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1
July 2016
EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 13, Downloads (12 Months): 13, Downloads (Overall): 13
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We consider a ubiquitous scenario in the Internet economy when individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic choices in an uncertain environment. This creates a three-way trade-off between exploration (trying out insufficiently explored alternatives to help others in the future), exploitation (making optimal decisions ...
Keywords:
recommendation systems, learning, exploration and exploitation, incentive-compatibility
2
July 2016
EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 27, Downloads (12 Months): 27, Downloads (Overall): 27
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We consider a setting where in a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. There is a public prediction that gradually converges to its realized value, and an expert that has access to a more accurate prediction. Our goal is to study when should the expert ...
Keywords:
prediction, prediction market, normal distribution, random walk, scoring rule, expert, inference
3
July 2016
EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 18, Downloads (12 Months): 18, Downloads (Overall): 18
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Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In the present paper we introduce an analytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In ...
Keywords:
homophily, voting
4
March 2016
Machine Learning: Volume 103 Issue 1, April 2016
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
In this work we lower bound the individual sequence anytime regret of a large family of online algorithms. This bound depends on the quadratic variation of the sequence, $$Q_T$$QT, and the learning rate. Nevertheless, we show that any learning rate that guarantees a regret upper bound of $$O(\sqrt{Q_T})$$O(QT) necessarily implies ...
Keywords:
Online learning, Regret lower bounds, Regularized Follow the Leader, Regret minimization, Online linear optimization
5
December 2015
WINE 2015: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 9470
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Allocating multiple goods to customers in a way that maximizes some desired objective is a fundamental part of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. We consider here the problem of offline and online allocation of goods that have economies of scale, or decreasing marginal cost per item for the seller. In particular, we ...
6
July 2015
SIROCCO 2015: Post-Proceedings of the 22nd International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity - Volume 9439
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
We consider scheduling information units called frames, each with a delivery deadline. Frames consist of packets, which arrive on-line in a roughly-periodic fashion, and compete on allocation of transmission slots. A frame is deemed useful only if all its packets are delivered before its deadline. Using standard techniques, one can ...
7
June 2015
EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 4, Downloads (12 Months): 27, Downloads (Overall): 39
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We consider a setting where n buyers, with combinatorial preferences over m items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these interactions, is to reconstruct both the preferences of the buyers and the mechanism of the seller. ...
Keywords:
mistake-bound learning, learning theory, algorithms, mechanism design
8
June 2015
EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 3
Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 51, Downloads (Overall): 76
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Individual decision-makers consume information revealed by the previous decision makers, and produce information that may help in future decision makers. This phenomenon is common in a wide range of scenarios in the Internet economy, as well as elsewhere, such as medical decisions. Each decision maker when required to select an ...
Keywords:
Bayesian incentive-compatibility, multi-armed bandits, mechanism design, regret
9
June 2015
EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2
Downloads (6 Weeks): 8, Downloads (12 Months): 95, Downloads (Overall): 116
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We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution D. The seller has "data" about D in the form of m ≥ 1 i.i.d. samples, and the algorithmic challenge is to use these samples to obtain expected revenue as ...
Keywords:
revenue, auction, sample complexity
10
January 2015
AAAI'15: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: AAAI Press
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction (Myerson 1981). However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess this information. Recently work (Cole and Roughgarden 2014) showed that an approximation based on a ...
11
December 2014
SODA '15: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0, Downloads (12 Months): 26, Downloads (Overall): 40
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Robust probabilistic inference is an extension of probabilistic inference, where some of the observations are adversarially corrupted. We model it as a zero-sum game between the adversary, who can select a modification rule, and the predictor, who wants to accurately predict the state of nature. Given a black-box access to ...
12
July 2014
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence: Volume 71 Issue 4, August 2014
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
We derive a generalization bound for domain adaptation by using the properties of robust algorithms. Our new bound depends on ¿ -shift, a measure of prior knowledge regarding the similarity of source and target domain distributions. Based on the generalization bound, we design SVM variants for binary classification and regression ...
Keywords:
Robustness, Adaptation, SVM, 68T04
13
May 2014
EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 2
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2, Downloads (12 Months): 23, Downloads (Overall): 86
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We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design - designing game theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism ...
Keywords:
stable matching, mechanism design, local computation algorithms
14
March 2014
Theory of Computing Systems: Volume 54 Issue 3, April 2014
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Our main goal is to abstract existing repeated sponsored search ad auction mechanisms which incorporate budgets, and study their equilibrium and dynamics. Our abstraction has multiple agents bidding repeatedly for multiple identical items (such as impressions in an ad auction). The agents are budget limited and have a value per ...
Keywords:
Auctions, Budget, Algorithmic game theory, Sponsored search
15
February 2014
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation: Volume 2 Issue 1, March 2014
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 1
Downloads (6 Weeks): 6, Downloads (12 Months): 39, Downloads (Overall): 164
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We study a basic network creation game proposed by Fabrikant et al. [2003]. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the ...
Keywords:
price of anarchy, Nash equilibrium, Networks, network design
16
June 2013
EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 3
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2, Downloads (12 Months): 27, Downloads (Overall): 177
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We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents arrive sequentially and each in turn chooses one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of an agent to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal disclosure ...
Keywords:
multi-arm bandit, game theory
17
June 2013
EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Publisher: ACM
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0, Downloads (12 Months): 13, Downloads (Overall): 167
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We introduce and study the algorithmic problem of maximizing revenue in a network using differential pricing, where the prices offered to neighboring vertices cannot be substantially different. Our most surprising result is that the optimal pricing can be computed efficiently, even for arbitrary revenue functions. In contrast, we show that ...
Keywords:
social networks, algorithmic game theory, pricing
18
May 2013
AAMAS '13: Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 0
Downloads (6 Weeks): 0, Downloads (12 Months): 3, Downloads (Overall): 38
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We study the empirical behavior of trading agents participating in the Ad-Auction game of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC-AA). Aiming to understand the applicability of optimal trading strategies in synthesized environments to real-life settings, we investigate the robustness of the agents to deviations from the game's specified environment. Our results ...
Keywords:
agents, robustness, learning
19
December 2012
SODA '13: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Bibliometrics:
Citation Count: 5
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 29, Downloads (Overall): 53
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We show a regret minimization algorithm for setting the reserve price in second-price auctions. We make the assumption that all bidders draw their bids from the same unknown and arbitrary distribution. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and achieves a regret of O (√ T ), even when the number of ...
20
December 2012
WINE'12: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Walrasian equilibrium is one of the basic notions in economic theory. Items are priced in such a way that the market clears i.e. the supply for each item equals the demand for it (or there may be items with excess supply priced at zero.) When there is a Walrasian equilibrium, ...
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