile USA Web Guard</title><link>https://ooni.org/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</link><pubDate>Wed, 21 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.org/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</guid><description>Measuring censorship on T-Mobile USA</description></item></channel></rss>