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How To Read News Like A Search Warrant Application

January 19, 2017 by Ken White 25 Comments

Biased, wish-fulfilling, partisan, badly supported news stories abound. (I'm going to try to avoid the f–e n–s term, even ironically.) Has it always been thus? Maybe. But it's never too late to try to improve yourself. Moreover, with a highly controversial and divisive President, such stories will probably multiply. We'll be faced, daily, with more news that tells us what we want or expect to hear, that endorses our dim view of the political and social figures we don't like.

Critical reading is essential. Skepticism of even one's favored sources is important, unless we're looking only to be entertained and affirmed. This is an hourly habit, not an occasional one. It's a task I fail daily and will probably keep failing daily even if I try harder. But maybe I could fail a little less often.

Recently it hit me: what if I reviewed news stories with the skeptical eye I turn towards search warrant applications?

If you're not familiar with them, search warrant applications include a declaration under penalty of perjury from the investigating officer or agent. The declaration and supporting paperwork are supposed to identify the location to be searched, the items to be seized, and the specific facts providing probable cause that those items are evidence of a crime. Federal courts scrutinize search warrants more closely than state courts. That's not the law; that's just reality.

When I was a prosecutor, my job was to review proposed warrant applications from federal agents and make sure that they complied with legal requirements before submitting them for approval to federal magistrate judges. As a criminal defense attorney, my job is to analyze warrant applications that have yielded searches of my clients and scrutinize them for flaws and constitutional failures that I can present carefully and forthrightly to a judge so that the judge can then ignore or rationalize them. The critical eye that prosecutors and judges are supposed to use when reviewing a warrant application — and that defense lawyers use in evaluating whether they can be challenged — comes in handy in assessing the trustworthiness of news. Three doctrines in particular come to mind.

Attribution: Around the time I became a federal prosecutor, thanks to a series of unfavorable Ninth Circuit decisions (which, naturally, I resented at the time as unfairly anti-government), the U.S. Attorney's Office began emphasizing attribution in reviewing search warrant applications and prosecutor training. Put simply, attribution means this: for each fact asserted in the warrant application, how does the affiant know it? if the affiant learned the fact from someone else, how did that person know it?

A good search warrant establishes clean attribution for each fact, even if that attribution involves second, third, or fourth-hand knowledge. For example, a good search warrant would say something like this: "I spoke with Officer Jones of my department on January 15th, 2017. Officer Jones told me the following: she interviewed Mary Smith earlier that day. Smith stated that she was present at the corner of Elm and Oak and saw the car accident. Smith told Officer Jones that she was walking north on Oak when she saw a red SUV travelling at a high rate of speed run a stop sign and crash into the side of a green sedan." A well-drafted affidavit also identifies its factual inferences and its basis for them. "I obtained electricity usage records with an administrative subpoena to Southern California Edison for the subject address. I noted that, starting the month that suspect ROBERTS occupied the residence, energy usage spiked 350%, to a level that was consistently more than three times what the energy usage had been for the same time of year over the last five years at the residence. In my training and experience, I know that indoor marijuana grows often result in substantial spikes in energy usage because of the lights and other equipment used"

Thanks to thorough attribution, the reader knows the ultimate source of the fact and the ultimate source's basis for asserting the fact. A bad search warrant application, by contrast, makes assertions about what happened without any indication of how the affiant knows those facts.

A well-attributed news story might be less stilted. But it would still make clear the basis for the facts asserted in the story. Partial or unclear attribution obscures this. Take yesterday's extremely popular New York Times story about Rick Perry's gig as Energy Secretary. I certainly wanted to believe it. I deplore Donald Trump and, to a lesser extent (mostly thanks to his criminal justice stance) Rick Perry. The slams on Perry were artful and viscerally satisfying. The picture it painted confirmed what I wanted to believe about the administration. But notice how the story's main assertion — that Perry thought he was signing up to lead energy industry policy, when in reality his job would be primarily about nuclear security — comes in the first three paragraphs without any attribution. The fourth paragraph has a quote from a (former) insider, but the paragraphs are structured so it's impossible to determine if that source told the Times what's in the previous three paragraphs, or if he endorses that content (he says he doesn't), or whether he's simply provided a pull quote that the Times can present as consistent with their theme. Is the point of the story the Times' characterization or interpretation of facts, or is it based on something that a source specifically told the Times? If it came from the source, was it all based on direct knowledge or based on the source's own gloss? (Notice how the source switches from "I asked him" to describe one sentiment and the vague and unattributed "now he would say" for the second). We're left to guess.

Particularity: My debut as a prosecutor also coincided with a Ninth Circuit push for more particularity in warrants. That is, the Court pushed back against the habit of general warrants that sought permission to seize whatever the investigating agents felt like seizing.1 Instead, the Court demanded that warrant affidavits not only specify with reasonable particularity what is to be seized, but support the proposition that each thing to be seized is somehow evidence of a crime. "There are things that are evidence of a crime, some of those things are in this house, therefore all things in this house should be seized" doesn't cut it.

Particularly is useful in evaluating news stories too. If a story attributes a stance, or a goal, or a motive to a public figure, does it give specific examples of conduct consistent with stance? If the story offers examples of conduct — specific facts — does it connect them to the thesis of the article? Does it show how those specific examples actually support its thesis, or does it simply regurgitate them and rely on proximity to persuade the reader to assume they are connected? So, for instance, the New York Times' Rick Perry story has a number of paragraphs questioning Perry's qualifications, comparing the better qualifications of a prior Energy Secretary, and discussing Trump's likely energy policy. Are those paragraphs proof of the article's thesis? Does Perry's lack of qualification — if that's what it is — support the thesis that he thought he was going to be controlling energy use policy instead of nuclear security?

Corroboration: Anonymous or obscure sources are not inherently impermissible in search warrants or in journalism. A search warrant may rely in part on an anonymous source if the affiant corroborates that source — that is, offers other facts supporting what the source says. In theory a warrant application should corroborate facts only an insider could know. "My source told me that methamphetamine is being cooked at a green house at 123 Elm. I traveled to 123 Elm and observed that the house is, in fact, green" is not meaningful corroboration. "My source told me that suspect ROBERT is cooking methamphetamine at 123 Elm, that he began cooking in March 2016, and that he had precursor chemicals delivered there beginning in April. Based on my review of the Southern California Edison records described above, I noted that there was a 300% spike in energy usage at 123 Elm beginning in March 2016. My review of the UPS records described in paragraph 17 above showed a series of deliveries from an online chemical supply company beginning in April of 2016" is good corroboration.

I can't critique the New York Times Perry story on source corroboration because it's not clear what parts of it come from sources, anonymous or otherwise. But it's now routine for the media to offer sources — anonymous and named — with no corroboration and very little indication of the source's basis for knowledge (which is also an attribution problem). I recognize that journalists have an interest in protecting their sources, but that protection has a cost, and that cost ought to include a higher level of skepticism with readers. A reliable story based on an anonymous source would corroborate elements of the source's story in a meaningful way for the reader. Otherwise it's just the reporter's appeal to his or her own authority — I trust this person so you should as well — and that's no different than an agent's "trust my skeevy anonymous informer because I'm a cop so you can trust me."

If you're reading this to suggest that I think one "team" or another is more guilty of this or more or less credible, you're reading it wrong. Skepticism and critical reading are good. The fact that we'll certainly fall short is not a reason not to try. And gosh, what if a habit of critical reading of the news could even translate to critical evaluation of law enforcement claims? Nah. One improbable goal at a time.

Edited to add: I missed that Jesse Singal already made the same point about attribution.

Filed Under: Law, Politics & Current Events Tagged With: Journalism

The Latest Defamation Case Against Donald Trump, and the "Trump Defense"

January 18, 2017 by Ken White 24 Comments

The latest defamation suit against Donald Trump has emerged. Summer Zervos, recently famed for her accusation that Trump sexually assaulted her in 2007, filed suit against Trump in state court in New York, accusing Trump of defaming her in the course of denying her accusations. The suit follows a recent trend in cases against public figures: the plaintiff accuses the public figure of sexual misconduct well outside the statute of limitations, then sues the public figure or his representatives based on their response. I'm not a fan of the public figures at issue nor of this legal approach.

The main legal issue in play is the distinction between provable statements of fact, which are potentially defamatory when false, and statements of opinion and hyperbole, which are not unless they imply false statement of fact. For instance, "Ken is a jackass" is not defamatory (it's not provable fact, it's an insult and hyperbole), but "Ken is a convicted felon" is defamatory (it states a false provable fact), and "Ken is guilty of a crime" may or may not be defamatory depending on the circumstances. (It would be opinion if uttered in response to a newspaper article about me; it could imply false facts and be defamatory if, for instance, the speaker suggested that he or she reached the conclusion after reviewing my emails or seeing an undisclosed police report.)

In Zervos' case, the statements at issue involve denials of Zervos' allegations and attacks on her credibility after her accusation of sexual assault. Zervos complains that Trump (1) denied that he'd ever met her in the hotel she described, (2) drafted her cousin's statement saying she'd only praised Trump in the past and was trying to get back on television, (3) called her allegations a hoax, phony, lies, false, made up, fabricated, and a smear for political or financial purposes, and (4) suggested her allegations had been "proven false."

Calling someone a liar is not automatically fact or opinion; it depends on the circumstances. Sometimes it's treated as figurative opinion. See, e.g., Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.App.4th 676, 691 (1994) (titling article “Lies, Damn Lies, and Fund Advertisements” not actionable as libel because it “cannot reasonably be read to imply a provably false factual assertion”). Courts are more likely to interpret statements as hyperbole, figurative speech, or opinion in some contexts, including politics and litigation. See, e.g., Information Control v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir.1980) (attorney's press statement that a lawsuit was a way to avoid a debt was opinion because in context of legal dispute, “language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.”)

Here, the better argument is probably that at least some of Trump's statements were assertions of provable fact. He wasn't merely characterizing the merits of a case that relied in part on subjective factors. He wasn't merely disputing her characterization of an encounter as sexual assault. He was specifically claiming based on his own personal knowledge that Zervos was lying about whether a specific incident happened at all — that is, he was making a factual claim about her. By contrast, some of his typical Trump bluster — that she was doing it for politics or money — is probably non-factual opinion. Some of Bill Cosby's accusers made defamation claims that survived a motion to dismiss based on significantly more ambiguous denials, and I suspect Zervos will survive a motion to dismiss here.

Next, there's a relevant legal privilege that Trump may assert. A privilege, in this context, is a defense that shields a statement from defamation liability even if it's false. Privileges can be absolute (meaning that the statement is immune from suit even if the speaker knew it was false) or qualified (meaning that the statement is immune from suit unless the speaker knew it was false — that is, it's immune from defamation on a negligence theory). Most jurisdictions, for instance, have an absolute litigation privilege — you can't be sued for defamation based on what you say in court or in a court pleading. A few jurisdictions have what's called a "self-defense privilege" — a privilege that covers responses to accusations. That's the privilege Bill Cosby tried unsuccessfully to invoke in his I-didn't-do-it defamation case. New York doesn't have something called a "self-defense privilege," but it does have an applicable privilege that applies when a statement is "fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in a matter where his interest is concerned." New York courts apply that privilege to public statements made to defend the speaker from an accusation of wrongdoing. But it's a conditional privilege, and doesn't apply to a statement made with malice — meaning with knowledge that the statement is false or with recklessness as to its falsity. Here Zervos explicitly claims Trump knew he was lying. Trump can't get rid of the complaint before trial based on this privilege; it's a trial defense. Frankly it's not a defense that fits well to a pure he-said-she-said situation.

Trump is going to have a very hard time getting rid of this case in a motion to dismiss, and perhaps can't even get rid of it on a motion for summary judgment. It's not clear whether he's willing to invoke what would be the most effective defense, a variation on the distinction between opinion and fact: nobody sensible takes anything Trump says as a provable statement of fact. Rather, rational people increasingly recognize that anything Trump says is "serious" but not "literal" — an assertion of interest or ambition or anger, but not a statement meant factually. If Trump says it, it's probably opinion, insult, and hyperbole, whether or not it comes clothed in nominal fact.

That's the defense I suggested Trump ought to invoke in Cheryl Jacobus' defamation case against him:

In defamation law, there's a popular philosophical question: can someone be "defamation-proof"? That is, can someone's reputation be so awful that no falsehood can make it any worse? There's a flip-side of this as well: can someone be so notoriously full of shit that they are incapable of defamation, because no reasonable person familiar with them would interpret anything they say as provable fact? This is what I call the batshit crazy rule and the Ninth Circuit more decorously refers to as "general tenor of the entire work." I think Trump — or at least Trump on Twitter — presents a good test case of the batshit crazy rule. Trump's Twitter behavior is such a legendary dumpster fire that I think Jacobus will find it very difficult to argue that anyone familiar with it would take what he says as a statement of fact. Sad!

The trial court in Jacobus' case actually relied upon something like that argument in dismissing her case, though in considerably more genteel terms. Any putative factual statement by or on behalf of Trump, the court said, has to be taken in the context of the way Trump habitually acts, which cuts against a literal interpretation:

Moreover, the immediate context of defendants' statements is the familiar back and forth between a political commentator and the subject of her criticism, and the larger context is the Republican presidential primary and Trump's regular use of Twitter to circulate his positions and skewer his opponents and others who criticize him, including journalists and media organizations whose coverage he finds objectionable. (See eg Jasmine C. Lee & Kevin Quealy, The 289 People Places and Things Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Complete List, The Upshot, NY Times [digital ed], Dec. 6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/28/upshot/donald-trump-twitter-insults.html [accessed Jan. 8, 2017]). His tweets about his critics,
necessarily restricted to 140 characters or less, are rife with vague and simplistic insults such as "loser" or "total loser" or "totally biased loser," "dummy" or "dope" or "dumb," "zero/no credibility," "crazy" or "wacko," and "disaster," all deflecting serious consideration. (Id.; see Technovate LLCv Fanelli, 49 Misc 3d 1201[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51349[U], *4 [Civ Ct, Richmond County 2015] ["On-line speech often is characterized by the use of slang, grammatical mistakes, spelling errors, and a general lack of coherence."]; Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look Like in the Age of Twitter, 13 J High Tech L 430, 433 [2013] ["The informal nature of conversation on Twitter tends to encourage people to talk more freely about others, including the spreading of rumors and potential falsehoods."]).

Put another way, it is a matter of judicial record that the new President of the United States is habitually full of shit. This is optimal for a defamation defense, if perhaps not for America.

Zervos has an excellent chance of surviving a motion to dismiss and even a motion for summary judgment. But even leaving aside a rehash of Clinton-era squabbles over executive privilege, she has an uphill battle at any trial.

Filed Under: Law Tagged With: Free Speech

Legalize Child Porn?

January 17, 2017 by Randazza 75 Comments

Wait… wat?

We should be worried about the Adverse Secondary Effects of making child porn illegal.

A few days ago, I brought you this post about a cop who got busted for filming the perfectly legal (in Texas) act of having sex with a dog. In it, I hinted that he also got tapped for possession of child porn, and that this was a rant for another day.

Welcome to that rant.

Unsheathe your rage. I am going to make the case for legalization of child pornography – or at least to argue against long-standing beliefs about why possession of it should be illegal.

I am not talking about production. If you actually make child porn, I think our laws are not harsh enough. Producers of actual child porn should not only go to prison, but should be put into a special kind of hell space, where they beg for death for the entirety of their sentences.

But, lets talk about mere possession.

Prior to 1982, child pornography was not categorically outside First Amendment protection. In order to be convicted of an chid porn offense, the porn had to also be "obscene" under Miller v. California.

Miller v. California allows a conviction for obscenity, so long as the state can prove three elements:

  1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
  2. Whether the work depicts/describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law,
  3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary and/or artistic, political, or scientific value.

Most juries would likely say that any child porn would fit that test.

"Prurient interest" generally means "an appeal to a morbid, degrading, and unhealthy interest in sex." Pretty much anything a normal person would think of as "child porn" would fit that description. Patently offensive? That too. Serious value? Well, that will save Nabakov, but not what we all know we're talking about when it comes to "child porn."

In other words, with Miller, we already had enough ammunition to go after child porn. But, in 1982, along came New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In that case, the Supreme Court held that states could ban the sale of child porn, even if it was not "obscene" as defined by Miller. It simply created a new category of unprotected expression.

And who wants to argue against that?

For most of my career, I took the "what's the big deal" approach to Ferber. After all, who cares about some child pornographer?

I am starting to think I was wrong.

Constitutional rights are like a nice spicy soppressata. You slice off one piece of it. Just a nibble. But, then you've got that exposed end. And, you've got a taste for it. And then another slice. And another. And it doesn't take long until you've eaten the whole thing. (Ok, the analogy breaks down because soppressata is meant to be eaten… but you get my point)

That first slice made the rest of the soppressata irresistible.

Ferber explained that if we ban the commercial market for child porn, we dry up the incentive to produce it. Sort of like banning ivory is supposed to stop us from killing endangered elephants.

Ferber left the question of possession open, and it seemed that someone could still possess it, in the privacy of their home. After all, we had Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1969) and its inspiring pronouncement of what freedom means.

If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Id. at 558.

However, Stanley struck down a statute where the justification was to, paternalistically, protect the viewer.

The rationale for the regulation was that you, Jane Q. Citizen, could not watch an obscene movie without it seeping into your mind and destroying it. While Stanley threw that out, that theory persists — even for non obscene content — in the minds of those who want to control what you can read, see, and hear. See PORN! PORN! PORN! WEB PAGES OF DEATH! and see a debate at Mimesis Law where Chris Seaton argues to make all porn illegal, and Mario Machado argues against it.

Therefore, after Ferber, we had a quandary. Everyone hates child porn. But, how to could we justify banning the mere possession of it? Enter Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1990) which sliced off another piece of that soppressata. The court held:

Ohio does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind, but has enacted its law on the basis of its compelling interests in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the market for the exploitative use of children by penalizing those who possess and view the offending materials. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-758, 761-762. Moreover, Ohio's ban encourages possessors to destroy such materials, which permanently record the victim's abuse and thus may haunt him for years to come and which, available evidence suggests, may be used by pedophiles to seduce other children.

Osborne, relying on Ferber's market-effect justifications, sliced off just a little bit more of the First Amendment. Child porn is bad. Therefore, if it is illegal to even have it, much less produce it, we will dry up the market even more.

Sure, you and me weren't using that piece of the Constitution anyhow, so who cares?

Well, are you sure?

Child porn is not limited to depictions of child abuse. Prosecutors have gone after innocent content like baby pictures. I personally have slapped my wife's camera out of her hands as she readied herself to take a picture of one of our kids in the tub. Why? Because I know that the day may come that some prosecutor decides that he wants to shut my ass up – and what better way than to drag me through the streets, accused of possessing and creating child porn? Sure, it is just a wee baby picture. And maybe that's how the jury would see it too. But, I'm never taking that chance. Baby pictures must be clothed in my house.

Lets look at the other (seemingly reasonable) Osborne justifications.

It seems a reasonable argument that if someone actually abuses a child on film, that child gets re-victimized, to some extent, each time someone looks at that picture. I think there are good logical arguments against that, but I'll buy it. So why not remedy that with civil claims? I myself have brought cases on behalf of child porn victims. In one, I and secured a $385,000 judgment against the scumbags who published it. In others, we had less public resolutions, but we felt justice was done. Civil remedies do not present the same constitutional fears as criminal remedies (for example, criminal libel statutes vs. civil remedies for libel).

If we remove that justification as otherwise-provided-for, what is left?

Pedophiles might use existing child porn to seduce other children? Well, then lets ban vans and candy. Done.

So we are back to the Ferber market-draining analysis.

Since 1982, that has hardly done much except drive the market underground and create an insane "market" in wildly illogical sentences and prosecutions. As one example, we have this guy who was having perfectly-legal-sex with a 17 year old, who posed for pics for him. He got 15 years for that. Fifteen years for taking a photo of a girl that he could, without any state interference, have sex with. In others, teenagers sexting each other have wound up on the sex offender list for life. When a law can be used irrationally, it will be. And this has.

But that's not the only place where Ferber raises concern. You see, the really scary thing about Ferber is that its logic dangles out there like so much irresistible bait to the would-be-censors. In United States v. Stevens, for example, the government tried to ban depictions of animal cruelty. Why? In large part, relying on the Ferber logic of a) animal cruelty is bad, b) people watching videos of animal cruelty is bad, c) if nobody can sell or buy the videos, it will dry up the market for animal cruelty.

I get it. Nobody wants to be the one to say "hey, maybe child porn ought to be legal." I expect to have this very post used against me in the future.

But, think beyond the nightmare scenario. Think about your stash of baby pictures, and how those could get you tossed in jail with a lifetime on the sex offender list. Think about your 17 year old son with pictures of his 17 year old girlfriend winding up in jail and on the sex offender list for life. Think about the irrationality of how the law is already being used.

Then think about how the infection we picked up in Ferber could spread.

Find the most censorious ass-hat you can think of. Think of Katherine MacKinnon or Gail Dines arguing that "porn makes people think less of women, thus as a matter of drying up the market for porn, it should be illegal." Or, imagine Donald Trump's administration saying that "this specific expression creates a market for Islamic extremism."

Don't we want to "dry up the market" for sexism or terrorism? Who wants to argue against that?

Imagine anyone prepared to deem a thought "dangerous" and then taking a knife to our soppressata. Imagine banning Mein Kampf or The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, because we want to "dry up the market for racism." How about banning Fight Club or A Clockwork Orange because we want to "dry up the market for violence."

How about abortion?

You think that's far fetched? Guess what? 18 U.S.C. § 1462(c) already bans talking about abortion. Sure, no prosecutor has been dumb-enough to try and bring any charges under that section, but what about if Trump gets impeached and President Pence has that weapon in his hand? Is prevention of child abuse any less grave than "preventing the killing of the unborn?"

I once said "go ahead and take child porn, who cares about that anyway?" But, I now think that was a cowardly position.

If we slice off pieces of the Constitution, just because it makes our stomach turn, we've caught a constitutional infection.

I think that it is time for us to re-think Ferber or at least Osborne. In doing that, yes, we might make it legal for some creep to have a shoebox full of child porn images. But, that is a small price to pay to exorcise the infection we have been carrying around since 1982.

Edited to add: Ken has a partial dissent.

Filed Under: Law

Screw your dog, just don't film it!

January 15, 2017 by Randazza 46 Comments

Texas puts the "best" in bestiality! A cop got arrested for fucking a dog. Hilarity ensues. (source) And, who could sympathize with this cop? He was fucking a dog, after all. Well, that's the thing about seeing someone prosecuted — you shouldn't think about whether you sympathize with them. You shouldn't think about "what happens if I want to fuck a dog?" You should think about what's really going on, and how it could affect you, even if you could never get a chubbie for a pug, no matter how slutty it is.

In Texas, believe it or not, it is legal to have sex with your dog.

Woof.

Enter the Harris County DA's Sex Crime Division.

JoAnn Musick from Harris County District Attorney Office’s Sex Crime Division says the acts being committed by Sustaita Jr. seen in the bestiality video are so extreme and graphic, she decided to charge the deputy with felony obscenity, since Texas remains one of the eight total states where no laws exist specifically banning bestiality. (source) (corrob.)

So what? Fuck him. He's a cop fucking a dog.

Wrong.

Because if we fuck him, its all of our asses that bleed.

If you have the right to do something, why should it be illegal to film it? Think about how fucked up our laws are when it comes to this shit. Two 17 year olds get married. Perfectly legal. They want to fuck. Again, perfectly legal. They set up a tripod in the bedroom and film it – now they're "child pornographers," and there is no exception, and they will go to jail and be registered sex offenders for life.

So that's not exactly fucking a dog — but in the eyes of Texas law, you can fuck a dog as readily as you can fuck a melon or a fleshlight. If I go out, buy the sexiest honeydew melon I can find, carve me a sweet hole in it, and go the fuck to town on it, giving it a reverse cow-melon, an inverse-Tony-Danza, or even cut a second hole in it and ask Ken over to double team it, there isn't a damn thing the law can do about it.

Don't judge me, monkey! I would make sure that the holes were offsetting so our dicks wouldn't touch, so there'd be nothing gay about it.

It would make me weird, but so what? If being free means anything, it means being able to have weird ass perversions involving Ken and a melon.

Would you say I should go to jail if I film the melon fucking episode? I mean, sure … maybe there should be some social consequences for me putting the image of me and Ken longingly staring at each other while we double-fuck a honeydew melon, but just because it is wrong doesn't mean it should be illegal.

But, you say "fucking a dog is disgusting".

No argument there.

But, now you're talking about putting someone in jail as a matter of taste. That's where I get pissed off. Because a man did something completely legal, but the state is trying to put him in jail for making a film of it … and I do not think the First Amendment should abide such a maneuver.

Unfortunately, it likely will. Miller v. California upheld the constitutionality of an obscenity prosecution, so long as the state can prove three elements:

  1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
  2. Whether the work depicts/describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law,
  3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary and/or artistic, political, or scientific value.

How are we to define "serious _____ value?" If freedom of expression means anything, then we must leave the marketplace of ideas to decide what expression should live or die. Sometimes, even often, we must pay an unfortunate price for holding on to that ethic. It means that both Mein Kampf and America's Next Top Model get to exist. It means that "Anal Zucchini Vol. 5" stands aside Casablanca. Lets remember that once James Joyce's Ulysses was considered to be contraband here.

The filmmaker must have the freedom to film the porn, he must have the right to distribute it, and we must have the right to buy it or not buy it, as it were.

Asking six (or 12) people who couldn't get themselves out of jury duty to determine whether a work has "serious value" — and to not only make that decision for themselves, but for the rest of us, is worse than any dog-fucking movie. If we leave a tool like this in the hands of some prosecutor, they're going to use it when they just don't like that kind of thing.

This time it might be the kind of thing that none of us are ready to defend. I'm not going to get upset if they make it illegal to fuck dogs. But, I am going to get upset – as you should – if a prosecutor finds conduct that she thinks is objectionable, and shoehorns it into an obscenity prosecution. Because if this man goes to jail, it isn't going to be because he fucked a dog — it is going to be because the government didn't like his movies.

And that leaves your ass exposed as much as mine.

I stand with Justice Brennan, who called for an end to obscenity prosecutions in a dissent he wrote for Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton:

[T]he effort to suppress obscenity is predicated on unprovable, although strongly held, assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion. The existence of these assumptions cannot validate a statute that substantially undermines the guarantees of the First Amendment…Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 109-110 (U.S. 1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting)

If we don't eventually crush Miller, they're coming for our "regular" porn or even our speech about abortion. Or whatever they want. Because allowing obscenity prosecutions is no different than simply letting a prosecutor threaten any citizen with a long time in a metal box, simply because they don't like what you have to say.

And with an incoming administration that just might abuse that privilege, maybe it is time to take on Miller before it is too late. If we must climb that mountain with a dog fucker as a companion, then so be it.

–Randazza

NOTE: After his arrest, cops allegedly also found child porn on his computer. That's a whole 'nother rant for another day.

Filed Under: Law

In a Crowded Field, University of Oregon Distinguishes Itself At Unprincipled and Lawless Censorship

January 10, 2017 by Ken White 49 Comments

The University of Oregon, a public institution, does not see itself as meaningfully bound by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor by any civic obligation to offer a minimally rational or persuasive explanation for why it is not bound. That cavalier attitude specially applies to the School of Law, an academy nominally devoted to teaching about the rule of law.

This is disappointing, if not particularly surprising.

Our story begins on Halloween, with blackface. College of Law Professor Nancy Shurtz wore a blackface as part of a costume at a party at her home to which students were invited. She wore it with a doctor's coat. She intended it as a reference to Damon Tweedy's book Black Man in a White Coat: A Doctor's Reflections on Race and Medicine, in which Dr. Tweedy discusses his experience becoming a doctor. Professor Shurtz intended to comment on discrimination and race in America, and even carried the book as part of her costume for part of the evening.

Many have argued that Professor Schurtz was mistaken about whether blackface — even blackface in the service of a condemnation of racism — is ever socially acceptable. That's a philosophical argument. Factually, Professor Schurtz was absolutely mistaken about the sort of community of which she was a member, and whether her academic interlocutors cared about her intent, her good faith, or the value of her right to express herself in her own home. She was unspeakably naive.

As Eugene Volokh describes, the University of Oregon suspended Professor Shurtz, disciplining her for "harassment." In its report, the University gestured at the correct legal standard for actionable harassment:

Discriminatory Harassment is defined by University policy as conduct that either in form or operation, unreasonably discriminates among individuals on the basis of race or color; which is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it interferes with work or participation in any University program or activity; which creates an intimidating, hostile, or degrading working or university environment for the individual who is the subject of such conduct; and where the conduct would have such an effect on a reasonable person who is similarly situated.

The University is right, at least, that harassment must be severe and pervasive, and that a reasonable person must find it severe or pervasive, to be actionable. But the wheels fell off the wagon when the University applied this standard to the facts.

Almost every student interviewed reported that they knew the costume was “not okay.”

The University mistook academic social consensus — at least among those who felt safe in answering — for severity, pervasiveness, and reason. As Eugene Volokh points out, the University's explanation suggests that the purely subjective reaction of students and faculty hostile to an idea — including deliberate acts by those listeners — can transform speech into harassment. Quoth the report:

The law school environment has become hostile, with discussions and strong conflicts of opinion taking place within the classrooms and on the law school social media pages. The reactions to the event and the students’ conflicts have required other teachers to take time from lessons to address the Halloween incident. The open discussions in class have also resulted in racial hostility between the students. The lack of understanding by some students, coupled with an existing lack of diversity in the law school student body, has led to minority students feeling further disenfranchised from their classmates and the school. Some students have been missing class, avoiding the law school, and changing their study habits in an attempt to avoid the resulting negative environment. Based on both the reaction and lack of reaction from other faculty and professors, students have also felt a sense of anxiety and mistrust towards professors and faculty beyond just Shurtz, with some students considering and seeking out transfers to other schools. A full list of the range and severity of impacts has been referenced above. We find that this environment was and is intimidating and hostile and has impacted a wide range of students from different backgrounds. It is also apparent, given the unanimous response from the witnesses, that a reasonable person who is similarly situated would have experienced such an effect.

Under the University's logic, students and faculty can decide whether expression is harassment subject to discipline by how they choose to react to it. That's a classic heckler's veto. The University's application of the legal norms governing the free speech rights of public employees is equally deferential to subjective hostility to viewpoints.

This approach to the tension between free expression and harassment law is gravely concerning. But it gets worse.

University of Oregon President and Professor of Law Michael H. Schill has written an indignant public statement defending the University from widespread criticism. The statement promotes confusion and ignorance of free speech legal norms in a way unbecoming to a law professor.

But here is the problem—figuring out when and whether there are legitimate limits on freedom of expression actually is complicated.

This is a classic misdirection. Is application of free speech precedent "complicated?" Arguably. But it's not complicated like judging a sonnet or deciding the meaning of life. It's complicated like, say, removing an appendix. You don't remove an appendix by committee of people who have strong feelings about appendices. You remove it by applying medical authority and training and established practices. This is not 'Nam, there are rules. President Schill is invoking a variation on Trope Four, the "unclear line between" trope, pretending that a legal determination is opaque when it's actually based on established precedent.

In general, it is not acceptable for someone to use her rights to deprive another of her rights. I should not be able to use my speech to deny others of their right to be free from racial or sexual harassment. I can hold—and share—controversial views. But that does not give me the right to harass specific individuals or to speak in any way I wish to, in any place, or any point in time.

Now President Schill is begging the question — assuming for his analysis that wearing a costume in your own home at your own party to express a philosophical opposition to racism is "depriving another of her rights" or harassing someone.

But, when exactly does offending someone turn into proscribed harassment? Only a small number of legal commentators would say that faculty members should be immune from all harassment charges on academic freedom grounds.

Here we see Trope Three, "not all speech is protected," used to distract listeners from the application of established legal precedent to this particular situation.

But even I believe that there are cases when speech or conduct is of relatively minimal value compared to the great harm that it may do to our students—particularly to students who already struggle with isolation and lack of representation. For example, imagine a required class in which a professor repeatedly uses the “N” word for no apparent reason except to elicit a reaction. Could African American students forced to sit through this class have a claim of harassment? I think so. Similarly, imagine a class in which a professor makes repeated, sexually explicit remarks to a student or students for no educational purpose. Free speech principles should not, in my view, prevent the university from taking appropriate actions to make sure these actions stop and do not recur in the future.

This argument — which I call "what if there were a wizard with a nuke" — is just a reductio ad absurdum variation on the "not all speech is protected" trope. Yes, we can imagine speech that would satisfy the legal standard for harassment.

To be sure, the case of Professor Shurtz is not quite as clear-cut. The events took place in her home, not in the classroom. Her stated intention ex post was not to offend, but to draw attention to systemic racism. Still, some of her students felt that they were in a similar situation to students in a classroom being subjected to harassing speech, as they felt pressure to attend and to remain at the event. They felt that they could not leave without jeopardizing their standing in the class, and they also felt that the offensive nature of the blackface was the equivalent of hearing the “N” word. In these circumstances, should the university have ignored the event or should it have taken action proportionate to the offense? What lesson would we be teaching our students if we let the incident end without even an official letter of reprimand? These were the very difficult questions that Provost Coltrane had to grapple with, and I am supportive of the process he used and the fairness he displayed in making his decision.

The problem is the complete abandonment of an objective standard and the uncritical embrace of a subjective standard that yields without question to the heckler's-veto-prone assertion of offense. Under this standard — the one that President Schill defends — whether something is harassment and can be punished, and whether a professor's right to speech is outweighed by some notion of public good, depends entirely on how listeners choose to react. Not all students or faculty are intolerant, censorious martinets. But the loudest ones are, and the University of Oregon has decided to defer to them. The University has decided that the people devoted to the idea that ideas and speech they don't like are harassment should determine which speech should be punished, based on the fervor of their reaction.

Call this what you like, but don't call it law. Don't call it a university.

Filed Under: Law, Politics & Current Events Tagged With: Academia, Free Speech

Popehat's 2016 Censorious Asshat of the Year: The City of Parma Police Department

January 6, 2017 by Ken White 29 Comments

The votes are in! At 1176 votes — an overwhelming 49.49% of all votes cast — Popehat's 2016 Censorious Asshat of the Year is the City of Parma Police Department, which I profiled in April 2016. Congratulations! Sort of.

How did the police of a modest Ohio town beat out luminaries like Donald Trump and the assorted colleges and college students of America? They earned it, friends and neighbors. They didn't just bluster, or threaten suit, or denigrate free speech values. They arrested someone for making fun of them and forced his felony prosecution.

Anthony Novak created a satirical Facebook page full of fake news, derogatory jokes, and clear tells of parody. It had "news items" like these:

The City of Parma Police Department will enact a Pedophile Reform event outside of St. Anthony of Padua Church on 5-1-16 in an attempt to reform pedophiles to normality. We will have multiple learning stations including a “No means no” station filled with puzzles and quizzes. Anyone who passes all of the stations will be removed from the sex offender registry and accepted as an honorary police officer of the Parma Police Department. Have fun out there!

We have forgotten to post that on September 30, 2015 at approximately 10:00 am the Parma Subway Sandwich Shop located at 5890 Broadview Rd. was robbed at knife point. The white male offender got away with a small amount of money and did not harm the clerk. Moments after an unrelated African American woman was seen loitering for over 20 minutes in front of the store despite their no loitering policy. If you have any information regarding this African American womans whereabouts please contact the City of Parma Police Department so that she may be brought to justice. This is the best still photo we have of the offender. Mentor Police and Middleburg Hts. Police have reported similar loitering offenses which may be the same female. The Parma Police Department is seeking assistance identifying the individual in the picture. Please contact Det. Joe Tremble.

Did the Parma Police Department laugh off the joke? Of course not. This is America. In America, we're civilized. We know that the purpose of power is to punish people who mock us, especially if we are law enforcement officials.

No, the Parma PD arrested Novak, had him charged with the felony of "disrupting public services", and forced him to go to trial, where he was promptly acquitted by a jury that did not understand that in America we value deference to armed people with badges more than we value due process or freedom of expression.

Novak has, quite justifiably, sued. You can read his federal civil complaint here. He's sued the City of Parma, Parma's chief prosecutor and "Law Director" Timothy Dobeck, City of Parma PD Lt. Kevin Riley, and City of Parma PD Detective Thomas Connor for various violations of his civil rights.

Novak may prevail against the police officers and the City; it's too soon to tell. However, "Law Director" Timothy Dobeck will likely escape legal consequences for the grueling, retaliatory, terrifying felony prosecution itself.

"First Amendment? Due Process? Integrity? LOL!"

See, in America, under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, prosecutors can generally get away with violating your rights, even by prosecuting you for your exercise of your First Amendment right to criticize the government. Novak might get some limited relief against Dobek for his participation in securing search warrants — some courts have upheld claims against prosecutors who get search warrants to retaliate against obviously protected speech, on the theory that drafting and security search warrants is outside the core prosecutorial function — but that's only a small part of Novak's harm.

Parma PD, Connor, Riley, and Dobeck are bad public officials and bad Americans. They deserve our contempt. Please join me in showing it to them.

Filed Under: Law Tagged With: Censorious Asshat of the Year, Free Speech

Criticizing An Adverse Witness — Free Speech or "Retaliation"?

January 5, 2017 by Ken White 23 Comments

If you trash-talk a business and the owner sues you, the legal path is clear. You're protected by the First Amendment, indolent bloggers may write to support you, luminaries like Paul Alan Levy may get all up in your grill, and legislatures may pass laws to protect you.

But what are your rights if you're criminally prosecuted?

William Laurence Stanley of Dallas, Texas is exploring that question.

Stanley's a crook, and a search-engine-optimizer.

In 2014 federal prosecutors charged Stanley with extorting a former SEO client, a financial firm called Generational Equity. According to the when a dispute arose about Stanley's services, he repeatedly threatened to attack GE online unless they paid him money. He pled guilty to extortion and, in his factual allocution, admitted he extorted Generational Equity by threatening to post disparaging things about it on the internet unless it paid money that Stanley claimed was owed by another company acquired by GE. Stanley specifically admitted that he threatened to post fraudulent comments if his victims didn't pay him. A Dallas federal court sentenced him to 37 months in federal prison and ordered him to make restitution in amounts between $100 and $146,000 to a dozen victims, which — together with language in his factual allocution — suggests he extorted a variety of people and companies.

So far, this is straightforward. Extortion is not protected by the First Amendment.

But Stanley wasn't done, and this is where it gets trickier.

According to federal authorities, in September 2016 Stanley retaliated against Generational Equity for being a witness against him by posting false and derogatory comments about it online. According to the new federal complaint, Stanley (who was serving the tail end of his sentence in a halfway house and on home confinement at his daughter's house at the time) began trash-talking Generational Equity online through various posts and blogs he created, and employing SEO techniques to promote those comments.

Stanley is charged under 18 USC 1513(e), which provides:

Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

William Stanley argues that he's being prosecuted for his speech, and that the First Amendment protects his actions. Is he right?

It's complicated.

With all respect to Scott Greenfield, who wrote about this story already, I think that this particular prosecution does not violate the First Amendment. That's because Dallas federal prosecutors have cleverly avoided the First Amendment issue by taking on a heavier burden of proof than the statute requires. In the indictment, they charge that Stanley retaliated against GE by posting false and derogatory comments about it. By specifying that Stanley's assertions were false and derrogatory, the government has probably evaded the constitutional issue. This is an old prosecutor's trick — rendering constitutional problems with a statute moot by pleading around them and pretending that the stature requires you to prove more than it actually does.

But does the statute, Section 1513(e), require that? Could you commit a federal crime by intentionally trash-talking a federal witness against you, even if you only offered opinions or true facts? Rather alarmingly, that's not as clear. There are relatively few cases construing Section 1513(e) and many of those punt on the constitutional issue.

Take United States v. Sergentakis, 2015 WL 3763988 (SD NY 2015), in which a former employee of a charity was jailed for a kickback scheme. While in prison he wrote letters making wild allegations of child abuse against the charity's officers, and when he was released he created web sites making similar claims. When he was prosecuted under Section 1513(e), he brought a First Amendment defense. The district court rejected it under the doctrine that speech integral to criminal conduct is not protected by the First Amendment. This doctrine is typically invoked to explain why extortion, words used to form a conspiracy, etc. are not protected speech. In this context I find it unsatisfactorily circular — the speech is integral to criminal conduct because the government has defined bad-mouthing witnesses as criminal conduct. The court also found that the defendant's conduct was outside the First Amendment because Sergentakis' statements were defamatory — that is, provably false statements of fact, which are outside First Amendment protection. That part of the holding supports the government's appproach in the Stanley indictment.

In United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2015), the court found that the filing of a nonmeritorious civil rights complaint against the witness could violate the statute, completely avoiding the First Amendment implications of criminalizing the act of petitioning the government. The fact that another court found that the civil rights complaint lacked merit might offer a limitation on use of the statute.

In United States v. Nursey, 2015 WL 7074570 (MD AL 2015), the defendant created fliers accusing a federal witness of being a child molester and distributed them at the witness' church. The defendant, charged under Section 1513(e), challenged the prosecution on First Amendment grounds. Nursey made an overbreadth challenge — that is, he argued that even if the statute could be constitutionally applied to him, it also swept up behavior protected by the First Amendment. He speculated, for instance, that a husband could violate the statute by divorcing his wife who provided information about him. Applying the traditional test for such challenges — that a defendant may only challenge a statute for overbreadth if a substantial number of its applications to other people are unconstitutional — the court rejected the challenge. Once again, the court did not confront the problem of what would happen if a defendant were prosecuted for truthful speech or opinion about a witness.

In short, authority on Section 1513(e) suggests that the government may constitutionally punish you for saying false things to retaliate against a federal witness against you. But here's where it gets cloudier — can the government punish you for saying true things, or opinions, in an effort to retaliate against a witness? Say the government gives a sweet deal and preferential treatment to a cooperating witness against me. Put another way, say the government uncritically believes and rewards a rat. Is it a federal crime for me to blog about how the rat was more culpable than me, but was unfairly treated in a preferential fashion because he was willing to cooperate? Is it a federal crime for me to point out, truthfully, the bad things the rat did? Is it a federal crime to describe my opinion that the rat has poor character? Is it a federal crime for me to tell potentially employers — truthfully — the reasons I think the rat is not trustworthy?

The government may suggest those things are crimes under the "speech integral to criminal conduct" doctrine, and they may find some support for the proposition. I think that's clearly wrong — the government shouldn't be able to beg the question by criminalizing speech and then saying the speech is now inherent in criminal conduct. Stanley's case is fairly straightforward — he admitted before to extorting victims by demanding money and threatening to make false statements about them, and now the government has undertaken the burden (whether or not the courts would impose it on them) of proving that he published false statements to harm a witness. Other applications, though, may be problematical.

Filed Under: Law Tagged With: Criminal Justice, Free Speech

DC Appellate Court Hands Michael Mann A Partial Victory On Climate Change Libel Case

January 4, 2017 by Ken White 103 Comments

More than four years ago climate scientist Michael Mann sued the National Review, Mark Steyn, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Rand Simberg for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, complaining that they wrongfully suggested he used fraudulent methods in framing his much-discussed "hockey stick graph" purporting to show an increase in global warming. Mann was infuriated by vivid rhetoric that portrayed him as a molester of data and compared the investigations that cleared him to Penn State's insincere investigations of child molestation.

After a trial court in the District of Columbia denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, the case headed to the DC Court of Appeals (not to be confused with the United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit) — where it languished for more than two years after argument, which makes one rather more sympathetic to Mark Steyn's position that waiting for an appeal is foolish.

Now the DC Court of Appeal has ruled, handing Michael Mann a partial victory and partial defeat. The decision is here. It's gotten a lot of press. But it's complicated. What does it mean, and is it bad or good?

Let's break it down.

The right to an immediate appeal: The defendants won, and Mann lost, the first issue, which was a boring (to most people) procedural one: if you file an anti-SLAPP motion under DC's anti-SLAPP statute, and the trial court denies it, can you appeal immediately, or do you have to wait until the end of the case? The Court of Appeals, following the majority of anti-SLAPP statutes in America, decided that you can appeal immediately. Does that sound dull? It's not. It's actually incredibly important.

As I have described before, the point of anti-SLAPP statutes is to provide a relatively inexpensive, relatively early remedy for meritless lawsuits designed to chill protected speech. Sometimes judges get things wrong, and sometimes judges wrongly deny anti-SLAPP motions. If you can't appeal immediately, then the anti-SLAPP motion is rendered pointless — the defendant has to wait until the end of the case, when either (1) the defendant wins on the merits, making the anti-SLAPP motion irrelevant, or (2) the defendant has lost, so that the heart of the appeal is actually the merits of the case, not the anti-SLAPP motion. Either way, the defendant has been forced to incur the full expense and inconvenience of litigation. By contrast, the right of an immediate appeal protects the defendant, staying the trial court case while a court of appeal reviews the anti-SLAPP motion. Practically, this means that any defendant can delay a case targeting speech for years. The only disincentive to do so is the fact that most anti-SLAPP statutes allow courts to award attorney fees when an anti-SLAPP motion is frivolous. This means that plaintiffs know that if they bring a marginal case it will take years to proceed with it. It's a powerful barrier to filing weak cases against speech.

Now, here the appeal took years, including a two-year delay after oral argument, strongly supporting arguments that justice delayed is justice denied. In fairness to Mark Steyn, I was probably too dismissive of his view that the appellate delay was pointless (though I remain convinced that his cross-complaint is silly and counter-productive). But the decision is important — it means that defendants can still employ the DC anti-SLAPP statute to resist censorious lawsuits even if the trial judge makes a bad call. Though Mark Steyn may itch for an immediate trial, most people can't possibly afford one.

This part of the decision is unremarkable.

The standard of proof for the plaintiff: The DC Circuit also reached an important, but also impenetrable-to-most, decision about a plaintiff's burden of proof in resisting an anti-SLAPP motion. Mann won, and the defendants lost, this issue, although the outcome was by far the most likely one.

Almost all anti-SLAPP statutes use a two-step process for anti-SLAPP motions. In step one, the defendant — the one filing the anti-SLAPP motion — has the burden of showing that the lawsuit is targeting some speech covered by the statute. Anti-SLAPP statutes don't protect speech that's not already protected — that is, they don't immunize any speech that's not already immunized by the First Amendment or state statute. They simply provide a procedural vehicle to invoke those protections — a way to say "judge, you should dismiss this case because it's protected under the First Amendment." The anti-SLAPP statute is the syringe, not the vaccine. But different anti-SLAPP statutes cover different things — that is, they allow a defendant to make that motion in different circumstances. In some states — California and Texas, notably — the anti-SLAPP statutes are very broad and allow the defendant to make the motion whenever the speech is protected by the First Amendment or any statute. In other states the anti-SLAPP statutes are much narrower — they may only allow the defendant to make the motion when, for instance, the lawsuit targets someone petitioning the government. Whatever the statute covers, the defendant has the initial burden in step one of showing that the lawsuit falls into that category.

If the defendant makes that showing, in step two the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that they can win the case. If they can't make that showing, the defendant wins the motion; if they can, the plaintiff wins the motion. But what does it mean to say that "they can win the case" — or to use the statutory language, show they have a "probability of prevailing?"

The DC Circuit adopted the standard that the vast majority of states use for their anti-SLAPP statutes — the plaintiff only has to produce admissible evidence which, if accepted, is legally sufficient to win. That's the same standard courts apply to motions for summary judgment — motions in which the defendant argues that there's not enough evidence for the case to go to a jury. Practically that means that if the complaint is bogus as a matter of law (for instance, if it targets speech that is clearly just hyperbole or opinion), or if the plaintiff has no evidence to support it, the defendant wins — but if the complaint is legally plausible, and the plaintiff has any evidence to support it, the plaintiff wins. The bottom line is that it doesn't put the trial court in the position of evaluating witness credibility – it just inquires whether there are any witnesses.

A very few statutes require trial courts to engage in some sort of evidence-weighing to see if a plaintiff will prevail — that is, they ask the court to evaluate not just whether evidence is legally sufficient, but convincing. By choosing the "legally sufficient" standard, the DC Court of Appeals just followed the vast majority of courts. That makes it a bit easier for plaintiffs to survive an anti-SLAPP motion.

This part of the decision is also unremarkable.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The defendants won this issue and Mann lost.

Mann claimed that some defendants inflicted emotional distress upon him by calling him the "Jerry Sandusky of climate science" — a molester of data rather than of children. In DC that requires a plaintiff to show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct done (2) intentionally or recklessly that (3) causes severe emotional distress. Here the court said that even if the rhetorical comparison was extreme and outrageous — it declined to say whether it was — Mann did not present sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress to support the tort. In other words, even under the relaxed requirement that Mann only offer evidence that was legally sufficient if believed, he didn't. So the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to that cause of action. (Many, though not all, anti-SLAPP statutes let a defendant target individual causes of action rather than an entire complaint.)

This part of the decision is also unremarkable.

Rich Lowry's National Review Article: In August 2012, Rich Lowry wrote an article for National Review ridiculing Mann's threats to file a defamation claim. The DC Court of Appeal found that the trial court should have granted the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss as to this article. The court's clearly right.

Lowry's article linked to the Stein and CEI articles in the course of discussing Mann's complaints and legal threats about them, described Mann's complains as laughable bluster, criticized Mann as a censor, and asserted that the term "fraudulent" is best understood as an argument and opinion rather than a statement of provable fact. All of that is patently protected under the First Amendment as opinion. Lowry's article was not drafted to endorse or adopt Steyn's or CEI's characterizations of Mann or his work, and didn't even repeat the key passages Mann focuses upon. Only false statements of provable fact — or opinions that imply false statements of provable fact — can be defamatory. These weren't. The point is so clear that the DC Court of Appeal noted that Lowry and National Review didn't even need the anti-SLAPP statute; they could have relied upon a standard motion to dismiss based on Mann's quotations of the article in his complaint.

This part of the decision is also unremarkable.

Steyn's and CEI's Articles: The DC Court of Appeal held that the trial court was correct to deny the anti-SLAPP motion by Steyn, CEI, and Simberg. Mann won, and Steyn, CEI, and Simberg lost, that part of the appeal. The result is notable and, for several reasons, concerning.

There are two key elements to this part of the decision: the distinction between opinion and fact, and the question of what constitutes proof of malice.

Once again, only false statements of provable fact may be defamatory. Opinions, arguments, and hyperbole may not unless they imply false provable facts. "Ken is a jerk" can't be defamatory because it's not objectively provable; "I hacked Ken's email and he's a crook" might conceivably be defamatory because it could imply false facts.

Here, both Steyn's and Simberg's articles were replete with hyperbole, rather strongly signalling opinion. Moreover, they both disclosed the facts that they were relying upon — the hockey stick that another scientist [edited to correct: not Mann] called a "trick" to "hide a decline." I think — like others — that the better and more reasonable interpretation of these writings is that Steyn and Simberg were offering overt argument and opinion based on disclosed facts. You might disagree with the fairness of their conclusions — for instance, you might accept Mann's explanation of what the other scientist [edited: not Mann]meant by "trick," or believe that it's unreasonable not to agree with academic institutions that exonerated Mann — but conclusions based on data aren't defamatory even if they are unfair or unreasonable. That's classic protected speech.

The DC Court of Appeals, however, focused on a lack of overt signals like "in my view" or "in my opinion" or "I think" — silly formalism, in my view, but a pointer to practitioners of how one can manage libel risks. The court also focused on the fact that calling something "fraudulent" or "data manipulation" could possibly be interpreted as a statement of provable fact. The problem with this argument, I think, is that it is very selective about what context it considers. Steyn and Simberg are overtly operating in the context of a scientific culture in which someone has talked about a "trick" in presenting data in support of an argument to "hide" an inconvenient fact. That is the underlying fact framing their opinion. The fact is undisputed even if the interpretation of it is not. Their use of vivid and argumentative language helps establish that they are drawing conclusions, not asserting new (and unspecified) facts.

It's important to understand what the Court of Appeals found, though. It didn't find that Steyn's and Simberg's articles stated facts, let alone false ones. It simply found that Mann presented evidence that, if believed, could allow a jury to conclude that the articles stated facts rather than opinions. The court found he created an arguable issue, in other words. I don't agree, but that's much different than deciding that the articles were factual rather than opinion.

Next, the Court of Appeals found that Mann had presented evidence that was legally sufficient to show that Steyn and Simberg acted with malice. Malice, in this context, doesn't mean ill will — it means with knowledge that statements were false or recklessness about whether or not they were false. Mann has to meet that standard because he's a public figure — only false statements about him made with malice are defamatory. The court found that Mann had presented evidence of widely circulated studies and findings exonerating him, and that the existence of those studies could be accepted by a jury as adequate proof of knowledge that the factual allegations were false.

I think the Court's decision here was, at a minimum, badly framed. The entire point of Steyn's and Simberg's posts was quis custodiet ipsos custodes — that the scientific and academic community's policing of alleged wrongdoing by its own is incredible and unreliable when it is defending ideologically cherished consensus. That criticism is clear from their posts — it's an argument that we can't and shouldn't trust this sort of self-exoneration when it is driven, at least in part, by powerful political motives. The Court's portrayal of the "investigations" and "studies" exonerating Mann seems to wander oddly from dispassionate examination of evidence to eager and almost fawning appeal to authority. The logic is also troubling. The redoubtable Jonathan Adler suggested an apt analogy. Consider George Zimmerman's fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin. A jury acquitted Zimmerman. Imagine I say "George Zimmerman murdered Trayvon Martin." Under traditional First Amendment analysis that would be an obvious statement of political opinion based on the highly publicized facts of the case. Under this Court's analysis, and its stingy treatment of protected opinion, I'm concerned it could be taken as a statement of fact — and that the jury's verdict could be taken as adequate proof that I spoke maliciously, because I should have yielded to the jury's evaluation of the facts rather than assert my own.

Once again, the Court of Appeals only spoke of what a jury could find, not what it must find. But — even adjusting for my bias against defamation claims, against Mann's claims in particular, and in favor of protected speech — I found the Court's discussion disturbingly deferential to Mann's defenders in a way that I think undermines dissent.

In short, this part of the decision was notable.

So. The procedural arguments split one for the defendants and one for Mann, both in predictable ways. Mann lost a substantive argument — the easy one — and won two in ways that are reasons for concern. Next, discovery in the trial court. That will be interesting.

Filed Under: Law, Politics & Current Events Tagged With: Free Speech, Michael Mann Lawsuit, SLAPP

Breaking: Very Stupid Idea Arises From Florida

December 20, 2016 by Ken White 99 Comments

A government lawyer in Florida would like courts to impose community service and forced speech on you if you're unpleasant, and a prominent Florida newspaper is taking it seriously. Wait. Taking it "seriously." No. "Taking it seriously." Shit. "Writing about it without open ridicule." There.

The government lawyer is one Mikki Canton, "chief strategic adviser and global affairs counsel" to Miami Mayor Tomás Regalado and manager of a government program that encourages foreign investment through immigration. Apparently recent incidents like a rude (and crazy) Trump-voting Starbucks customer inspired Ms. Canton to suggest that the government punish rude speech:

Besides mentioning that basic civility guidelines could be drawn up, Canton also spoke of establishing “civility courts” that would be empowered to hand down noncriminal punishments like community work.

“I had talked to the judges about getting civility courts,” Canton said. “Sometimes what you do doesn’t rise to the level of breaking the law, but it sure does break civility rules.”

Asked what types of punishment she envisioned, Canton provided a specific example.

“Making them do some community outreach work, where they actually get a chance to interact with people and be civil,” she said. “If I were the judge I’d say, ‘What was it?’ and ‘Where did he commit this offense that didn’t rise to the level of breaking the law,’ and I would put him out there and make him be the spokesperson and make him work some community hours.”

At the risk of being sentenced to community service in Florida, I must inform you that Mikki Canton is an unserious imbecile and that the Miami Herald is guilty of shoddy post-factual journalism for running a story about her proposal without any critique whatsoever. As the As the Miami New Times' vastly more professional story suggests, Canton's proposal is a legal travesty. Rude and uncivil speech is protected by the First Amendment. Only a narrow range of speech falling into specific historically established exceptions can be punished. The state cannot get around the First Amendment by imposing only community service and "spokesperson" duty; if the state imposes any forcible consequence for speech, it must meet First Amendment limits.

I'm not a fan of lunatics shouting at barristas about Donald Trump. But honestly, I am far more offended by lawyers — especially government lawyers — promoting civic illiteracy by proposing patently unconstitutional policies. Lies are not polite, and Mikki Canton is lying about what the state is allowed to do to its citizens when it doesn't like what they say. Civility is nice, but civics — the adherence to core ideas about the rule of law — is nicer.

Ms. Canton, with all due respect, and without any intent to cause offense, and with sincere hope that it will not disquiet you, kindly fuck off until you've read the Bill of Rights.

Filed Under: Law, Politics & Current Events

The Prenda Saga Goes Criminal: Steele and Hansmeier Indicted On Federal Charges (Updated)

December 16, 2016 by Ken White 168 Comments

This is the latest post in the Prenda Law saga.

More than three and a half years ago I started covering a copyright-troll firm called Prenda Law, which came to my attention because it was filing defamation suits against critics accusing it of wrongdoing. Rarely does the Streisand Effect so utterly annihilate a group of censorious miscreants.

Over the last three years, Prenda Law and its principals John Steele and Paul Hansmeier have met with ruin at the hands of federal courts across the country. Their scheme — to upload porn, track people downloading it from torrent sites, then engage in fraudulent and extortionate litigation against the downloaders — has been exposed. The story has involved spectacles like lawyers taking the Fifth rather than answer a judge's questions about their lawsuits, devastating sanctions orders quoting Star Trek and referring lawyers for federal criminal investigation, withering fire from federal appellate courts, and generally every bad thing that can happen to a lawyer happening to the bad men behind this case.

When people have asked me why these lawyers aren't in jail, I've answered that the wheels turn slowly.

But they turn.

Today federal agents arrested John Steele and Paul Hansmeier, the two lawyers most responsible for this nationwide debacle. They were arrested on a federal indictment brought by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota. An indictment is an accusation, not proof: it only signifies that the U.S. Attorney has persuaded a grand jury that there is probable cause, which is not one of the more difficult challenges anyone ever faced. But a federal indictment is a very grave development for any defendant. The feds' competitive advantage is their ability to pick and choose cases, to develop evidence and witnesses painstakingly over time, and to bring their case only after they've amassed what they see as overwhelming odds in their favor.

The indictment (courtesy of Fight Copyright Trolls) is here. Let's discuss it, shall we?

The indictment charges Hansmeier and Steele with a raft of federal crimes: conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy to suborn perjury in federal court. As usual, if you count up the statutory maximum sentence for all of these crimes, you get a ridiculous number that bears no relation to the probable sentences they face if convicted. However, given the amounts discussed in the indictment, they are facing years in federal prison.

Having covered this story for almost four years, what's remarkable to me is how comprehensive the federal indictment is. It covers almost every sort of misconduct any judge or commentator has accused Steele and Hansmeier of committing in substantial detail. It therefore serves to demonstrate how broad and flexible federal criminal law is — how it can be brought to bear against a wide variety of conduct.

The story, as the indictment tells it, is this: Steele and Hansmeier used various entities, including Prenda Law, to commit fraud. The indictment mentions many entities familiar to followers of this story — AF Holdings, Ingenuity 13, Guava LLC, and so forth. These entities would appear in copyright cases as the nominal plaintiffs, but the indictment alleges they were actually owned and controlled entirely by Steele and Hansmeier to conduct their fraudulent scheme. According to the feds, Steele and Hansmeier uploaded their "clients'" pornographic movies to file-sharing websites intending to lure people into downloading them, then sued the people who downloaded for copyright infringement, concealing their role in uploading the movies. They used what the feds describe as "extortionate tactics" to coerce quick settlements, and dismissed cases when defendants fought back rather than risk discovery. When federal courts began limiting the number of people they could sue at once for porn copyright infringement, they changed tactics and began to file suits falsely asserting that their clients had been "hacked" and then using those allegations as a basis to subpoena ISPs for subscriber information. Eventually Steele and Hansmeier filmed their own porn to upload to support this scheme. When courts began to get suspicious, the indictment alleges that Steele and Hansmeier sent underlings to lie to courts, or even lied to courts themselves, to conceal the scheme. The indictment specifies 14 separate instances of perjury or lying to courts. This scheme, the feds claim, netted more than $6,000,000 in copyright settlements, of which $3,000,000 went to Steele and Hansmeier and only $1,000,000 went to sham "clients," with the rest consumed for expenses.

The feds apply these facts to the law deftly. They describe the entire thing as a conspiracy to defraud, which forms the first (and most flexible) count in the indictment. The indictment offers five counts of mail fraud tied to five settlement demand letters sent by the schemers. It offers 11 counts of wire fraud tied to uploadings of porn to file sharing site and processing of checks. That's the way mail and wire fraud works — every mailing or wire communication resulting from the scheme can be a separate count. The feds frame their conspiracy to commit money laundering charge on the theory that Steele and Hansmeier engaged in transactions (probably with the sham companies) designed to conceal that the money came from mail fraud and wire fraud. The conspiracy to commit perjury count is based on the theory that they agreed to send people across the country to lie to courts to protect their scheme. The indictment also seeks forfeiture of ill-gotten gains.

This is a devastating indictment. Its scope will make it extremely expensive and difficult to defend. The detail level suggests that the feds have amassed a vast amount of documentary evidence. Its reference to Prenda Law employees with initials like "M.L." and "P.H." strongly suggests that the feds have flipped some former employees, who are now testifying for the government.

Prenda fell years ago. But now doom has come for Steele and Hansmeier. Based on my observations throughout this case, it couldn't happen to more deserving criminals.

Steele and Hansmeier might have continued this scheme for much longer — and might have even gotten away with it — had they not gotten arrogant and vengeful. When criticized, rather than settling and dismissing some suits and moving on (the way practiced con men do), they were incensed, and decided to abuse the legal system even more by blitzing critics with multiple lawsuits. John Steele gleefully threatened opponents and Paul Hansmeier famously sneered at the defamation defendants "welcome to the big leagues." It was those actions that drew much more attention to their cases. Character is destiny. Not only are Steele and Hansmeier wanton crooks, they're spiteful, entitled, arrogant douches. That led to their downfall.

December 19 bail update: Paul Hansmeier made his first appearance in Minnesota District Court and was released on a $100,000 signature bond — that is, he was released on a promise to pay $100,000 if he fails to appear for trial or breaks terms of release.

hansbond

That sounds fairly lenient, but bear in mind that under the Bail Reform Act bond is supposed to be set at the minimum necessary to make sure that the defendant doesn't flee and doesn't pose a danger to the community. White collar dudes — and particularly white white collar dudes — typically get pretty low bail in federal court.

John Steele was arrested in Florida. Here's the way it's supposed to work: if you get arrested on a federal warrant in a different district, you have a right to a hearing at which the feds have to show you're the same dude charged in the other district and that there's probable cause (which can be satisfied by an indictment, like they have here.) Steele — who said he would be representing himself — waived further proceedings, thus agreeing to go to Minnesota to appear, and was released immediately on a $100,000 signature bond and a promise to post an actual $100,000 bond (meaning he'll have to put up $10,0000). Again, that is not atypical.

If Steele represents himself in Minnesota, it will be spectacular.

Filed Under: Law Tagged With: Criminal Justice, Prenda Law

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