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Computers That Count Votes

Voting machines used in Virginia and Pennsylvania allowed election-rigging via wifi, for anyone that could crack the machine's WEP password.
To make it even easier, they used the password "ABCDE". But that is the icing on the cake. There are programs that reliably guess WEP passwords. No matter what password they had chosen, the machine would still have been vulnerable to anyone with some expertise.
Today's voting computers might have a little better security, but that doesn't mean they can be trusted. Even if the security is enough to thwart random passers-by, that does not mean it will stop people from the company that made the machine, or people from the election authority, from rigging the election indetectably.
Virginia has decertified this machine, but is the replacement good enough for your elections? The proper criteria are more than a little more strict.
Even if the computer's security isn't so weak that outsiders can crack it, that doesn't mean you can trust it. The manufacturer might rig the election; the election authority might rig the election.
Virginia's computerized voting machines, whose security was easy to break, have finally been decertified.
It's a shame that the article uses "hackers" to mean "security breakers" — please use the term "crackers" when that's what you mean.
All non-auditable digital voting systems should be banned, as a blanket rule, because they make it easy to rig elections indetectably.
It's amazing how bad computerized voting machines can be. Here is a study of a machine that was used in New Jersey (and maybe elsewhere).
Investigation around 2006 found that Diebold voting machines were susceptible to fraud, and a virus could be designed to infect all the machines in a district.
More info.
It was easy to put fraud software in Diebold voting machines.

Voter verified paper audit trail

In a voting experiment, most voters failed to notice errors in their "voter-verified" paper ballots.

Internet Voting

Australia tried internet voting, and a security flaw put 66,000 votes in question.
They had the good fortune of knowing there was a security flaw. If a state tries internet voting and does not find a security flaw, that doesn't mean there isn't one. It means there is one and it has not been found.
Security risks and privacy issues are too great for moving the ballot box to the Internet.
Attacking Washington DC's internet voting was as easy as pie.
Estonia's internet voting is vulnerable too.
Australia is using an insecure internet voting system.

In addition to the software vulnerabilities, remote voting opens the door for voters to be coerced by their bosses, by abusive spouses, etc. It is a foolish risk to permit remote voting except in special cases such as when people are travelling or in the hospital.

If young people are not voting, it's because they see the candidates that might win are working for plutocrats. Making it less work to vote is no solution.
All remote voting has a fundamental danger: your boss or your violent spouse might coerce you to vote a certain way. This is bad for democracy and has no technical fix.