|
(Note: This Monograph has been reproduced
by kind permission of the Commission for the New Towns now known as English
Partnerships. It is published for general interest and research purposes
only and may not be reproduced for other purposes except with the permission
of English Partnerships who now hold the copyright of LDDC publications)
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6. The Jubilee Line Story
Large Illustrations and Tables
Figures 15 - 18:
~ Fig 15: 1960s Fleet Line Proposals
~ Fig 16: 1973 Travers Morgan Docklands Study
~ Fig 17: 1974/1976 London Rail Study/London Docklands Strategic
Plan/River Line Proposals
~ Fig 18 1985 GLC Jubilee Line Extension Proposal
Figures 18 - 21:
~ Fig 18: 1988 Olympia and York - Bakerloo Line Extension
~ Fig 19: 1988 Olympia and York- Docklands Second Rail Line>
~ Fig 20: 1989 Central London Rail Study - Jubilee Line Extension
~ Fig 21: 1990 East London Rail Study - Jubilee Line Extension
Figure 22: Jubilee Line Extension route options 1990
Figure 23:History of the Jubilee Line Extension
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Early beginnings
 The first
proposals for a new Tube Line into South-East London had their origins
in the British Transport Commission London Plan Working Party Report of
1949. In the years that followed, however, the main priority for London
Transport was the construction of the new Victoria Line. It was only when
this was under construction in the mid 1960s, that attention was switched
to what was then called the Fleet Line. This was to be constructed in
four stages, taking over the Stanmore branch of the Metropolitan Line
and connecting it to Charing Cross as the first stage, extending this
to Fenchurch Street as the second, possibly running on to Lewisham via
Surrey Docks as the third, and finally to Addiscombe as a fourth stage.
(Fig 14 - 108kb)
Parliamentary powers were granted for the first stage
in 1969, and after funding was secured from the Government and the GLC,
work started on the construction of the first section of the new route,
from Baker Street to Charing Cross. in 1971. The line was subsequently
renamed the Jubilee Line in recognition of the Queen's Silver Jubilee
in 1977, the expected opening date. In fact the Jubilee Line opened on
1st May 1979.
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Improving connections to Docklands
By the early 1970s the need for improved connections
for Docklands was beginning to be recognised. The 1973 Docklands Study,
undertaken by Travers Morgan for the Department of the Environment and
the GLC, looked at possible rail connections in the light of the development
considered likely. This study came to the conclusion that the needs of
Docklands could be met with the construction of a lower cost 'Minitram'
system from Fenchurch Street, linking in with the proposed second stage
extension of the Jubilee Line (Fig 15 - 108kb) This, the first precursor of the DLR, would
link areas north and south of the river. and could ultimately have been
extended to Barking and Thamesrnead, with three new river crossings.
However, the idea of a full scale underground connection
was not abandoned and the 1974 London Rail Study undertaken by the DoE,
GLC, BR and LT promoted the River Line, an extension of the Jubilee Line
from Fenchurch Street to Thamesmead. This was considered to have advantages
over a less conventional system such as 'Minitram' because of the use
of proven technology, and the integration with the rest of the Underground
network. It also avoided problems associated with the acquisition of surface
rights of way.
 The
proposed line would include five new river crossings and would link Surrey
Docks, the Isle of Dogs, the Blackwall Peninsula,the Royal Docks, Woolwich
and Thamesmead. The route is shown on figure 16 (108kb). The Study gave a higher priority to an
extension of the Jubilee Line eastwards to Thamesmead rather than south
to Lewisharn and on to Hayes and Addiscombe.
The idea was taken up by the Docklands Joint Committee,
and after a period of consultation and review, especially as to whether
the new link should be a Tube, tram or bus, the Underground scheme was
endorsed in the 1976 London Docklands Strategic Plan. The proposals included
two options east of Custom House in the Royals: one taking a northerly
route through Beckton and then direct to Thamesmead and the other taking
a southerly line through Silvertown and Woolwich Arsenal before reaching
Thamesrnead. (Fig 16 - 108kb)
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The project in abeyance
By the late 1970s the Government was under increasing
pressure to cut spending. In 1979 the Government asked the GLC to develop
ideas for a lower cost alternative, and in 1980 after further review the
1976 proposals were abandoned. The search was on for a cheaper option
which would still allow the regeneration of the Docklands area. The proposals
for the DLR grew out of this study, which eventually led to the approval
of the initial railway in 1982.
Strategic thinking about mass transit links for East
London continued. In Public Transport-the Next Ten Years published in
1985, the GLC investigated a proposal to extend the Jubilee Line along
the southern side of the Thames, largely using the rail corridor from
Surrey Docks to Abbey Wood. This is shown on Figure
17 (108kb). This did not in the end form part of the study's recommendations,
which did, however, include the extension of the DLR from Custom House
to Woolwich and Thamesmead.
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More proposals and studies
During 1985, however, the proposals for Canary Wharf
were also taking shape.
As these unfolded it became increasingly clear that with
the scale and type of activity now proposed for Docklands the capacity
of the DLR would need to be increased, and that a better link from Docklands
to the City was also required. The result was that the DLR City extension
was approved in 1987 and opened in 1991, together with a fourfold expansion
of the capacity of the railway. This involved increasing the rolling stock,
lengthening the platforms to accommodate double car trains, and strengthening
the structure of the viaducts. By 1988 the construction of Canary Wharf
was giving a fresh impetus to development proposals elsewhere in the area
and a further high capacity link to central London was needed. In particular
a direct link to the main line BR terminals of Waterloo and London Bridge
was considered important to give rapid access to travellers from the south,
south east and south west.
The first response to this was a proposal in early 1988
to extend the Bakerloo Line from Waterloo to Canary Wharf via either London
Bridge or Bricklayers Arms. This could then be extended with two branches;
one to Stratford and possibly Tottenham Hale and the second via East India/Brunswick
to the Royals. This is set out in Figure 18 - 108kb.
Political difficulties were anticipated because of the diversion of the
Line away from its present South London terminus at Elephant and Castle,
and proposals were then developed later in the year by Canary Wharf developers
Olympia & York for a stand-alone railway from Waterloo to Canary Wharf
and Westcombe Park.
This would be capable of extension and was regarded by
the promoters as a possible core for a future high speed east-west regional
metro. (Fig 19 - 115kb). O&Y offered significant
funding contributions to London Transport at this time to help pay for
this line.
At the same time as these proposals were being developed
to improve access to Docklands, a separate exercise, the Central London
Rail Study (CLRS), undertaken by the Department of Transport, British
Rail Network South East, London Regional Transport, and London Underground,
was looking at the problems caused by the rapid growth of employment and
rail traffic into Central London. This increased traffic had resulted
in congestion and overcrowding on many of the routes into London, particularly
from the east. The CLRS considered an extension of the Jubilee line via
Ludgate either to London Bridge or to Stratford and then llford or Hainault.
(Fig 20 - 115kb). As a solution to the problems
of Central London, these had low benefits and did not compare well with
alternatives such as CrossRail; but it was recognised that an extension
of the Jubilee line through Docklands via different route options could
be an attractive alternative to the stand-alone rail line proposed. These
were then examined in a further study, the East London Rail Study (ELRS)
commissioned by the DoT, following a statement by the then Secretary of
State for Transport, Paul Channon, in January 1989, in which he announced
initiatives to improve transport to Docklands. (Fig
21 - 115kb).
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The East London Rail Study
The ELRS was set up to examine the best options for
improving rail access from Central London to Docklands and East Thameside.
In particular, it was to consider whether this should be developed as
a stand-alone option or directly connected to the rest of the rail network,
and what alignment should be chosen, particularly between Charing Cross
and London Bridge, and at the eastern end of the route.
Although there would be some advantages in a stand-alone
route through the introduction of new management and technology, and possibly
a new type of rolling stock, these were considered to be outweighed by
the advantages of connection to the rest of the network, particularly
for passengers, who would not have to interchange at the western end of
the route. It was also advantageous to use existing depot facilities.
Proposals for an extension of the existing Jubilee line (the most recent
tube line to have been built in London) came out of these conclusions.
There were two options for the proposed Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) alignment
through Central London. (Fig 22 - 106kb)
In passenger and cost terms there was little difference
between these two Central London options, although the route via Waterloo
gave somewhat greater relief to overcrowding in the central area. However,
development interests outside the City of London were almost unanimous
in their support for the Waterloo route, in part because of the importance
of Waterloo station as a terminal for commuters (accounting for 20 per
cent of BR arrivals in central London), and as the terminal for cross-Channel
rail traffic.
East of Canning Town, options existed to take the route
north to Stratford or east to the Royals and Woolwich, and possibly on
to Thamesmead, or even both. However, the route to Stratford, already
an important transport node, would attract substantially more traffic
and would be cheaper than the route through the Royal Docks.
The only remaining choice outstanding at this stage was
for the section between Canary Wharf and Canning Town where options existed
north of the river via Brunswick/East India and south via North Greenwich.
The North Greenwich route would open up the Blackwall peninsula in a part
of Greenwich which is particularly inaccessible, where at that time development
of up to 9,000 homes was proposed. British Gas had also offered to make
a significant contribution to the cost of the new station (as had developers
at Leamouth in respect of the alternative station at Brunswick). The North
Greenwich station would also provide an access point to the railway for
bus and car travellers from south of the river and would thus help to
balance the flows on the line. It would also relieve the busy Blackwall
Tunnel, and provide two further crossings of the river. The southern route
was therefore chosen, and provision was made for safeguarding a station
at North Greenwich.
 Understandably
the developers and interests groups in the Leamouth area were strongly
opposed to the choice of the Greenwich route, and campaigned vigorously
against it. LDDC, however, on balance supported the southern alignment,
seeing that it provided a further valuable strategic connection to south
London, and would also help regenerate the Greenwich peninsula.
In addition, although a route through the Royal Docks
to Woolwich was not given a high priority initially, it was recognised
that this might be desirable at some future date. Provision was therefore
made for an underground junction at North Greenwich, to allow for a future
extension to the Royals.
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Demise of Olympia & York
After the study was concluded, only a short time remained
for the preparation and deposit of a Parliamentary Bill by November 1989.
After a concentrated effort by the project team a Parliamentary Bill was
submitted in 1989 for which Royal Assent was received in 1992.
An important component of the package was a large contribution
from Olympia & York towards the costs of the scheme, in recognition
of the development benefits that would arise at Canary Wharf. However
when the first payment of £40 million became due in April 1992,
Olympia & York were in financial difficulties and the banks appointed
administrators.
Without a private sector contribution the Government
would not authorise the project, and the scheme stalled. All through the
remainder of 1992 and 1993, discussions continued among the various parties
in an attempt to break the deadlock. London Underground held together
the design team to allow for a rapid resumption of the project when the
funding issues were resolved.
An interesting diversion that came and then went away
again during this period was a proposal to relocate a substantial number
of civil servants in Docklands out of the headquarters of the Departments
of Environment and of Transport in Marsham Street.
In mid 1992 the creditor banks for O&Y offered £100
million, but in November 1992 the Government again reaffirmed that its
decision to proceed with the JLE would depend on the previously agreed
contribution of £400 million being met in full.
Negotiations on bringing O&Y out of administration
to allow this contribution to be provided continued up until Autumn 1993.
Eventually following a High Court decision dismissing an objection to
the move, Canary Wharf came out of administration, and the banks were
able to organise a loan from the European Investment Bank to fund the
contribution.
On 29 October 1993 the Government finally gave the go-ahead
for the scheme. Construction started almost immediately and by the beginning
of December, there were clear physical signs that at long last the project
was under way.
The building of the line is scheduled to take 59 months,
giving a completion date in Autumn 1998. At the time of writing September
1998 is still the target date for opening. Although this is a six month
slippage on the original completion date, the times are still an exceptional
achievement for such a complex tunnelling project.
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The new railway
The new railway will provide a high capacity fast connection
between the Isle of Dogs and the centre of London and the important gateway
of Stratford. Journey times between Canary Wharf and London Bridge will
be 7 minutes and between Canary Wharf and Waterloo, with its Channel Tunnel
Terminal, 11 minutes. 
The line will also have wider benefits for London in
terms of bringing the Underground to areas of London previously unserved,
such as North Greenwich and Bermondsey, and improving access from London
Bridge and Waterloo to Westminster and the West End.
The construction of the new railway was seen as an opportunity
for imaginative station designs, in keeping with the importance of the
railway. One feature will be the incorporation of platform doors to improve
safety and comfort on the underground stations, which will be a first
for the network.
Twelve of Britain's most talented architects have been
asked to create ,a new architecture', strikingly different from the previous
generation of station design. The resulting stations will be worthy of
London as a world city.
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7. The Docklands Light Railway Story
The birth of the DLR
What type of system?
What the railway could do for development
From plans to project
The DLR effect
The planning and justification of the Beckton Extension
Further changes to the system
Service problems
Systems integration
Change of ownership
A new signalling system
Damage to South Quay
DLR Lewisham Extension
Franchising the DLR
Index Page
Part I: The Chronological Story- separate page
Part 3: The Chicken or the Egg? - separate page
Large Illustrations and Tables
Tables 2/3: Initial Evaluation
and Jobs Forecast 1982
Figure 24: Plan of the DLR
Table 4: - Housing, population and employees in
DLR eastern extension catchment area: the scenarios evaluated
Figure 25: Options for DLR Beckton Extension
Figure 26:DLR Reliability 1991-97, percentage of
scheduled mileage operated
Figure 27: DLR Lewisham Extension catchment
Figure 28: DLR Lewisham extension - route
Figure 29: History of the Docklands Light Railway
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The birth of the DLR
By the time the LDDC was set up the plans of the 1960s
and 1970s for Underground extensions to East London had faded, and LRT,
LDDC and the GLC set up a working party to consider other ways of improving
public transport. This time there was a consensus that light rail was
the preferred option, although there were differences between LRT, LDDC
and the GLC about the type of system it should be.
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What type of system?
LDDC's preference was for a highly visible, automated,
driverless system with a futuristic image, such as had been successfully
commissioned in the USA and Canada. LRT favoured a more low key, functional,
simple system, with tram type vehicles and a minimum of new, untested
technology. The GLC wanted a local railway, particularly serving existing
residential communities. There were, therefore, different views on the
routeing, the extent of street running, and choice of technology. Combining
these three different visions for what was to become the Docklands Light
Railway (Fig 24 - 89kb) into a single project
produced some dilemmas.
Several routes were examined, including some with a significant
length of street running, and these were compared with a base network
of express buses. In the event the practical possibilities narrowed to
a choice between two routes - an east to west route from the edge of the
City to the Isle of Dogs and a north to south route from Mile End to the
Island. This latter route included about 1.5 km of street running on the
busy A 11, one of the main radial routes into London from the east.
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 What
the railway could do for development
As had happened earlier in the 1960s and 1970s, it was
found that neither route was likely to be justified on transport benefits
alone and a case had to be built around the effects the railway would
have on creating the development it was designed to serve. Site by site
analysis of key areas adjoining the railway was carried out by the LDDC
to establish the likely development with and without the railway. From
this work two features emerged. First, it was strongly believed that the
railway could stimulate different kinds of development, for example high
employment, high value industries rather than warehousing and distribution,
and second, that the two alternative routes would perform rather different
functions. The east-west route would provide the link between Docklands
and the City. This would be of benefit to existing and future residents
and also establish a link which might encourage City related businesses
to consider locating in Docklands.
The north-south route would provide a link from the main
residential areas of north east London into the proposed employment areas
of the Isle of Dogs.
The two routes were complementary rather than alternatives
and a case for both was agreed.
The total cost of the two schemes was £65m. Table
2 (96kb) is part of the key table from the evaluation in the report
of the working group - Public Transport Provision For Docklands.
The Green Report, as it became known, was submitted to
Government in Summer 1982 and to the surprise of many, by the Autumn the
Government had given the go ahead.
The then Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley,
specified however that the railway had to be built within a £77
million total project outturn cost cash limit. This cash limit was to
have a strong influence on the form of contract for building the railway
at a later stage.
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From plans to project
The project then had to move quickly from a planning
exercise to becoming a real railway. The first step was to try to reconcile
the different visions of the clients. At an early stage the street running
option was abandoned. Because of the timeframe for EZ benefits it was
seen as vital that the railway should open within five years, (1987) and
the street running option could have jeopardised this timescale. In any
case LDDC believed that street operation would remove the opportunity
to have an automated system, and this would not be right for the area,
or have the right image. All parties were also concerned about the constraints
imposed by having to choose a system which was compatible with road traffic.
An alternative was put forward to route the railway to
Stratford, using an existing British Rail (BR) right of way. This also
had the advantage of linking in with BR Eastern Region and the Central
Line, and was accepted by all as the preferred option over Mile End.
Staff
It was also decided at this stage to provide staff on
the trains but not at stations. If stations had had to be staffed, station
costs would have doubled because of the need to provide facilities for
staff, and in a number of locations there would simply not have been room
for this.
There was therefore a real choice to be made between
a railway with only a few staffed stations, and a railway with at least
double the number of unstaffed stations. Not only did capital and operating
costs influence this decision but also the effects on accessibility. The
cash limit restricted the extent to which the east to west route could
provide a good interchange with the Underground at Tower Hill. It was
therefore important that the railway gave good accessibility at the Docklands
end of the journey, and the decision was therefore taken to have unstaffed
stations in order to maximise the number of stations which could be built
and to introduce security cameras at all stations.
Stations
A study was undertaken to identify the best locations
for stations, taking account of existing and future catchments and opportunities
for interchange, particularly with buses. The number of stations which
could be afforded was uncertain and priorities had to be established.
Inevitably there were conflicting views on the balance between serving
existing communities and the development areas. In the end sixteen stations
were agreed, and two were safeguarded for construction in the future (Carmen
Street and Pudding Mill Lane).
Disabled access
Another important principle established at this stage
was that all stations and trains should allow for disabled access. This
meant that lifts and ramps were available at all stations, and trains
were designed with platform height floors. DLR was the first British public
transport system where this approach had been taken.
These various decisions were made during 1983 and the
early part of 1984, during which time two Private Bills were submitted
to Parliament seeking powers to acquire the land to build the railway
and operate it.
Design - build
In parallel it was decided to adopt a design-build approach
to the contract in order to maximise the benefits of competition in getting
the provision of the most facilities within the budget. Above all, the
cash limits meant that a cost overrun was out of the question, and this
approach was the best means to avoid it.
The design build contract was completed, and the railway
opened in 1987, on schedule and having been built within budget. There
were problems, however. The race to complete on time had left elements
of the computerised control system and the new rolling stock inadequately
tested, and it became obvious that the time allowed for testing and commissioning
of the new computer system had been underestimated. None of the problems
was insuperable, but it was a sensitive issue when the railway had to
be closed immediately after the official opening by HRH Queen Elizabeth
II to allow further testing to be done.
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The DLR effect
The DLR was the first significant transport infrastructure
to be built in Docklands for decades. The start of its construction in
1984 itself stimulated development in Docklands. This stimulus was reinforced
by the time limited EZ benefits, the expansion of many City businesses
in the run up to Big Bang, and the national development boom. There was
a rapid growth in activity in the Docklands property market, culminating
in 1987 with the signing of the Canary Wharf development agreement.
The 10 million sq. ft. office development originally
proposed was, in itself, greater than the total initial forecasts of development
on the Isle of Dogs. It rapidly became evident that the capacity of the
initial railway, at around 1600 passengers per hour (in each direction)
on each branch, was far from adequate to meet the growing demand forecasts.
As a consequence of this, major upgrading of the railway was commissioned,
involving strengthening and lengthening of platforms to accommodate two
car trains, upgrading of the signalling system, and an extension west
to the heart of the City at Bank.
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The planning and justification of the Beckton Extension
The Corporation had from the outset intended to serve
the Royal Docks, Leamouth, and Beckton by extending the Docklands Light
Railway eastwards, and in 1985 options for the route to Beckton were examined
in detail. (Fig 25 - 51kb).
There were two key questions to be answered:
-
 What alignment
would bring the maximum regeneration benefit?
- How should the railway be funded?
Alignment choices
The essence of the proposal was to extend the DLR eastwards
from Poplar to Cyprus and Beckton via Custom House. The objectives were
to complete a relatively low cost rapid transit spine linking the majority
of the residential and development sites together and completing a direct
connection to the City.
River Lea Crossing
There were 3 options for the route alignment in crossing
the River Lea. (Fig 25 - 51kb) The Corporation
selected Route B, on the basis that it was quicker, would produce less
visual clutter at Canning Town, and would best serve the sites at Leamouth,
Limmo and Thames Wharf, which were difficult to access.
The London Borough of Newham, however, favoured Route
A because it served a larger residential catchment directly within 600
metres of a station, and could tap feeder bus services on the Barking
Road and the A13. (Route A1 was an early version of Route A)
The choice of route over this section was eventually
settled by a Parliamentary Committee, which found in favour of the London
Borough of Newham, and this route was thus adopted.
East of Custom House
East of Custom House there were essentially 3 options.
Option C made use of the old coke line
route running from Connaught to Beckton with the section through the park
running in tunnel. This was favoured by Newham, but was not liked by the
majority of residents.
Option D, paralleling the alignment with
Strait Road, was preferred by the Corporation, as it was felt to be better
both on development and environmental grounds. A majority (57%) of residents
also favoured this route, although many were still worried about the impact
of the railway on the adjacent housing areas.
Option E, for a line to North Woolwich,
serving the airport, could not be justified in its own right as it would
have generated far less passengers than either of the other two options,
and was also potentially extremely expensive.
It was therefore considered, briefly, as an additional
spur to the main route, but the passenger levels were still too low to
justify the capital cost. The airport at this time had a projected maximum
throughput of 1.2 million passengers per year, and this would only have
generated a maximum of 200 DLR passengers per hour during the peak hours.
Providing a spur would also have diluted the level of
service on the main Beckton branch, where passenger projections were much
higher, and this was not felt to be justified.
 An
additional factor was that at the time when decisions were being taken
on this issue, in 1986, the airport was under construction, and safeguarding
for a DLR station under the airport terminal was not favoured by the airport
developers Mowlem, who were working hard to achieve their target opening
date in 1987. Nor were the developers prepared to make any financial contribution
to such a spur.
Beckton timetable
The Bill for the Beckton Extension was finally deposited
in November 1986, and after being interrupted by the General Election
of 1987, and subject to a Parliamentary Committee hearing on the Canning
Town Route, it finally received Royal Assent in July 1989, with construction
starting in January 1990. The railway began carrying passengers in March
1994 initially on a shuttle service between Poplar and Beckton.
Funding
Discussions about the funding of the new line were long
and difficult. Whilst the initial railway had been jointly and equally
funded by LRT, as successor to the GLC, and LDDC, the Department of Transport
were not prepared to allow LRT to part fund the Beckton Extension and
the Corporation was left to make a case to Government based solely on
the development case for the line. This was despite the high transport
benefits, as well as regeneration benefits demonstrated for the line.
The LDDC therefore spent a year making a case to Government
on this basis. The 'with' and 'without' railway scenarios assumed varying
policy objectives, assessments of what the market would be likely to achieve,
and were quantified in terms of numbers of jobs created, and increases
to the value of land in public ownership.
Table 4 (89kb) shows the scenarios
used to test the case for the line. Case D was eventually agreed as the
basis for the scheme, and approval was finally given by Government to
deposit the Bill in November 1986. LRT agreed to act as LDDC's agent for
the scheme.
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Further changes to the system
There were two major problems with the DLR system which
were also being examined throughout the period 1987 -1989. These were:
- North Quay Delta Junction
- The Fixed Block signalling system
Both of these system characteristics had been identified as major constraints
to the capacity of the system.
North Quay Delta Junction
The Delta Junction was an elevated, tightly curved, at-grade junction,
at the very heart of the DLR system, through which all trains had to pass.
Changing the Delta Junction to separate out all the conflicting train
movements would:
- be expensive
- be disruptive to services
- require the demolition of the existing station at West India Quay
Decisions were difficult, but eventually the junction
upgrading was agreed, a Parliamentary Bill to obtain the necessary powers
was deposited in November 1989. Construction started in 1991, and was
completed in June 1993.
Changing from Fixed Block signalling to Moving Block
The debate about the need to change the DLR's signalling system was
protracted.
Moving block had not been used before by London Transport,
and was relatively unknown to them. Olympia & York, who had a large
stake in ensuring that the DLR could deliver the service capacity that
O&Y had paid for, were convinced that a moving block signalling system
such as that which controlled the Vancouver Skytrain would provide a more
reliable and more frequent service than fixed block ever could.
The basic difference between the two systems is as follows:
-
Fixed Block: The train signals its location to
the control system by passing fixed points in the system. When the
train is between points, the control has no way of telling exactly
where the train is.
-
Moving Block: In this case the train carries its
signal with it, and therefore is in contact with control at all times.
This potentially allows for closer spacing of trains with reduced
headways, and thus higher capacity.
The technical arguments went on for some time, but in
the end London Transport decided to change the whole system to moving
block. It was not an easy option. It was to mean changing the Beckton
contract, and using this contract to retro-fit the initial railway with
the new system.
It was also recognised that making the moving block system
work on a railway as operationally complicated as DLR would not be simple.
(Subsequently London Underground have chosen moving block technology for
both the new Jubilee Line Extension and the upgrading of the Northern
line.)
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Service problems
The DLR was Britain's first automated light rail transit
system with computer operated driverless trains. A number of things made
the first years of operation between 1987 and 1991 particularly difficult.
First, the amount of time needed to commission and debug
a computer operated system of this kind had been seriously underestimated.
Whilst a reasonable assessment had been made of the time needed to complete
and snag the more conventional civil engineering work, the unfamiliarity
of the new computer controlled train system meant that that the effort
needed to test it fully and make it work had been underestimated.
Second, because new contracts were let for the upgrading
and extension of the system before the defects liability periods and snagging
of the initial contract had expired,(the stations, structures and the
train control and signalling system were all being upgraded) there was
a diffusion of responsibilities which made it very hard for the DLR management
team to allocate responsibility to a particular contractor when the final
system still had problems.
Finally, the pressure of use by commuters from the outset
meant that DIR had little opportunity to recover from setbacks and test
the system during down-time to overcome problems. The upgrading of the
railway, the extension to Bank, and the addition of the Beckton extension
and the new Delta junction meant that weekend and evening closures were
needed for possessions by contractors. DLR were not able to use the railway
for testing at these times, and to compound the problem inevitable omissions
and errors by the contractors often left the railway in a faulty state
when passenger services were resumed.
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Systems integration
The contract for the initial DLR placed responsibility
for design and build with one contractor under a turnkey arrangement.
All the subsequent expansion and extension of the railway was carried
out with a variety of contractors, however, and DLR's own management had
to assume responsibility for systems integration for all these other contracts.
Whilst the DLR team were experienced in the management of civils contracts,
they had no particular experience or expertise in the critical area of
systems engineering/integration. There is no doubt that the lack of a
systems engineering approach contributed to the unreliability of the railway
in the early years.
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Change of ownership
Operating difficulties reached a nadir in Summer 1991
when performance fell to an all time low. (Fig 26
- 36kb) The option of complete closedown for a year was considered
and rejected. Government decided that because of the DLR's crucial importance
to regeneration, combined with London Transport's preoccupation with resolving
problems on the rest of the Underground network, it had to keep the railway
open but change ownership from London Transport to LDDC. LDDC would bring
a more local focus to resolving the railway's problems and would be able
to give it a higher priority than London Transport. In 1992 the ownership
of DLR was transferred to the LDDC, and a new management team was appointed.
The new team introduced changes in service operating patterns to reduce
pressure on the signalling system, more creative approaches to solving
software problems, and improved management practices, particular for the
Beckton project. A key change was the appointment of a Prime Contractor
to take full financial and performance responsibility for all outstanding
contracts involved in making the Beckton Extension operational, and of
integrating the new signalling system across the entire network. A significant
improvement in service reliability was noticed soon afterwards, and by
1993 DLR was performing much better.
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A new signalling system
Between 1994 and 1996 the DLR again had intermittent
periods of poor performance which were extremely frustrating for people
living and working in Docklands, and all related to the constant upgrading
and  extension
of the railway. The Beckton line opened in 1994 but using the new, more
sophisticated 'moving block' signalling system. For a year the Beckton
line and the initial railway had to run on different control systems and
this again caused some operating problems. Meanwhile at evenings and weekends
the signalling system on the Initial Railway was being upgraded to tie
in with the Beckton system and this work was eventually completed in July
1995. Soon after this weekend and late evening services were reintroduced,
and in April 1996 frequencies at Bank station increased to 15 trains per
hour.
During 1995 the DLR team ordered new software in a more
advanced but simpler 'Second Generation' computer language. This should
further increase the railway's reliability and enable any software problems
to be dealt with more speedily.
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Damage to South Quay
In February 1996 the terrorist bomb at South Quay damaged
the station and railway viaduct. DLR moved quickly to prop up the viaduct
and patch up the station to get services running from South Quay southwards
again by April 1996, and permanent repairs were started in December 1996.
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DLR Lewisham Extension
Extension of the DLR southwards under the Thames to
Greenwich and Lewisham was first proposed by LB Lewisham in 1985. The
extension has consistently drawn widespread support, not only from LDDC,
DLR and LRT, its original promoters, but also strong all-party enthusiasm
from the London Boroughs of Lewisham, Greenwich and Tower Hamlets, as
well as from all affected constituency MPs. Public consultation in 1988
resulted in 85% of respondents declaring themselves in favour of the extension.
Despite the scheme's manifest benefits, it was not possible
to obtain Government approval until November 1990, following a concerted
campaign and extensive work by LDDC, LRT and the London Borough of Lewisham.
An enabling Bill was laid before Parliament, promoted by LRT. Even at
this stage the proviso was that the new line was to be funded entirely
by the private sector. In the intervening period and since, many studies
and analyses were carried out, including Environmental Assessments, Traffic
and Revenue studies, and Economic & Financial Cost-Benefit Analyses.
The case for Lewisham Extension
Justification for the new extension comes from the major benefits it
will bring to London as a whole, to Docklands, to the Boroughs south of
the River and to DLR itself.
-
The extension provides a strategic cross-river
public transport rail link for London, benefiting South East London,
the Thames Gateway, Docklands, East London and the City. It will relieve
road traffic congestion, in particular on Tower Bridge, Rotherhithe
and Blackwall Tunnels.
-
The new extension will provide direct access to
Docklands, the City and Stratford for an additional catchment population
(Fig 27 - 24kb) of 500,000, and journey
time savings of up to 20 minutes for existing Kent and South East
London main-line rail commuters. -
For the first time there will be a direct rail link
between the Tower of London and Greenwich, which together were visited
by over five million tourists in 1995. The new extension will provide
access for residents of Docklands to retail, tourism and heritage
attractions south of the River.
-
The extension will also provide new local transport
links within Greenwich and Lewisham, and trigger regeneration opportunities
south of the River with new connections to attract businesses and
to support local and Central Government initiatives at Deptford City
Challenge, Greenwich Waterfront and Lewisham Town Centre.
-
For DLR, the new line is vital for the future
health of the railway in the medium and long term. It will balance
the DLR network operating patterns and passenger flows, helping to
complement Jubilee Line services, at the same time buffering DLR against
the effects of Jubilee Line Extension opening. It will allow DLR to
maximise efficient use of its current assets, boosting revenues towards
profitability
The route
The route of the new extension follows an alignment
judged to have the feast adverse environmental impact, with five new stations
south of the river, and two replacement stations on the Isle of Dogs.
Despite widespread general support, there were still petitions in both
Houses of Parliament against specific aspects of the project. In addition,
the transfer of ownership of DLR from LT to LDDC in the middle of the
House of Commons' proceedings caused some uncertainty. As a result, Royal
Assent was not received until 27 May 1993, but in the end there were very
few significant changes to the scheme as originally promoted. (Figure
28 - 37kb)
 Private Sector
project
Following Royal Assent, the next step was to determine
how the project could be funded by the private sector. Responsibility
for the project within Government was transferred in August 1993 to the
Private Finance Unit of DoE. It was decided to promote the scheme as a
Private/Public Sector Joint Venture under the Private Finance Initiative
with DLR running the trains. Official go-ahead on this basis was announced
in the Chancellor's Budget statement on 30 November 1993. On the same
day, the Secretary of State for the Environment stated that he had instructed
DLR and LDDC to give the project top priority.
DLR and LDDC, under the guidance of the Department of
the Environment's Private Finance Unit, established a Joint Project Office
to take the scheme to market. A 24.5 year concession was awarded in September
1996 to the City Greenwich Lewisham Rail Link consortium for the design,
build, financing and maintenance of the extension, making it available
for the running of DLR services. It is expected to come into operation
in early 2000. The major part of the capital cost of the extension has
been financed by the Concessionaire with some grant coming from Government
and contributions from the London Borough of Lewisham (£4.8m) and
Deptford City Challenge (£1m) together with contributions for Cutty
Sank Station from London Borough of Greenwich (£1m), University
of Greenwich (£1m), National Maritime Museum (£100k) and sponsorship
and development inputs (£2.3m).
The process of marketing the scheme, negotiating with
the bidders and finally selecting a preferred bidder and awarding the
concession took longer than expected. New factors complicated the forecasting
of traffic and revenue on the future extension during 1995 and 1996. These
were the introduction of the Government's new rail fares policy to restrict
fares increases to be in line with inflation or less (thus producing less
revenue than forecast originally) and the announcement that Greenwich
would host the Millennium Exhibition, which could significantly increase
ridership in the first years of operation. There was also the question
of whether a Cutty Sank Station would be built as part of the scheme.
Discussions on how and whether this station could be funded continued
during the Summer of 1996. The outcome was that with the additional participation
as site development agency of English Partnerships, sufficient third party
funding was found to allow Cutty Sark Station to be included.
The total cost of the project had also risen to more
than £200m, including costs of private finance, the bulk of which
(some 60%) is being provided through a bond issue on the capital markets
with 10% coming from subordinated debt and equity funding, 25% as compensation
from Central Government for the effect of capping rail fares in London,
and 5% from local contributions.
This is a much higher percentage of private finance than
achieved for any other public sector project to date in Britain, except
for tolled estuarial road crossings, and at the time of signing it was
only the second bond financed project under the Private Finance Initiative,
and the first bond to be issued unsecured by third party guarantee.
With Government's further requirement that there should
be substantial transfer of risk from the public to the private sector
as well as risk and benefit sharing between the two, realisation of the
project has broken new ground in developing opportunities for private
investment in public infrastructure projects.
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 Franchising
the DLR
In 1994 John Gummer, the then Secretary of State for
the Environment, announced that the DLR would be franchised to the private
sector. The competition for the franchise began in 1995 and was successfully
concluded with the award of a seven year franchise for the operation and
maintenance of the railway to Docklands Railway Management Limited (DRML)
starting on 6 April 1997. DRML is a joint venture of the former DLR management
team and SERCO plc. From the outset the management team declared their
interest in competing for the franchise and so the process of the competition
was handled by a dedicated team with no interest in the franchise, working
closely with the Department of the Environment, Treasury and the LDDC.
The reason for franchising the railway at this point was to secure savings
in the cost of running the railway whilst at the same time raising quality
and performance standards. The franchise contract requires a core set
of services which will assist the continuing regeneration of Docklands
and DRML is free to exceed this in both quality and quantity terms so
that it attracts more passengers and revenue. A holding company, DLR Ltd,
has been set up to monitor train service quality and performance against
targets. Depending on its performance, DRML will receive additional payments
or deductions from its fee payments from DLR Ltd. The holding company
also owns the assets and infrastructure of the railway, is managing the
implementation of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project for the
construction of the Lewisham Extension and will continue the strategic
development of the railway, including any further extensions or improvements.
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8.The Development of the Docklands Road Network
Large Illustrations
Figure 2: Key Road Proposals in the 1960s and 1970s
(68kb)
Figure 31: New roads constructed within the UDA
(141kb)
Table 5: Road constrcution in the LDDC area 1981-94
(133kb)
Figure 32: Docklands Northern Relief Road route
options (59kb)
Figure 33: Limehouse Link Options 'a'-'d' (75kb)
Figure 10: The new Docklands Roads (95kb)
Figure 35: Proposed river crossings (78kb)
Figure 36: Options for DLR Thamesmead extension
on Thames Gateway Bridge (92kb)
Figure 37: History of the East London River Crossing
(153kb)
Index Page
Part I: The Chronological Story- separate page
Part 3: The Chicken or the Egg? - separate page
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The need for new roads
The inadequacy of the principal road network within
and to Docklands was underlined in the London Docklands Strategic Plan
(LDSP) of 1976. The LDSP made abundantly clear the seriousness of then
current traffic congestion even before the development of Docklands.
The lack of opportunity to cross the Thames by car or
bus was always seen as a major contribution to the traffic congestion
problems on all the main roads in the area.
Despite the traffic restraint policy adopted by the
GLC and the environmental concerns of the local Councils, the LDSP report
included firm support for:
Support for these schemes rested on the link between
good communications, investment and jobs. The Jubilee/River Line was also
part of the transport plan. Interestingly, market research carried out
in the general business and employment sectors in the late 70s indicated
that the most important highway schemes for retaining and attracting employment
were considered to be the South Woodford to Barking Relief Road and the
East London River Crossing.
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 Investment
certainty?
Although the LDDC built the Enterprise Zone roads in
the early 1980s, including the two lane road across the north of the Isle
of Dogs parallel to Poplar High Street, there was, in the period to 1986,
no significant progress made by the GLC on any of their schemes. The DSRR
and Jubilee Line were abandoned by the GLC and the Government in 1980,
and the value of (non trunk) major roads still committed for the area
was reduced to about one tenth of what had been proposed.
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LDDC's plans for Docklands highways
Meanwhile the LDDC had started planning for schemes
north of the river to make up for the lack of progress. The new direction
and commitment for major road building strategy sprang from an LDDC report
approved in March 1986. This presented a costed road programme for the
area and stressed the need for additional DoT improvements on the A13,
support for ELRC, and further improvements to the approaches to Blackwall
Tunnel.
Later that year, the LDDC unveiled its proposed strategy
for a network of new roads, running largely east-west through the area,
designed to provide greatly improved access to all the key Docklands development
sites.
Figure 31 (141kb) shows the
road improvements planned and implemented in Docklands since 1981, and
they are listed in Table 5 (133kb).
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The Memorandum and The Accord
To help build a partnership on the local highways programme
the LDDC entered into pathbreaking agreements with Newham Council: the
Memorandum of Agreement in 1987; and with Tower Hamlets Council: the Accord,
agreed in principle in 1998. Under both agreements the LDDC sought co-operation
from the Councits to help road and transport developments in return for
LDDC investment in local housing and community schemes.
Under the Accord Tower Hamlets Council made its land
available for construction of the Limehouse Link and Poplar Link (Aspen
Way), and as Highway Authority agreed not to oppose the LDDC's major road
schemes in the Isle of Dogs and Limehouse.
In return the LDDC agreed to provide new housing accommodation
and to assist housing refurbishment for council tenants to a far greater
extent than the direct housing loss due to the road schemes. The building
of the Limehouse Link directly affected 169 homes, largely at St Vincents
Estate and at the Barley Mow Estate. Under the Accord the IDDC rehoused
people from an additional 296 units and a number of families who were
sharing homes. In total 556 households were rehoused. Most of the rehoused
families were offered new housing association homes, mainly on the Isle
of Dogs, and some opted for refurbished Council homes.
The LDDC also agreed to fund a £35 million package
of social, economic and community initiatives to benefit Tower Hamlets
residents.
These wider initiatives helped to alleviate the road
construction disturbance and also reflected the wider responsibilities
of the LDDC as not only being a provider of infrastructure investment
but also a regeneration authority.
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Statutory Procedures
To implement the highways strategy, the LDDC resolved
to use its Compulsory Purchase powers (CPO) where it was not able to buy
land by agreement. In Newham only one CPO public inquiry was held in 1985
for the Eastern Gateway Access Road. Otherwise no public inquiries were
needed and the roads were built following full consultation.
In Tower Hamlets there were CPO inquiries for the Poplar
link, Limehouse link and Lower Lea Crossing. The only opposition at the
inquiries came from affected landowners from a local pressure group, the
Docklands Consultative Committee (which opposed roads in principle), and
from individual local Councillors. The Accord helped to alleviate the
impact of the road schemes, and approval to all the main CP0s was given
by the Secretary of State for the Environment in 1989.
In addition the highways schemes were governed by statutory
planning procedures. In the case of the Limehouse Link the LDDC's Planning
Committee submitted their proposal to grant planning permission to the
Secretary of State for the Environment in May 1988 as a departure from
the London Borough of Tower Hamlets Borough Plan. The Secretary of State
decided not to call in the planning application and the LDDC formally
granted planning permission in June 1998.
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The environment
Throughout construction of the major highways schemes
the LDDC acted to minimise disruption for local people and to work within
environmental health legislation, while still delivering the essential
highways network on time. The cut and cover design of the Limehouse Link,
for example, minimised the construction impact as, once the tunnel roof
was in place, construction activity took place underground.
In the residential areas of Tower Hamlets, noise and
vibration limits during construction were determined by agreements under
Section 61 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974, negotiated by the LDDC
with the Borough. Part of the agreement provided for secondary glazing
to properties along the routes.
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Limehouse Link
The Limehouse Link was perceived by the LDDC and by
developers and investors as a critical part of the highway network, providing
an important direct connection between Docklands and the City and West
End. It was also intended to bring significant traffic relief in Limehouse
and secure an improved environment for residents and future development.
In the course of planning the 'predecessor' of the Limehouse
Link (the DNRR), the GLC had carried out extensive public consultation.
As mentioned earlier, the DNRR was first suggested in a public consultation
document published by the Docklands Joint Committee in July 1975, and
in the LDSP of 1976.
The LDSP considered two alternative DNRR alignments
through Limehouse, (Fig 32 - 59kb) though no
recommendation was made on either. One route followed the line of an improved
Commercial Road (A13) between West India Dock Road and Butcher Row (Option
A) and the other followed a line to the south, crossing Limehouse Basin
by a swing bridge and connecting into The Highway (Option B). To the east,
both alternatives continued along the line of the Poplar Link Road, which
has subsequently been built in phases across the north of the Isle of
Dogs.
Variations on these options, one of which included the
use of the disused railway viaduct (Option C) which now carries the DLR,
were elaborated - but there was considerable public opposition to these
preferred options of the GLC and London Borough of Tower Hamlets, and
consensus about alignment could not be reached.
Finally, in 1983, following the announcement of the
proposed abolition of the GLC and the emerging proposals from 1984 onwards
for large scale office development at Canary Wharf, the LDDC had to make
more progress, and four Limehouse options were investigated (Fig 33 - 75kb):
a) Widening of Commercial Road plus use of Narrow Street
This scheme would have had significant traffic and environmental
problems within Limehouse, and would also have required expensive engineering
solutions on the Commercial Road to deal with the two railway overbridges,
and the two significant waterways passing under the alignment. One of
the bridges at Limehouse Station carries the Fenchurch Street commuter
service to East London and Essex, and the other, at Lowell Street, though
disused, is a listed structure.
b) A river based scheme
A road sunk into the Thames would have been the most
difficult option in engineering terms, and might have had significant
hydrological effects on the river course.
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The preparation of the engineering solutions for such
a scheme would have necessitated significant delays, and uncertainty about
the implementation of the scheme would have been high. A number of demolitions
of riverside properties in Narrow Street and elsewhere in Limehouse would
also have been necessary.
c) At grade land based scheme
Perhaps even more than option 'a' this option was considered
entirely unacceptable on environmental grounds. The intrusion and severance
caused by a four lane surface highway would have been considerable in
this location, and would also have required a substantial amount of demolition.
d) Tunnel scheme
It soon became apparent that the tunnel scheme should
be the preferred option. To minimise the amount of demolition in this
residential area a serpentine route under the Limehouse Basin linking
a number of parcels of derelict, underused and cleared land was considered.
Any other route would have created much greater demolition,
disruption and dislocation, as more homes and businesses would have been
affected.
Putting the scheme underground provided much greater opportunity for
subsequent redevelopment. The resale of the developable land above the
route would help offset the additional cost of a tunnel. The traffic benefits
were also better, as the user would have a grade separated, dedicated
route and the community would have complete relief from rat-running.
The serpentine route under the Limehouse Basin was therefore selected,
and in 1989, following the public inquiry, work started on site. The Limehouse
Link opened to traffic in May 1993.
Selecting a route and scheme through Limehouse was therefore
a long drawn out exercise begun in the mid 1970s. The Limehouse Link was
planned and built in seven years, compared with the average for a Department
of Transport highway scheme of 13 years. Obviously a tunnel is more expensive
than an at grade scheme but there is no evidence that the Limehouse Link
is expensive compared with other urban tunnels. Interestingly, there is
no data available comparing tunnel costs nationally.
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Leamouth and the Royals
The LDDC's plans for improvements to the road and rail
network in the eastern part of the Urban Development Area were meanwhile
well under way.
 Government,
the LDDC, and the London Borough of Newham were all determined that the
Royals should take advantage of the opportunity to put in the transport
infrastructure in advance of development. In the mid 1980s, of course,
it was much easier than it had been earlier to make the case for this,
with proposals for Canary Wharf developing alongside.
A road network had been designed for the Royal Docks
which sought to maximise access to the vast tracts of development land,
whilst minimising the severance effects that such new roads would produce.
A circuitous alignment was developed, with many roundabouts
en route to access development sites and discourage through traffic from
diverting from the A13. Pressure to take a new road across the north side
of the Royal Victoria Dock was resisted for this reason. The LDDC had
no wish to see the new Royals roads made attractive to through traffic
commuting into London.
The basic form of the Royals road network was largely
agreed by 1985.
 The
roads ran in an S shape (Fig 10 - 95kb) through
the Docks, and were designed to integrate with the new DLR extension in
an environmentally acceptable way. Rather than put most of the railway
high up on viaduct, as had happened in the Island, a different solution
was adopted in the Royals. The DLR & BR rail corridor across the north
side of the Royal Victoria Dock was kept to a minimum width, with pedestrian
bridges linking housing in the north with development sites, and beside
the Royal Albert Dock the railway and its stations were integrated with
the road.
The new bowl stations, designed to a concept originated
by Richard Rogers and Partners, have a three tier arrangement, with a
DLR station at the bottom, pedestrians crossing the road/rail corridor
at grade in the middle, and a roundabout road junction at the top.
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Lower Lea Crossing
As part of the strategy in 1986 it was decided that
it was important to reduce the severance effect of the River Lea between
the Royal Docks and the Isle of Dogs by building a new bridge.
Both areas had suffered for many years from the very
severe congestion caused by the pinch point in crossing the River Lea
at the A13 Iron Bridge (Canning Town). The Department of Transport's proposals
for removing this pinch point were likely to take a decade or more to
resolve, and so the LDDC developed plans for a new road bridge, the Lower
Lea Crossing.
The Royals road and rail programme, and the Lower Lea
Bridge proposal were intended therefore to facilitate development of the
remaining sites in the east.
All of these proposals were tested against various development
scenarios, and proved sound. Following lengthy negotiations, the London
Borough of Newham became supporters of the proposals, and the Royals roads
started construction without the need for any public inquiry. They were
all completed between 1989 and 1990, in advance of any development in
the Royals. The Lower Lea Crossing was opened in December 1991.
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Status of the Docklands highways
The Limehouse Link and East India Dock link were opened in May 1993,
marking completion of the Docklands highways. All the new LDDC schemes
are private streets, operated by the LDDC as traffic authority and street
managers, with Traffic Orders in the joint names of the Corporation and
the relevant Boroughs. At the time of writing it is planned that ownership
of the Limehouse Link, East India Dock Tunnel and Aspen Way will pass
to the Highways Agency, whilst the LDDC's other private streets will be
adopted by the relevant highway authority.
[Note by Webmaster: The
Limehouse Link, Aspen Way, the Prestons Road Flyover and the East India
Dock Link were taken over by the Commission for the New Towns on an interim
basis. In July 2000 they were taken over by the Greater London Authority]
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The DoT's schemes
In 1986, the Department of Transport, having trunked
the A13 between Canning Town and Butcher Row, also committed to a programme
of major improvements on the A13, and to ELRC, which had just completed
its passage through the longest road inquiry ever.
At the time of writing the remaining major A13 schemes
are scheduled for completion by 2003, 17 years after their announcement.
The A13 Iron Bridge/Canning Town Flyover and the A13/Woolwich
Manor Way schemes are to be progressed as Design, Build, Finance and Operate
(DBFO) projects. The A13/Prince Regent Lane improvement is to be investigated
further, on the basis of a more southerly alignment, before decisions
can be taken on implementation.
The East London River Crossing, however, was postponed
by the Secretary of State for Transport in July 1993, subject to finding
an environmentally acceptable way of building the scheme. (See Part 1 for details)
In April 1996, the Secretary of State published a Transport
Strategy for London which included proposals for a new multi-modal river
crossing at the location of the previous East London River Crossing. Revocation
Orders for ELRC were published in July 1996. The local crossing, Thames
Gateway Bridge, is discussed later in this chapter.
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River Crossings
(see Fig.35)
There has been an increasing realisation in recent years
of the importance of the new river crossings, not only for Docklands,
but also for other regeneration areas in the Tharnes Gateway and for the
existing residential and commercial communities of East London.
Until July 1993, the East London River Crossing (ELRC)
had been taken as a fix in all development scenarios for the Royal Docks.
The announcement by the Secretary of State in July, stating that ELRC
would be reviewed, was a signal to rethink the river crossing and development
strategy. The position was exacerbated by the hostile reception given
by local businesses and residents to the proposal for a high level bridge
at Blackwall.
In view of all these uncertainties, LDDC commissioned
a study, ERICA, to look into the development implications of the river
crossings for Docklands. The Government Office for London (GOL) consulted
on the various proposals in 1995, seeking views on a number of possible
crossings to the east of Tower Bridge.
GOL's response to the consultation was published as
a part of the Transport Strategy for London, published in April 1996.
The individual studies and crossings are discussed further
below.
ERICA (Eastern River Crossings Assessment) Study
This work was commissioned by the LDDC in October 1993
and reviewed the relative merits of the four proposed river crossings.
Lewisham DLR extension, Blackwall Third Crossing, Woolwich Metro and ELRC
or a more local replacement facility. This was the first time road and
rail crossings were considered equally in terms of transport benefits
as well as socio/economic impacts and achievability. The study, which
reported in January 1994, helped the Corporation to reappraise its priorities
on river crossings, and gave the highest priority to the Lewisham Extension
of the DLR. Second was a local crossing in the Gallions Reach area, then
Woolwich Metro, and finally a third crossing at Blackwall.
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Tower Bridge and Rotherhithe Tunnel
In West Docklands, concern about the lack of adequate
reliable cross-river capacity led to two studies looking into new or replacement
facilities.
These studies in 1993 and 1995 considered the need for
new or replacement crossings between Tower Bridge and Rotherhithe Tunnel.
The consultants, Mott McDonald, concluded that new crossings could not
be justified and with controlled use and regular maintenance, both Tower
Bridge and Rotherhithe Tunnel could remain in use for fifty years or longer.
LDDC's view, however, was that dependence on two historic
crossings, either of which could be closed for reasons other than structural
integrity, was not a satisfactory situation for a developing area and
at least one alternative crossing should be safeguarded. To date this
safeguarding has not been possible, as there is no consensus about the
location of such a link.
Consultation on river crossings and Transport Strategy for London
The Government Office for London consultation in 1995
included the Blackwall third crossing, Woolwich Rail Crossing, a multi
modal Gallions Reach crossing and crossings to the east of Beckton. The
main proposals, however, were the first three crossings. GOL's response
to the consultation was presented in A Transport Strategy for London published
jointly by GOL and the Department of Transport in April 1996. On river
crossings, the strategy proposes a package approach, whereby all three
crossings would be promoted under the Private Finance Initiative. As well
as the tolled Gallions Reach crossing. it was proposed that the improved
Blackwall crossing should also be tolled. The Strategy document also announced
that the East London River Crossing orders should be withdrawn in favour
of the Gallions Reach crossing. The river crossing package was to be promoted
under the Transport and Works Act or through a hybrid Bill.
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Fresh options for Blackwall Third Crossing
It was accepted in the Government Office for London
consultation document that the 1993 consultation on the third crossing
at Blackwall had been fruitless. Since that time GOL has commissioned
a number of studies into environmentally more acceptable options which
would also provide more capacity for local movements and cater for commercial
traffic. As a result of this work, additional safeguarding instructions
were published in April 1997. It is anticipated that a preferred route
will be announced later in 1997.
Thames Gateway Metro or the Woolwich Rail Crossing
The idea of linking by tunnel two British Rail lines,
the North London Line which terminates at North Woolwich in the Royal
Docks, with the North Kent Line at Woolwich Arsenal on the south side
of the river, has been discussed over many years.
It was resurrected as an option for the Jubilee line
Extension in the late 1980s and explored further in the second East London
Rail Study in 1992, commissioned by London Transport and the LDDC. The
conclusion of this study was that a new rail tunnel at this location would
create a new rail corridor which could help regeneration of the Royal
Docks, Woolwich and Thamesmead. While further work was under way on the
feasibility of the scheme in 1993, the concept of the Thames Gateway was
gathering momentum, and the tunnel came to be seen as a way of facilitating
a new rail connection between East London and North Kent. For this reason
the scheme started to be called Thames Gateway Metro. During 1995 and
1996, LDDC, together with London Transport, British Rail and Railtrack,
commissioned further work which has demonstrated that the scheme is feasible,
and that a core scheme of six trains per hour could be provided between
Stratford and Abbey Wood, and could be extended further east to Dartford
with additional infrastructure. The scheme has a cost benefit ratio of
1.3:1 but if all the regeneration aspirations in Thames Gateway are realised
this could rise to 2:1.
Thames Gateway Bridge or Gallions Reach Crossing
Following the ERICA report the Corporation, together
with Thamesmead Town Ltd, carried out a number of studies between November
1994 and June 1996 to establish the feasibility of a multi modal crossing
at Gallions Reach. Thames Gateway Bridge Summary Report, published in
February 1997, contains the findings of these studies. This crossing would
provide a new local link between the Royal Docks and Thamesmead (Newham
to Greenwich), and would carry a dual two lane road, as well as a dedicated
public transport facility.(Fig 36 - 92kb) It would be tolled, with tolls being charged
in such a way to discriminate in favour of local trips whilst discouraging
through traffic. It would be mainly funded by private money and promoted
by either the local authorities, Government Office for London (GOL) or
a residuary body. In 1997 GOL published a safeguarding line for the Thames
Gateway Bridge, prior to the revocation of the ELRC Orders in April 1997.
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The way forward
The package approach to the river crossings is a viable
and balanced way forward. The three schemes in the package would provide
improved accessibility, mode choice and would, in combination, cater for
the regeneration needs of East London and the Thames Gateway. The package
requires a promoter or promoters, and a sponsor, to take it through the
hybrid Bill process, to organise the concession competition and oversee
implementation. With LDDC's departure from the area in March 1998 the
Thames Gateway Bridge will lose its main promoter. It is to be hoped that
the package, which at present has considerable momentum behind it, will
be taken forward by Government in partnership with the local authorities,
and be implemented.
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9. RIVERBUS
The struggle to launch
The birth of RiverBus
Funding problems
The difficulty of operating a viable service
Lessons for the future
Index Page
Part I: The Chronological Story- separate page
Part 3: The Chicken or the Egg? - separate page
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The struggle to launch a service
RiverBus, which was set up in 1988, but died in 1993,
made a small but intriguing contribution to the regeneration of London
Docklands and to its transport system. Observers noted how relatively
few passengers it carried compared to buses and trains, but it had a romantic,
pioneering image which attracted many supporters when it was struggling
to survive.
There was a long history of attempts to run such services
in London which help to explain its demise. Passenger traffic on the Thames
grew in the 17th Century, but began to fall away as more bridges, roads
and railways were developed. Steamboats flourished in the first half of
the 19th Century, but the last company had gone into liquidation by 1886.
Schemes this century included a 30 boat London County Council fleet in
1905-7 and a waterbus service initiated during the Festival of Britain
in 1951 by a consortium of owners, and which withered once the South Bank
site closed. Against this background, RiverBus was the tenth attempt since
1945 to run a commercially viable transport system on the Thames. There
were various reasons why all these services failed, but over-ambitious
schemes, lack of integration with bus and rail, lack of riverside facilities,
boat design, operating difficulties and high costs were all relevant factors.
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The birth of RiverBus
The raison d'etre of RiverBus was that it would serve
two newly developed riverside areas, Chelsea Harbour and Canary Wharf,
and piers in between, carrying residents and business people who would
be prepared to pay a higher price than for a journey by tube or bus. The
boats were relatively small, with 62 seats, and built to high internal
standards of comfort. Staffing was relatively generous to keep customer
service standards high. Demand for the service would grow as firms moved
into Canary Wharf. This was the concept which attracted a Business Expansion
Scheme grant in 1988 and the service, named Thamesline, was launched.
From the start, Thamesline was viewed with suspicion
by the established operators and users on the River running tourist services
and there were complaints about wash damaging other craft and creating
problems for rowers and others, which meant they had to slow down. The
catamarans had problems particularly with rubbish floating in the Thames
damaging their propulsion equipment, and damage to the hulls from frequent
docking. Already by the end of 1988 Tharnesline was experiencing financial
difficulties.
Rescue came from a consortium of developers who saw
that a Riverbus service was an asset to Chelsea Harbour and Canary Wharf,
in marketing terms as well as for practical reasons. Docklands was still
perceived as difficult to get to, with a limited service on the initial
DLR (no underground connection at Bank at this time) and with the Docklands
highways still under construction. RiverBus could also serve as a link
between the mainline stations at Charing Cross, Waterloo and London Bridge
and the new developments on the Isle of Dogs.
Funding from five developers and a grant of £500,000
from the Department of Transport and Department of Environment underpinned
the new RiverBus service operation for the next four years. London City
Airport also became a sponsor, and the airport service became popular
with incoming airlines.
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Funding problems
RiverBus increasingly attracted tourists and services
started from St Katharine Docks and Greenwich, but in spite of a dramatic
growth in passenger numbers to nearly three quarters of a million by 1992,
RiverBus still depended on a substantial subsidy from Olympia & York
who consciously promoted it as a service for the Canary Wharf commuters.
When Olympia & York went into Administration, the
banks provided funds on a month by month basis with increasing reluctance.
RiverBus had to seek additional funders during 1992
and contributions were received from local government, the private sector
and individual benefactors including a new supporter, Parkview International.
When the final funding crisis occurred in July and August 1993 the immediate
reasons were a shortfall in projected off-peak passenger demand and higher
costs than budgeted for in the business plan.
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The difficulty of operating a viable service
RiverBus went into receivership in August 1993. There
are many views about why the service couldn't survive. but there are some
fundamental problems in the way of running a commercially viable passenger
service in London in the 1990s.
London has a highly developed bus, rail and tube network
which is subsidised and offers joint ticketing and the Travelcard facility.
RiverBus management attempted to secure inclusion in the Travelcard scheme
and through-ticketing arrangements. This would only be financially viable
for the service if it charged a premium to passengers on top of the Travelcard
Scheme, but would have had the advantage of convenience and flexibility.
In the event, London Transport was advised that the RiverBus could not
be invited to participate since it would involve public sector grant for
LT being passed onto the RiverBus which was a private sector commercial
operation.
The result was that the journey between Waterloo and
Canary Wharf was £2.80 by RiverBus and £1.20 by bus
and rail. This made it more difficult for RiverBus to sustain or increase
its commuter traffic or attract off-peak business users, particularly
when there were steady improvements to the services on the Docklands Light
Railway and the Docklands highways opened in May 1993.
The size both of the boats and of the fleet was insufficient
for RiverBus to generate enough income to offset its overheads. In the
absence of public or private sector funders to inject the substantial
capital investment necessary to restructure its fleet, RiverBus could
not build itself into a position from which it could approach profitability.
Other adverse factors included a failure to drive costs
(especially manning costs) down fast enough, and the inability to utilise
Westminster Pier - a factor critical to building market share in the off-peak
tourist trade.
Other difficulties included the problem of generating
sufficient demand at any pier throughout the day, the fact that demand
from tourists is seasonal and weather-related, and the problem of providing
services sufficiently frequent to be attractive with a small fleet. In
conclusion it was hard for a commercial operation to compete in an uncertain
market with subsidised public transport without its own subsidy from the
developers of Canary Wharf.
In February 1994 the fleet of eight catamarans which
provided the RiverBus service were sold by the liquidators to the Siam
Development and Holding Company of Bangkok for tourist' use in that city.
The three other boats reverted to the ownership of P&O.
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Lessons for the future
The experience of RiverBus, even though it eventually failed, has encouraged
others to explore further the idea of passenger transport services on
the River. London First commissioned a study, published in January 1996,
The Business Case for a Passenger Transport Service on the River Thames.
This study was looking at different kinds of services from the current
leisure trips on the River mainly used by visitors to London. Its main
conclusions were that a 'hopper service' might be feasible linking the
Central London tourist attractions, particularly with new, less accessible
attractions coming on stream including the Globe Theatre and Tate Gallery
Bankside Extension. For the Millennium, Greenwich's historic centre, the
Millennium Exhibition site, car parks and Central London piers could also
be linked by a hopper service. However, a service designed purely for
commuters is unlikely to be able to operate at a profit without subsidy
and while a hopper service could be used by commuters between Central
London piers, it would not be feasible to run those services to Docklands.
During 1996 several business interests looked again at commuter services,
with trial runs during the Spring between Central London and Greenwich
via Canary Wharf. It will be interesting to see whether, spurred on by
the Millennium, a form of river passenger transport will emerge again
in London.
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10. CITY AIRPORT - continuation
page
11. PEDESTRIANS, CYCLISTS AND BRIDGES
- continuation page
12. DOCKLANDS TRANSPORT PLANNING: THE ANALYTICAL
SIDE - continuation page
13. FINANCIAL INVESTMENT - continuation
page
Note by Webmaster:
Some readers will be interested to know about the progress
made in developing the transport infrastructure since the LDDC closed
its doors in 1998. There is a good summary of the various projects
completed, in progress or planned at the website of the London City Airport Consultative Committee.
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